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This dissertation examines three distinct big data analytics problems related to the social aspects 
of consumers’ choices. The main goal of this line of research is to help two sided platform firms 
to target their marketing policies given the great heterogeneity among their customers. In three 
essays, I combined structural modeling and machine learning approaches to first understand 
customers’ responses to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, using unique data sets I scraped from the 
web, and then explore methods to optimize two sided platforms’ firms’ reactions accordingly.  
The first essay examines “social learning” in the mobile app store context, controlling for 
intrinsic value of hedonic and utilitarian mobile apps, price, advertising, and number of options 
available. The proposed model extracted a social influence proxy measure from a macro 
diffusion model using an unscented Kalman filter, and it incorporated this social influence 
measure in a mixed logit choice model with hierarchical Dirichlet Process prior. Results suggest 
 vii 
significant effects of social influence, which underscores the importance of choosing different 
marketing policies for pervasive goods. The comparison of mobile app adoption parameters 
suggests that among several classical goods mobile app adoption pattern is very similar to that of 
music CDs. The simulation counterfactual analysis suggests that early targeted viral marketing 
policy might be an optimal strategy for the app-store platforms.  
The second essay investigates bidders’ anticipated winner and loser regret in the context of the 
eBay online auction platform. I developed a structural model that accounts for bidders’ learning 
and their anticipation of winner and loser regrets in an auction platform. Winner and loser regrets 
are defined as regretting for paying too much in case of winning an auction and regretting for not 
bidding high enough in case of losing it, respectively. Using a large data set from eBay and 
empirical Bayesian estimation method, I quantify the bidders’ anticipation of regret in various 
product categories, and investigate the role of experience in explaining the bidders’ regret and 
learning behaviors. The counterfactual analyses showed that shutting down the bidder regret via 
appropriate notification policies can increase eBay’s revenue by 24%. 
The third essay investigates the effects of Gamification incentive mechanisms in an online 
platform for user generated content. I use an ensemble method over LDA, mixed normal and k-
mean clustering methods to segment users into competitors, collaborators, achievers, explorers 
and uninterested users. Then, I develop a state-dependent choice model that accommodates the 
effect of number of badges, the rank in the leaderboard, reputation points, inertia, and 
reciprocity, and allow for heterogeneity by Dirichlet Process prior. The results suggested that 
estimating the model on small samples generate biased estimates. Furthermore, they suggest that 
the effects of Gamification elements are heterogeneous, significantly positive or negative for 
 viii 
different users. I found sensitivity patterns that explain importance of certain Gamification 
elements for users with certain nationalities. These findings help the Gamification platform to 
target its users. The simulation counterfactual analysis suggests that a two sided platform can 
increase the number of user contributions, by making earning badges more difficult. 
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1.1. ABSTRACT 
 
I developed a structural model that combines a macro diffusion model with a micro choice model 
to control for social influence on the mobile app choices of customers over app-stores. Social 
influence is measured by the density of adopters within the proximity of the customers. Using a 
large data set from an African app-store and Bayesian estimation methods, I quantify the effect 
of social influence on customer choices over the app-store, and investigate the effect of ignoring 
this process in estimating customer choices. I find that customer choices on the app-store are 
explained better by off-line density rather than online density of adopters, and ignoring social 
influence in estimation results in biased estimates. Furthermore, my results showed that the 
mobile app-adoption process is very similar to adoption of music CDs, among all other classical 
goods. My counterfactual analysis showed that the app-store can increase its revenue by 13.6% 
through the viral marketing policy (e.g., sharing with friends and family button).  
Keywords: mobile app-store, social learning, state space model, structural model, semi 
parametric Bayesian, MCEM, unscented Kalman filter, hierarchical mixture model, genetic 
optimization. 
 
1.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Smartphones pervade the global telecommunication market to such an extent that, for example, 
in the US a consumer has the option to adopt a smartphone handset on a postpaid contract, no 
matter which mobile operator (e.g., T-Mobile, Verizon, AT&T, or Sprint) the consumer selects. 
The smartphone handsets and the mobile apps are complements. A mobile app-store (e.g., 
Google play, Apple and Microsoft’s app stores) acts as a two sided platform that matches 
3 
 
consumers to the mobile app publishers/developers. The mobile app platform revenue comes 
from two sources: selling the paid apps, or advertising on the freemium apps. As a result, for the 
app-store platform, the consumers’ adoption of the mobile apps represents a critical problem. 
The app-store platform has a lot of information about the consumers’ download behavior, 
enabling it to customize its marketing actions to target different consumers’ based on their 
different behaviors. For example a mobile app platform should decide between the free trial and 
the viral referral strategies. A viral referral strategy can be useful if consumers’ preferences are 
interrelated, because of the psychological benefits of social identifications/learning/inclusion or 
the utilitarian benefits of the network externalities. However, a trial strategy is useful if 
consumers’ have a learning cost or an uncertainty about the mobile apps. 
It is not uncommon for customers to have interrelated preference for mobile apps. Online forums 
are filled with questions about requests for mobile app recommendation, 1 and, in fact, app-stores 
try to inform users about the popularity of mobile apps. The interdependence of mobile app 
choices is not only relevant for online world, but also for offline world. It is hard for customers 
to know what mobile app they want, so they find new mobile apps from family friends and 
colleagues. App-stores have tried to facilitate this process by creating “Tell a Friend” and “Share 
This Application”2. Therefore, an app-store platform needs a framework to quantify not only the 
effect of mobile app characteristics, but also the effect of online and offline social influence on 
customer choices to design policies to affect mobile app choices of its customers. 
                                                 
1
 "Mobile Applications Forum." CNET. Accessed April 02, 2016. http://www.cnet.com/forums/mobile-apps/. 
2
 WonderHowTo. "How to Share Your Favorite Mobile Apps with Your Friends." Business Insider. June 16, 2011. 
Accessed April 02, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-share-your-favorite-mobile-apps-with-your-
friends-2011-6 
4 
 
Given this context, I asked the following questions: (1) How can I design a targeting approach 
for an app-store platform? (2) How does the social learning process of the mobile apps’ 
customers differ from that of the classical economy products, such as a color TV? (3) How can 
an app-store platform capture the heterogeneity of its customers and the variation in the mobile 
apps to customize its marketing actions? (4) What are the key elements of the consumers’ utility 
of adopting a mobile app that allows an app-store platform to group and target its potential 
customers? 
To answer these questions, I combined a macro social learning diffusion model with a micro 
choice model. I used a choice model to study the adoption behavior of the consumers. To control 
for social influence, I applied a filtering technique (i.e., Unscented Kalman Filter) on another 
aggregated data set to create a time varying measure of social influence. Also, to control for 
mobile app characteristics, price, and advertising, I used a factor model. I ran the filtering 
technique on two aggregate adoption data sets for approximately two hundred days. These data 
sets include, on the one hand, the cumulative number of adopters within a local city in Africa, 
and on the other hand, the cumulative number of adopters across all thirty cities in which the 
platform under the current study globally operates. I refer to these two data sets as the aggregate 
data sets from now on. I ran the choice model and the factor model on a data set of a sample of 
choices of one hundred forty seven consumers over twenty weeks. I refer to this sample as micro 
sample. 
I used a social learning diffusion model of Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) to model the 
simultaneous diffusion of the mobile apps on the app store. Such a modeling approach presents 
two challenges. The first concerns mobile app consumers’ choice sparse data, because the 
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download of a mobile app is a rare event. To address this challenge, I aggregated the data at an 
app-category level. The second challenge involves dealing with the possible measurement error. 
For this purpose, I cast the Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) model into a discrete time state space 
model. The use of Gaussian Process to filter the measurement error is quite common in online 
mission critical systems such as robotics as well. In this case, I had to filter two double-degree 
polynomial differential equations of each mobile app category’s diffusion. I used an Unscented 
Klaman Filter (UKF), an approach introduced to Machine Learning and Robotics to estimate the 
non-linear diffusion equation up to third order precision (Julier and Uhlman 1997; Wan and van 
der Merve 2001). This approach is an alternative to Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) which 
estimates the non-linear diffusion equation only up to first order precision.  
I further used a hierarchical prior with a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to use the 
shared information in the simultaneous diffusion of the mobile app categories, and to avoid the 
over fitting of the model with three hundred macro parameters. To estimate the macro diffusion 
model in the short planning time horizon of an app-store platform, I used a Monte Carlo 
Expectation Maximization (MCEM) approach to optimize the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) of 
the parameters, in contrast to a possibly slow convergence Bayesian sampling algorithms, such 
as Gibbs and Metropolis Hastings. To deal with the problem of the stochastic surface search of 
the MCEM approach, I used a genetic optimization algorithm, with an initial population that is a 
perturbed version of the estimates found in Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) study.  
Next, I used the outcome of the macro diffusion model as a measure for social influence in the 
structural choice model to extract factors of customers’ mobile app choices. The choice of a 
mobile app adoption is very sparse over time. In other words, I expected to observe several zeros 
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in the data. To deal with such sparsity and to filter the possible noise of the data, I aggregated the 
data on the characteristics of the mobile app categories, and the cumulative number of imitators 
at a weekly level. Further, to not discard the multi-collinear data on the mobile app-
characteristics, I used a factor model to recover the underlying factors of the mobile apps 
profiles. To name these factors, I merge the factor loading profiles and practitioners’ knowledge 
of customers’ mobile app choices.  
Given the mobile app-category latent factors, the density of the imitators, and the download 
history of the app-store platforms, I used a mixture normal multinomial logit model to represent 
each consumer’s choice of mobile app-adoption. I estimated this model by MCMC sampler. The 
hierarchical modeling and the weighting scheme I used make the approach appropriate for the 
big data, because the mixture normal prior allows for flexible structure that yet may not over fit. 
This modeling approach is appropriate for the context of online retailers, in which the 
distribution of choices follows long tail distribution (Anderson 2006).  
I estimated this model over a data set of a newly launched app-store in Africa during May 2013 
and a supplementary dataset of network location of the mobile app-store users scraped from web. 
The sample consists of mobile app choices of approximately 20,000 customers that reside in 30 
cities that the app store is available, among which approximately 1,000 resides in a city in 
Africa. Mobile apps belong to various categories among which I selected 10 categories 
(presented in table 1.3) that were less sparse. The estimation results show that, social influence 
significantly affects customer app-adoption choices, and I find that social influence at offline 
world (within the city) explains the customer choices better than social influence at online world 
(within the 30 cities that app-store performs). I also find that not controlling for social influence 
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in mobile app choices of customers results in biased customer preference estimates. Furthermore, 
I find that among many different classical goods, mobile app adoption pattern is very similar to 
music CDs adoption pattern. 
I further used the estimated micro choice model to simulate a counterfactual policy that 
intervenes in social influence to affect consumers’ choices. I find a policy that increases mobile 
app diffusion by 13.6%. This step is a form of prescriptive analytics that I built over the 
descriptive and the predictive analytics steps. Furthermore, I find individual specific preference 
parameters estimated by the choice model, which can help the mobile app-store target its 
customers. 
The current study is mostly related to studies on consumers’ peer effect by Yang and Allenby 
(2003), Stephen and Toubia (2010), Lehmmes and Croux (2006), and Nair et al. (2010). Also, it 
is related to studies on the global macro diffusion by Van den Bult and Joshi (2007), Putsis et al. 
(1997), and Dekimpe et al. (1997). Another relevant research stream includes studies on micro 
diffusion models by Dover et al. (2012), Chaterjee and Eliashberg (1990), and Young (2009). 
The last stream of relevant studies includes studies on the app store platform by Ghose and Han 
(2014), Carare (2012), Garg and Telang (2013), Liu et al. (2012), Ghose et al. (2011), Ghose and 
Han (2011b), Ghose and Han (2011a), and Kim et al. (2008). Although these studies have 
contributed greatly to the understanding of the phenomenon, none has created a pipeline which 
combines the macro diffusion modeling and the micro structural choice modeling approaches to 
allow the app-store platform to target its consumers. The proposed approach allows the app-store 
to target its customers by applying the descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive analytics over a 
high volume, high velocity, high variety, and high veracity big data.  
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Thus, this paper, contributes to the emerging literature on the prescriptive data analytics of the 
mobile app-store platform in three ways. First, it introduces the combination of macro 
simultaneous social learning adoption model and micro structural choice modeling approaches to 
design a method that allows the app-store platforms to target their heterogeneous consumers, 
using their big data. Second, this paper benchmarks the parameters of social learning mobile app 
adoption against those of classical economy goods such as the color-TV, personal computer, 
music CD, and radio-head. Third, this paper shows that social influence at offline (local city 
level) drives mobile app choices of customers on the app-store, and ignoring social learning 
process creates biased estimates. Fourth, this paper shows the power of its proposed model for 
prescriptive analytics over the big data, by finding an optimal viral marketing policy (e.g., share 
with friends and family) for the app-store that can increase its total expected diffusion by 13.6%. 
Last but not least, to estimate the proposed social learning model, this paper employs SUR, UKF, 
MCEM, and genetic algorithm to maximize the MAP estimate of the macro diffusion model. In 
addition, it uses a hierarchical mixture normal prior over its multinomial logit choice model, 
estimating it using MCMC sampling method. These approaches that allow for a flexible 
heterogeneity pattern and for a robust filtering of process and measurement errors, as well as 
computational feasibility of big data analytics, should be of interest to academia and a number of 
commercial entities interested in not only the descriptive and predictive, but also the prescriptive 
analytics of their big data. 
 
1.3.LITERATURE REVIEW 
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This study draws upon several streams investigated, within the literature: (1) the interdependence 
of consumer preference; (2) mobile app store dynamics; and (3) global macro and micro 
diffusion and social learning. Given the breadth of these areas across multiple disciplines, the 
following discussion represents only a brief review of these relevant streams. Table 1.1 presents 
a summary of the position of this study in the literature. 
Table 1.1. Literature Position of this study 
Stream of Study 
Interdependen
ce of consumer 
preference 
App Store 
Global 
micro/macro 
Simultaneous 
Diffusion 
Current study * * * 
Yang and Allenby (2003); Stephen and Toubia (2010); 
Lehmmes and Croux (2006); Bell and Song (2007); Aral 
and Walker (2011);     Nair et al. (2010); Bradlow et al. 
(2005); Hartmann (2010); Yang et al. (2005); Narayan et 
al. (2011); Kurt et al. (2011); Chung and Rao (2012); 
Choi et al. (2010). 
* - - 
Ghose and Han (2014); Carare (2012); Garg and Telang 
(2013); Liu et al. (2012);     Ghose et al. (2011); Ghose 
and Han (2011b); Ghose and Han (2011a); Kim et al. 
(2008).   
- * - 
Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007); Yong (2009); 
Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990); Putsis et al. (1997); 
Dekimpe et al. (2000); Neelamegham and Chintagunta 
(1999);  Talukdar et al. (2002); Gatignon et al. (1989); 
Takada and Jain (1991); Dover et al. (2012). 
- - * 
 
 
 
1.3.1. Interdependence of consumer preference 
 
Quantitative models of consumer purchase behavior often do not recognize that consumers’ 
choices may be driven by the underlying social learning processes within the population. 
Economic models of choice typically assume that an individual’s latent utility is a function of the 
brand and attribute preferences, rather than the preferences of the other customers. However, for 
pervasive experience goods, a new model which accounts for these underlying forces and 
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preferences may better explain consumers’ choices. Many studies have tried to address this issue, 
using cross sectional data to model the consumers’ preference dependency (Yang and Allenby 
2003), online social network seller interaction data to quantify the network value of the 
consumers (Stephen and Toubia 2010), the customer trials data at Netgroceer.com to determine 
the importance of its consumers’ spatial exposure (Bell and Song 2007), and physician’s 
prescription choices and their self-reported information to demonstrate the significant effect of 
network influence on consumers’ choices (Nair et al. 2010). 
Other researchers have also reported on the critical role played by social proximity in shaping 
consumer preferences. Bradlow et al. (2005) builds on the previous literature to suggest that the 
demographic and the psychometric proximity measures are important for consumers’ choice. 
Hartmann (2010) uses customer data to show a correlation between social interactions and the 
equilibrium outcome of an empirical discrete game. Yang et al. (2005) demonstrate the 
interdependence of spouses’ TV viewership to suggest the need for considering choice 
interdependency. Narayan et al. (2011) employ conjoint experience data to highlight the effects 
of peer influences, and finally Choi et al. (2010) draw from an internet retailer’s dataset to 
establish the importance of imitation effects in a geographical and a demographical proximity. 
However, although all studies are significant in suggesting the role of social influence on 
decision making, none has modeled consumers’ mobile apps choices’ interdependence.  
 
1.3.2. Mobile app store dynamics  
 
Recently, a stream of literature has emerged that pertains to the dynamics of mobile app store. 
Some studies have addressed Apple and the Google platforms’ competition (Ghose and Han 
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2014), Google play’s fermium strategy (Liu et al. 2015), and Apple’s app-store’s bestseller rank 
information influence on sales (Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013). Other studies consider the 
relation between the content generation/consumption (Ghose and Han 2011b), the internet usage 
and mobile internet characteristics (Ghose and Han 2011a), users’ browsing behavior on mobile 
phones and personal computers (Ghose et al. 2011), and voice and short message price elasticity 
(Kim et al. 2008).Although these studies are represent attempts to teach us more about the nature 
of the mobile app-market, none has extracted the effect of social dynamics on the consumers’ 
choices in the context of the mobile app-store, at both the macro and micro levels.  
 
1.3.3. Global Macro and Micro Diffusion and Social Learning 
 
Two main streams of literature in product diffusion are relevant to this study: the micro diffusion 
models, and the global diffusion and social learning models. The earliest micro diffusion model 
considers consumers’ Bayesian learning from the signals that follow a Poisson process 
(Chaterjee and Eliashberg 1990). Later studies emphasize the need for micro-diffusion modeling 
(Young 2009), and critically review the aggregation and homogeneity of diffusion models (Peres 
et al. 2010). To remedy the issues, some studies proposed micro network topology approaches 
(Iyengar and Van den Bulte 2011; Dover et al. 2012). Other studies suggest structural modeling 
of consumers’ dynamic-forward looking adoption choices (Song and Chintagunta 2003), and 
systematic conditioning to heterogeneous consumer’s adoption choices (Trusov et al. 2013). 
Peres et al. (2010) presents a review of this literature stream. 
Parallel with the micro diffusion literature, a stream of studies provide solutions for 
heterogeneous social learning process (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007), the mixing (interactions) 
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of adoption process (Putsis et al. 1997), simultaneous diffusion (Dekimpe et al. 1998), supply-
side relationship (e.g., production economies) and omitted variables (e.g., income) correlations 
(Putsis and Srinivasan 2000), and the effect of macro-environmental variables (Talukdar et al. 
2002). 
This study builds on this literature, by proposing a prescriptive machine learning pipeline that 
combines the advantages of both macro and micro modeling approaches. The approach that I 
have proposed recognize that the app-store platform’s data may be a noisy measure of the 
variables of interest. I deal with the sparsity of the choices through a combination of aggregation, 
filtering, hierarchy, and SUR processes. I suggest a data cleaning and modeling approaches that 
may be suitable for the big data variety, velocity, veracity, and volume of the app-store platform. 
To estimate the model, I also suggest a genetic optimization meta-heuristic approach, which 
enables the stochastic surface optimization. 
 
1.4. MODEL 
 
I start the modeling section with the choice of individuals ),...,1( Ii =
 
at the app-store.  I am 
interested to model consumer’s mobile app choices. However, to recognize the long tail 
distribution of mobile app choices (which creates sparsity), I aggregated the choice data at app 
category level. The customer makes a choice of mobile app category j ),...,1,0( Jj =  at a given 
week ),...,1,0( Tt = , where 0=j  denotes the outside good option. The model of consumer app 
choice is different from the prior studies (Carare 2012) in not modeling aggregate purchases, but 
modeling individual specific choices, through a rich set of mobile app category characteristics. 
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The model is similar to nested logit model structure of studies such as Ratchford (1982) and Kok 
and Xu (2011), yet to recognize sparsity of end choices, I aggregated the choices within the nest 
as the choice of the nests. This model may be useful for mobile app-store owners, because they 
concern about the diffusion of mobile apps within the categories rather than the diffusion of each 
instances of mobile app in seclusion.  
I specified the utility of consumers’ choice of app categories on the app store in the following 
form:  
j
itjtijtijti
imm
jtiitiijijt FFFcsu εαααααα ++++++= 3152141131211
)
   (1)
 
where ijα denotes the random coefficient of individual i’s preference for mobile app category j. 
jtF1 , jtF2  and jtF3 denote factors that control for variation in observable mobile app 
characteristics/quality, price, and advertising (the structure of factors are explained later). immjtc)
denotes time varying social influence measure (the structure of the measure is explained later), 
and its denotes history of consumers i’s app downloads until time t, which controls for state 
dependence and app-choice interdependence.  Particularly, if consumer i downloads an app at t-
1, then 11 += −itit ss , otherwise if the consumer selects outside option, then its  remains 
unchanged: i.e., 1−= itit ss . This specification induces a first-order Markov process on the choices. 
Controlling for state dependence and social influence helps to consider the potential correlation 
between customers’ choices across the categories and across the individuals. Table 1.2 presents 
the definition of the variables and the parameters. 
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Assuming the random utility term jitε  has type I extreme value distribution, consumer’s i's 
probability of selecting the app category j at time t is given by a multinomial logit model, based 
on the deterministic portion ijtv of random utility ijtu  as follows: 
                                                 
)exp(1
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=
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j
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                                                              (2)
 
where the mean utility of outside good is set to zero, i.e., 00 =itv . 
Vector of mobile app category characteristic includes average file size of mobile apps (a proxy 
for the app quality), frequency of featuring, average and variance of mobile app prices, the 
number of paid or free apps and their ratio, and the average tenure (time since creation) of all the 
mobile apps within the category.  These variables can act as measures of (proxy for) competition. 
I assumed each of these pieces of the data contains some information that may be important for 
the consumer, but these pieces are highly correlated. Therefore, to get a better insight, I reduced 
the variation in these variables into three factors that preserve 85% of the variation. Formally, I 
used the following factor model process: 
                                                
),0(~, '' ENeebFx kjtjtjtjt +=
                                                (3) 
To model consumer social learning, I used filtered latent time varying density of imitators immjtc
)
.  
This approach is similar to the classical practice of modeling consumer’s response to featured 
and display products, in which the modeler includes an aggregate measure into the choice model 
to measure the consumers’ response. Furthermore, the theoretical interpretation of this modeling 
approach is that as the number of imitators within the population increases, the possibility that an 
individual observes another individual who has already adopted the mobile app increases. As a 
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result, the consumer may become more or less likely to adopt a mobile app within mobile app 
category j. This theory is similar by micro modeling diffusion proposed by Chatterjee and 
Eliashberg (1990), except that the model does not assume that consumer receives information 
with a Poisson process, so the process can be a non-homogeneous Poisson process (inter-arrival 
time is not memory-less anymore). In other word, I endogenize consumers’ information 
receiving process in the choice model. The approach serves as an alternative to the micro-
modeling approach used by Yang and Allenby (2003) to incorporate interdependence of 
awareness and preferences of consumers, but this model is useful when micro spatial structure 
information is not available. My proposed approach may be relevant to the context of pervasive 
goods, because these goods are more visible in daily interactions.  
There are two approaches to capture the density of imitators in the model. The first approach is 
to model it as a latent state variable, and recover it from the choice model. Although fancy, this 
approach may not be the best approach over big data, because it is computationally intractable. 
The alternative approach is to use the aggregate diffusion data to filter the number of imitators. 
This approach combines macro aggregate diffusion modeling with micro choice modeling 
methods, to endognize the number of imitators, an approach that may be more suitable for the 
big data. In this approach, I can use an aggregate diffusion data, to filter the number of imitators 
with two degree polynomial linear model. Then, I can use the filtered data in the choice model, 
to run a nonlinear model on the data set of individual choice of consumers. 
To sum up, I used the whole dataset to filter the density of influential and imitators for the 
mobile app category j within the population at the given time t. I casted the social-learning 
diffusion differential-equations (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007) into a discrete state space model. 
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This model is like a double barrel Bass diffusion model, and allows for heterogeneity in the 
adopters, by segmenting the observed cumulative number of adopters into the latent number of 
imitators and influentials. In contrast to classical log likelihood and non-linear least square 
methods, my filtering approach increases estimation robustness to process and measurement 
noises (Srinivasan 1999; Xie et al. 1997).  
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where jty denotes the observed cumulative number of adopters of mobile apps in the mobile app 
category j at time (day) t. infjtc denotes the latent cumulative number of adopters in influential 
segment for app category j at time (day) t. immjtc denotes the latent cumulative number of adopters 
in imitator segment for app category j at time(day) t. jθ  denotes the size of the segment of 
influential adopters, and it is bound between zero and one. infjp  denotes independent (random) 
rate of adoption of influential adopters, and infjq denotes the dependent (influenced by other 
influential adopters) rate of adoption of influential adopters. immjp  denotes independent (random) 
rate of adoption of imitator adopters, and infjq denotes the dependent (influenced by other 
adopters) rate of adoption of imitator adopters. jw  denotes the degree of influence of influential 
adopters on the adoption of imitators. jtv denotes the noise of observation equation, and 
),( inf immjtjt ee denotes the vector of noises of state equations.  
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In summary the first equation denotes the observation equation and the second two the state 
equations of the state space model. The first equation uses a discrete latent model to integrate 
over the cumulative number of influential and imitator adopters. The second equation captures 
the adoption process of influential adopters segment, and the third captures the adoption process 
of imitator adopters segment. The imitators are different behaviorally from the individuals in 
influential segment, in that they learn not only from themselves, but also from individuals in 
influential segment.  
This model of social influence measure is more suitable for the context of mobile apps, as it 
captures more social learning process (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007) than information cascade 
process (Bass 1969). Furthermore, it allows for heterogeneity in the adoption process, by 
segmenting the adopters into influential and imitator segments. Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) 
find a closed form solution for this model. I considered that the data may have measured with 
noise. As a result, to control for this potential measurement error, I use a state space model 
structure with observation and state noises. 
I recognized that there is shared information in the diffusion of various mobile app categories on 
the app store. As a result, I modeled these differential equations of social learning across mobile 
app categories jointly and simultaneously. This joint modeling captures shared information at 
two levels: covariance and prior. 
To account for the simultaneity, on the covariance level, I modeled the state variance of the 
latent measure of cumulative influential and imitator adopters, and the variance of state equation 
of cumulative influential and imitator adopters through a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model. The SUR model is presented formally in (4) as modeling the joint distribution of the state 
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equations in a multivariate normal model structure, rather than modeling the state equation error 
terms individually.  
To jointly model the diffusions, I used a hierarchical model (prior) with conditionally normal 
distribution constraint on the fixed app-category specific diffusion parameters, which is 
),,,,,,,( infinfinf jjimmjjimmjjimmjjj wMMqqpp θ=Φ . This Bayesian process shrinks the fixed app-
category specific parameters toward the popularity of each mobile app, because it is expected 
that more popular mobile apps have higher rate of imitator adoptions and market size. Formally, 
I defined the following structure: 
),0(~, 2ojjjoj NPop σοο+∆=Φ
                                    (5) 
where jΦ  denotes vector of non-state (fixed) parameters of the diffusion. jPop denotes the 
popularity of mobile app category j. o∆ denotes the hyper parameter of app category specific 
parameter shrinkage, and jο denotes the noise  of the hierarchical model, or the unobserved 
heterogeneity of the mobile app categories.  
I accounted for heterogeneity in the individual choice parameters by modeling the choices’ 
parameters random effects. To consider the possibility of misspecification that may result from 
rigid normal prior, I adopted the flexible semi-parametric approach proposed by Dube et al. 
(2010). This approach assumes a mixture of multivariate normal distributions over the 
parameters’ prior, to allow for thick tail skewed multimodal distribution. I denote the vector of 
fixed consumer-level parameters by ),..,,( 1521 iiii ααα=Α . I accommodated consumer 
heterogeneity by assuming that iΑ  is drawn from a distribution common across consumers, in 
two stages. I employed a mixture of normal as the first stage prior, to specify an informative 
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prior that also does not overfit. The first stage consists of a mixture of  K  multivariate normal 
distribution, and the second stage consists of prior on the parameters of the mixture of normal 
density, formally: 
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where b denotes the hyper-parameter for the priors on the mixing probabilities and the 
parameters governing each mixture component. K denotes the number of mixture components. 
},{ kk Σµ  denotes mean and covariance matrix of the distribution of individual specific parameter 
vector for mixture component k. kpi denotes the size of the thk '  component of mixture model, 
and φ denotes the normal density function distribution. iz  denotes information set about 
customer i, which here only includes only the tenure (the number of days from customer i’s 
registration on the app store). ∆ denotes the parameter of correlation between choice response 
parameter and information set about customer i. 
To obtain a truly non-parametric estimate using the mixture of normal model it is required that 
the number of mixture components K  increase with the sample size. I adopted the approach 
proposed by Rossi (2014), called non-parametric Bayesian approach. This approach is equivalent 
to the approach mentioned above when K  tends to infinity. In this structure, the parameters of 
mixture normal model have Dirichlet Process (DP) prior. Dirichlet process is the generalization 
of Dirichlet distribution for infinite atomic number of partitions. This process represents the 
distribution of a random measure (i.e., probability). Dirichlet process has two parameters, the 
first is the base distribution, which is the prior distribution on the parameters of the multivariate 
iΑ
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Normal-Inverse Wishart (N-IW) conjugate prior distribution for the distribution for the partitions 
that the choice parameters are drawn from, and the second parameter is the concentration 
parameter. Formally, the prior for the individual specific choice parameters has the following 
structure: 
powerd
kkkk
d
kkk
UnifdUnifzzdaaUnifaa
IIWaNG
GDP
))/()(1(~
),(~),,1(~),exp(1~),,(~:),,(
),(~),,0(~|:)(0
)),(0(~),(
1
1
111
111
ααααα
υυυνννυνλ
υννµλ
αλµθ
rsr
srsrsr
−−−
+−+−
××ΣΣΣ
Σ=
−
   (7)
 
where )(0 λG denotes the base distribution or measure (i.e., the distribution of hyper-parameters 
of the prior distribution of the partitions). λ  denotes the random measure, which represents the 
probability distribution of ),,( υνa . ),,( υνa denotes the hyper-parameters of the prior 
distribution of the partitions that the choice parameters belong to, which represent the behavior 
parameters of the latent segments. d  denotes the number of choice parameters per customer (in 
my case d is equal to 15). dα denotes the concentration (also referred to as precision, tightness, 
or innovation) parameter. The idea is that DP is centered over the base measure )(0 λG  with N-
IW with precision parameter dα  (larger value denotes tight distribution). ),,,,,( υυνν srsrsr aa denotes 
the hyper parameters vector for the second level prior on hyper parameters of prior over the 
partitions distribution of the choice parameters. 
Dirichlet Process Mixture (DPM) is referred to the distribution over the probability measure 
defined on some sigma-algebra (collection of subsets) of spaceℵ , such that the distribution for 
any finite partition of  ℵ  is Dirichlet distribution (Rossi 2014). In my case, the probability 
measure over the partitions for mean and variance of random coefficient response parameters of 
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individual choice parameters sigma-algebra has the Normal-Inverse-Wishart conjugate 
probability. For any subset of customers C of ℵ : 
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By De Finetti theorem, integrating (marginalizing) out the random measure G results in the joint 
distribution for the collection of individual specific mean and covariance of random coefficient 
choice parameters as follows: 
dGGpGpp )()|,(),(
....
Σ=Σ ∫ µµ
                                                 (9) 
This joint distribution can be represented as a sequence of conditional distributions that has 
exchangeability property: 
)),(),...,,(|),(())...,(|),(()),(()),(),...,,(( 1.11111221.111 −− ΣΣΣΣΣΣ=ΣΣ nnIIII pppp µµµµµµµµ
 (10) 
The DP process is similar in nature to Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP) and Polya Urn. In the 
CRP, there is a restaurant with infinite number of tables (analogous to partitions of mean and 
variance of the individual choice random coefficients). A customer entering the restaurant selects 
the tables randomly, but he selects the table with probability proportional to the number of 
customers that have sat on the table so far (in which case the customer behaves similar to the 
other customers who are sitting at the selected table). If the customer selects a new table, he will 
behave based on a parameter that he randomly selects from restaurant customer behavior 
parameters (so not necessarily identical to the parameters of the other tables). 
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Table 1.2. Model Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
App Category Daily Download( jty
) 
Cumulative number of consumers who download an app in app category j up 
until a given day t 
App Category Weekly Download 
Latent ( infjtc ) 
Latent cumulative number of consumers from influential segment, who 
download an app in app category j up until a given day t. Consumers from 
influential segment only learn from each other, and not from imitators. 
App Category Weekly Download 
Latent ( immjtc ) 
Latent cumulative numbers of consumers from imitator segment, who download 
an app in app category j up until a given day t. Consumers from imitator segment 
learn both from each other, and adopters in influential segment.  
Segment size ( jθ ) A parameter between zero and one that define the size of the influential segment 
Internal Market Force ( immjj pp ,inf ) The random Poisson rate of adoption of individuals in influential and imitator segment respectively.  
External Market Force ( immjj qq ,inf ) The endogenized imitation rate of adoption of individuals in influential and imitator segment respectively. 
Learning split ( jw ) The degree to which the individuals in imitator segment learn from adopters in 
the influential segment 
Market size  ( immjj MM ,inf ) The market size of individual in influential and imitator segments respectively.  
Category hierarchy parameters 
},{ 22 kk Σµ  
Parameter of locally weighted regression parameters of the hierarchical prior of 
app category diffusion parameters 
Full covariance matrix of state 
equation(W ) 
Full covariance matrix of state equation of macro diffusion model, which may 
suggest complementarity or substitution. 
Variance of observation equation (
jV ) Variance of observation equation of macro diffusion model 
Category data ( jtx ) Category j characteristic data at day t, including Average file size, total number 
of adds featured in the category, average price, variance of price, paid app 
options, free app options, fraction of free to paid apps within the category, 
average tenure of each app category, total app options within the category 
Category Factors( jtF ) Reduced factors explaining the variation in category data 
Factor loading of Category )(b  Factor loading of data item j of category data vector 
Consumer utility from app category (
ijtu ) Consumer i’s utility from selecting an app in app category j at week t 
App category preference ( ijα ) App category specific preference of consumer i 
Individual download history state (
j
its ) 
State of individual i’s download history in a given category j until week t 
1511... ii αα  Utility parameters of consumer i 
ijtp  Probability of selecting an app in category j at time t 
},{, 111 kk Σµpi  Parameter of hierarchical mixture of normal components of individual choice parameters 
 jtjtjt eev ',,  Error terms of observation/state equation and factor model 
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The Polya Urn process has also the same structure. In this process, the experimenter starts by 
drawing balls with different colors from the urn. Any time the experimenter has a ball with a 
given color drawn from the urn, he will add an additional ball with the same color to the urn, and 
he also returns the drawn ball. The distribution of number of customers sitting at each table in 
CRP and number of balls in each color in Polya Urn follow DP. 
An alternative way is the approach proposed by Dube et al. (2010) to fit models with 
successively large numbers of components and to gauge the adequacy of the number of 
components by examining the fitted density associated with the selected number of components. 
However, the process of model selection is tedious in this case.  
Table 1.2 presents the definition of variable and parameters. To sum up, I used the combination 
of macro diffusion model and micro choice model that considers the big data nature of the 
current study: variety, velocity, veracity, and volume. On the variety aspect, I used a flexible 
semi parametric mixture of normal distribution as prior on the individual choice model. For 
velocity, I used a simpler linear state space model on the daily data over the full sample, and I 
aggregated this data at weekly level to use it in the micro individual choice non-linear model.  
For volume aspect of the data, I considered sparsity nature, so I aggregated both macro diffusion 
and micro individual choice data for mobile app instances within the mobile app categories, and I 
used a factor model to summarize the sparse characteristics of the mobile app categories. Finally, 
for veracity, I casted the social diffusion model into a discrete time state space model to add a 
layer of robustness to the potential misspecification and process errors. Figure 1.1 presents the 
box and arrow diagram of the proposed model. 
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 Figure 1.1. Box and Arrow Representation of the Model 
 
1.5.DATA 
 
The data set were collected by an African telecom operator on individual choices of downloading 
mobile apps from the app store platform of its global partner. The app-stores are a type of two 
sided platform, as they match consumers’ and developers/publishers without taking the 
ownership of the mobile apps. The app-store I studied is launched within around 330 days prior 
to the current study in 2013 and 2014. I used the aggregate download data for a period of around 
190 to 259 days as the macro sample, and the data on download choices of a sample of 1,258 
consumers for a period of 124 days as the micro sample.  The macro sample therefore includes 
between 1,900 to 2,590 observations, which might not be considered big, but the small sample 
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includes approximately 160,000 observations, which might be considered big for non-linear 
models. 
A big data set such as ours creates a trade-off in estimation. On one side, I had a big data that can 
give insight in a short planning horizon, given that I used a linear model. On the other hand, I 
had computationally intensive methods that can give insights with prescriptive power, given that 
the data is not big. I wanted to have a method that gives us the advantage of both big data and a 
computationally intensive method. As a result, I used a second degree polynomial macro-model 
of social learning diffusion over the macro sample and the non-linear computationally intensive 
micro choice model over the micro sample. 
To deal with the sparsity of the data, which is driven by the long tail distribution of the mobile 
apps’ adoptions, and to reduce the daily noise in the data, I aggregated the data of the micro 
sample at weekly level before I fed it to the choice model. Second, I aggregated the macro app 
adoption, and micro app download choice data at app category level to limit the study to the 
topic of interest for the app-store platform, as well as to handling the data volume. In addition, I 
used a flexible Bayesian prior to shrink the individual specific choice parameters. I investigated 
two sources of consumer preference interdependence: local and global. For the local 
interdependence, I filtered the macro sample data to individual adopters who live in a city under 
the current study. To do this filtering, I used a data set of mapping IP addresses to cities that I 
collected by crawling World Wide Web. For the global interdependence, I did not use this 
filtering, so I used the aggregate information about the mobile app adoptions within all thirty 
cities from all five continents. 
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Table 1.3. Categories Basic Statistics 
Index Category Total Downloads 
within local city 
1 Dating 27 
2 eBook 414 
3 Education & Learning 24 
4 Health/Diet/Fitness 42 
5 Internet & WAP 52 
6 Movie/Trailer 597 
7 POI/Guides 22 
8 Reference/Dictionaries 55 
9 TV/Shows 135 
10 Video & TV 105 
 
In a nutshell, the data consists of around 20,000 consumers, with around 3,000 consumers in a 
local African city under the current study.  This local city has around 4,000 app downloads for 
the duration of the current study. Twenty thousand global and three thousand local consumers’ 
who make choices for a course of six month classifies the current data as a big one, for its 
variety, velocity, veracity, and volume. Table 1.3 illustrates the list of the categories that I 
selected and their corresponding total downloads within the local city under this study. Each of 
the 1,258 customers under the study adopts only one of the mobile apps during the course of 
study, so on all other days she selects outside option. This observation may suggest that a mixed 
logit choice model might be a suitable model, only if that an inter-temporal dependencies 
between the choices are controlled. 
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Figure 1.2. Intercontinental (across 30 cities) Diffusion Curves for the mobile apps within the 
Categories 
 
The dataset also included longitude and latitude of each IP address. However, as mobile phones 
are usually attached to the customers who might move within the city, aggregating locations at 
city level might be relevant.  Moreover, this assumption is innocuous, because of the social 
nature of mobile phones and mobile apps (i.e., usage of mobile and mobile phones in social 
atmosphere). Particularly, mobile phones have become inseparable part of societies, to the point 
that not only customers use them when they are alone in the bus, when they are to sleep, or even 
when they are in the class, but also they use them in their parties, in their offices, in their leisure 
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times, and generally in any social events. Mobile phones use in social events makes mobile apps 
visible, and this visibility can create social learning opportunities. In the figure 1.2, I plotted the 
diffusion curves of the cumulative adoptions of a sample of six mobile app categories.    
For each mobile app category, I had the average file size, the total number of apps featured, the 
average and the variance of app prices, and the number of paid and free options. Table 1.4 
presents the basic statistics of these variables. To explain the heterogeneity in individual 
responses, I used the data on the tenure of each customer. I defined tenure as the number of days 
since each customer has subscribed to the app-store. As different types of consumers (i.e., 
influential and imitators) with different psychological traits adopt the technology at different 
points in time (Kirton 1976), I used the tenure of consumers as a proxy for the psychological 
traits that can explain the heterogeneity in consumers’ choice responses.  
Table 1.4. Mobile app categories basic statistics 
Category Data Summary Mean Variance Min Max 
Number of available apps in the Category 35 1250 12 141 
Average tenure of apps in the category (Days) 316 6,386 169 498 
Number of available free apps in the category 32 908 7 120 
Average days that an app is featured in the category 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.71 
Average file size of apps in the category (MB) 2.00 4.00 0.50 8.00 
Variance of prices of apps in the category 0.51 1.09 0.00 3.75 
 
To explain heterogeneity in app store categories, I used the popularity of the mobile app 
categories on the Apple app store. As the Apple app store is the founder and the leader of the 
app-store platforms and its consumers are more affluent ones (possibly more influential ones), 3 I 
expect that the popularity of the mobile app categories on the Apple app store to explain the 
diffusion of the mobile app categories on the other app store platforms as well. Therefore, I used 
                                                 
3
 "App Store (iOS)." Wikipedia. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/App_Store_(iOS). 
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the mobile app categories’ popularity on the Apple app store to explain the heterogeneity in the 
mobile app category parameters. These popularity statistics is presented in figure 1.3.  This 
figure shows the long tail distribution of the popularity of the mobile apps. 
 
Figure 1.3. Popularity (market share) of App Categories on Apple Inc. App Store 
 
Figure 1.4, from Distimo, a mobile app market research company, suggests that some mobile app 
categories are more susceptible to be paid, and others are more susceptible to be free. The high 
share of free mobile apps is an important observation in this figure. The same feature exists in 
the data sets I used in this study. This feature suggests that the key cost factor that the consumers 
incur might be the cost of learning about the application, supposedly from others (e.g., their 
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friends, or over internet). This observation suggests that social influence might be an important 
factor for adoption decision, but a formal model is required to confirm this conjecture. 
 
Figure 1.4. Free mobile apps versus paid mobile apps 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that from mental accounting perspective consumers perceive the 
paid mobile apps as investment, for which they are willing to pay money, and the free mobile 
apps, as entertainment, 4 for which the customer might be less inclined to pay. Guided by the 
same intuition, I also classified mobile app categories in the sample into two categories: 
utilitarian and hedonic categories. The utilitarian category includes: device tools, 
health/diet/fitness, internet/WAP, and reference/dictionary mobile apps. These types of mobile 
apps might be prominent for their utility rather than their entertainment. The hedonic category 
includes: ebook, games, humor/jokes, logic/puzzle, and social networks mobile apps. These 
                                                 
4
 Chang, Ryan. "How to Price Your App: Free or Paid - Envato Tuts Code Article." Code Envato Tuts. February 19, 
2014. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://code.tutsplus.com/articles/how-to-price-your-app-free-or-paid--mobile-
22105. 
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types of mobile apps might be more relevant for their entertainment features. This categorization 
might allow to further investigate whether customers really value the utilitarian mobile app 
categories more than the hedonic mobile app categories, based on the customer choice 
parameters.  
Finally, the mobile apps are more similar to durable goods than to non-durables. Therefore, the 
consumers’ choice of downloading a mobile app may be sparse in nature. Sparsity here means 
that several choices of the consumers are no download or outside option choices.  A suitable 
modeling approach that can handle this sparsity might be hierarchical Bayesian approach, which 
borrows information from other sample items, when the information on an individual is sparse.  
 
1.6. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
 
In order to identify the choice model, I used a random coefficient logit specification, which has a 
fixed diagonal scale. To set the location of the utility, I normalized the utility of outside option to 
zero. To minimize the concerns about endogeneity (omitted variable), I control for potential 
correlations between choices by explicitly modeling the inter-temporal choice interdependence in 
the choice history state variable. I also control for potential confounding effects of price, 
advertising, and product characteristics by including the latent factors of variation in these 
variables in the choice model. To control for potential measurement error in the social influence 
measure, I use Kalman Filter, and I control for potential simultaneity in the social measures 
through Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model structure. In addition, by random 
coefficient structure, the modeling approach also minimizes the concern for Independence from 
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Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), as it allows for heterogeneity in the individual specific choice 
behavior parameters.  
I identified individual level choice parameters using the micro sample panel of individuals, a 
sample that consists of twenty week micro choices of a 1,258 customers. Bayesian shrinkage 
with flexible DP prior helps to identify the large set of individual specific parameters, without 
over-fitting. The mixture normal distribution is subject to label switching problem (i.e., the 
permutation of segment assignment returns the same likelihood). However, I immunized myself 
to this problem by limiting my inference to the joint distribution rather than individual segment 
assignment. To estimate the micro choice model on the micro sample, I used multinomial logit 
with DP prior on the individual specific hyper-parameter (Bayesian semi-parametric) estimation 
code from Bayesm package in R. This method uses Metropolis-Hasting Random-Walk (MH-
RW) method to estimate conditional choice probabilities on cross-sectional units (i.e., 
customers). The limitation of MH-RW is that random walk increments shall be tuned to conform 
as closely as possible to the curvature in the individual specific conditional posterior, formally 
defined by: 
),,,|()|(),,,,|( ∆Σ∝∆Σ iiiiiii zApAypzyAp µµ
                            
 (11) 
Without prior information on highly probable values of first stage prior (i.e., .)|( iAp ), tuning 
the Metropolis chains given limited information of cross-sections (i.e., each customer) by trial is 
difficult (this problem exacerbates when each customer does not have some of the choice items 
selected at all in his history). Therefore, to avoid singular hessian, the fractional likelihood 
approach proposed by Rossi et al. (2005) is implemented in the used approach. Formally rather 
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than using individual specific likelihood, MH-RW approach forms a fractional combination of 
the unit-level likelihood and the pooled likelihood as follows: 
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where w denotes the small tuning parameter to control the effect of pooled likelihood
∏
=
I
i iii
yAl
1
)|( . β denotes a parameter chosen to properly scale the pooled likelihood to the 
same order as the unit likelihood. in  denotes the number of observations for customer i . Using 
this approach, the MH-RW generates samples conditional on the partition membership indicator 
for individual i  from proposal density ),0( 2ΩsN , so that: 
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where iAˆ denotes the maximum of the modified likelihood )(* ii Al , and AV  denotes normal 
covariance matrix assigned to the partition (i.e., segment) that customer i  belongs to. 
This approach considers that 
.iA is sufficient to model the random coefficient distribution. To 
estimate the infinite mixture of normal prior for choice parameters, a standard data augmentation 
with the indicator of the normal component is required. Conditional on this indicator, I can 
identify a normal prior for each customer i  parameters. The distribution for this indicator is 
Multinomial, which is conjugate to Dirichlet distribution, formally: 
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As a result posterior can be defined by: 
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where )( ij zδ denotes indicators for whether or not jz i = . This result is relevant for DP as any 
finite subset of customers’ choice-behavior parameters’ partitions has Dirichlet distribution, and 
finite sample can only represent finite number of partitions. Exchangeability property of 
partitions allows the used estimation approach to sequentially draw customer parameters given 
the indicator value as follows:  
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The next portion of this approach’s specification is the definition of the size of the finite clusters 
over the finite sample that is controlled by pi . Rossi (2014) suggests augmenting Sethuraman’s 
stick breaking notion for draws of pi . In this notion, a unit level stick is iteratively broken from 
the tail with proportion to the draws with beta distribution with parameter one and dα , and the 
length of the broken portion defines the thk '  element of the probability measure vector pi (a 
form of multiplicative process), formally: 
),1(~),1(1
1∏ −= −= ki dkikk Beta αβββpi
                                     (17) 
In this notion, dα determines the probability distribution of the number of unique values for the 
DP mixture model, formally by: 
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where *I denotes the number of unique values of ),( Σµ in a sequence of i  draws from the DP 
prior. )(kiS denotes Sterling number of first kind, and γ denotes Euler’s constant. Furthermore, to 
facilitate assessment, this approach suggests the following distribution for dα , rather than 
Gamma distribution: 
φ
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whereαr and αs can be assessed by inspecting the mode of dI α|* . φ denotes the tunable power 
parameter to spread prior mass appropriately. An alternative to Gibbs sampler employed by this 
approach might be collapsed Gibbs sampler that integrates out the indicator variable for partition 
(segment) membership of each customer, but Rossi (2014) argues that such an approach does not 
improve the estimation procedure. Appendix 1.C presents the series of conditional distribution 
that this approach employs in its Gibbs sampling to recover individual specific choice 
parameters. 
I identified the latent cumulative number of influential and imitators of mobile app categories 
with observed cumulative number of adopters in the complete dataset. Also to avoid over fitting, 
I used a normal prior on the fixed social learning macro diffusion model to regularize the 
likelihood of the model. Although the local and global aggregate data sets only have two 
thousands observations, Bayesian shrinkage of parameters allows identification of parameters. 
To estimate the latent cumulative number of influential and imitators, I used the maximum a 
posteriori (MAP) method, a popular method in machine learning, as an alternative method to 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling methods. This approach uses an optimization 
method to maximize the a posteriori of the model parameters. I used genetic algorithm for the 
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optimization, as the number of parameters that I estimated for the social learning diffusion model 
is around 300: 210 covariance elements of state covariance matrix, 10 elements of observation 
covariance matrix, and 80 elements of fixed parameters of the diffusion differential equations. 
Gradient descend optimization method has complexity of )(PO per iteration, but requires tuning 
learning parameter, and the quasi newton optimization method has the complexity of )( 2PO per 
iteration, where P is the number of parameters to estimate.  This complexity translates to long 
run time over big data, in which the number of parameters increases with the variety, and volume 
of the data. As a result, I adopted the genetic algorithm approach that Venkatesan et al. (2004) 
finds comparable to the classical gradient descend or the Quasi Newton approach. In addition, 
genetic algorithm is known as global optimization method, in contrast to local optimization of 
Quasi Newton method. Given that a latent state space model like mixture models has multiple 
local maxima, genetic algorithm might be more prone to find the global maxima than a Quasi 
Newton method. 
In order to estimate the macro social learning diffusion model, I used Unscented Kalman Filter 
(UKF) nested within a Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization (MCEM) method. Unscented 
Kalman Filter (UKF) is an approach proposed in robotics literature (Wan and Merwe 2001, 
Julier and Uhlmann 1997), which achieves third order accuracy in estimating the latent state in a 
state space model, as opposed to the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) that only achieves the first 
order accuracy, with the same order of computational complexity, i.e., )(TO . The basic idea 
behind UKF is that rather than using the closed form first order tailor expansion term, for the 
measurement updating of the latent state, by computing Jacobean vector, it uses an Unscented 
Transformation (UT) to transform sigma vector of points around the mean, and the mean of the 
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latent state prior of a nonlinear state equation, to estimate the transformed normal distribution 
posterior parameters. I explained UKF algorithm in appendix 1.B.  
The MCEM approach starts with an initial vector of parameters. Then it uses MCMC, UKF in 
this case, to recover the latent state distribution, and a set of samples. Given the latent state 
samples, it computes the expected log likelihood, and it searches for the parameters that 
maximize this expected log likelihood (de Valpine 2012). MCEM is appealing for its speed, 
compared with the full MCMC sampling method. However, MCMC approach is notorious for 
slow convergence, and both approaches may suffer from finding only the local maxima. The 
exercise of global optimization genetic algorithm stochastic search may be a remedy to this 
stochastic surface search problem. In the optimization, I used transformation to make sure that 
the market sizes of the social learning diffusion model are positive, and parameters of effect of 
learning from imitator and influential in the imitator state equation ( w), and the segment size of 
influential and imitators (θ ) are between zero and one.  I used just in time compiler in R to 
speed up the estimation process. 
In summary, I used MCEM, UKF, MAP, GA, and SUR methods to estimate the social learning 
model on the aggregate sample data, which consists of the aggregate number of adoption of 
twenty thousand adopters of mobile apps in ten mobile app categories for two hundred days, and 
I used MCMC sampling to estimate the mixture normal multinomial logit model of the micro 
mobile app choices of a hundred forty seven customers in ten app categories over twenty weeks. 
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1.7. RESULTS 
 
Table1.5. presents the log-likelihood of the proposed models. Model 1 and 2 represent social 
learning aggregate diffusion models over local adoption (only adopters within one city) and 
global adoption (total number of adopters across 30 cities). Local social learning model 
dominates global social learning model by the likelihood. This result might suggest that mobile 
app adoption process is more locally rather than global coordinated. Model 3 and 4 use the 
filtered number of imitators as a measure for social influence, and model 5 and 6 use the 
observed number of adopters as a measure for social influence. Domination of model 5 and 6 
over model 3 and 4 by log likelihood might suggest that not only number of imitators but other 
social factors might be the driving factor for mobile app adoptions. This other factor might 
include the social force of differentiators (in fact the result of micro analysis reconfirms the 
existence of such potential). The dominance of model 5 and 6 over model 7 (the model with no 
social learning) suggests that in fact social learning is an important force that drives individual 
mobile app adoption choices (the bias in the parameter estimates when social learning is ignored 
is discussed later).  
Table 1.5. MODEL COMPARISON 
Model Description Number of obs. Log Lik. 
1 Local Adoption (aggregate sample) 2,000 -20,724.16 
2 Global Adoption (aggregate sample) 2,000 -21,649.32 
3 Choice Explained by Local Imitators Signals (micro sample) 22,644 -25,921.92 
4 Choice Explained by Global Imitators Signals (micro sample) 22,644 -38,310.49 
5 Choice Explained by Local Adopters Signals (micro sample)* 22,644 -12,252.85 
6 Choice Explained by Global Adopters Signals (micro sample) 22,644 -15,275.20 
7 Choice with No social influence measure (micro sample) 22,644 -15,977.04 
* dominant model 
Finally, dominance of model 5 over model 6 reconfirms the result from aggregate model that 
social learning at local level (within the city) rather than global level (for example over the world 
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wide web) drives the adoption choices of the customers. This finding for mobile apps (as a form 
of pervasive good) contrasts with findings about the adoption of traditional goods that emphasize 
the importance of learning over World Wide Web (Putsis et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 1.5. 1-Step-ahead Forecast for Local 
Diffusion (Green Line: a step ahead; Red line: the 
actual) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. 1-Step-ahead Forecast for Global 
Diffusion level (Green line: a step ahead, Red line: 
the actual) 
Table 1.6. Performance of the Proposed Model for local and international category adoption 
Description MAD MSE 
Local Category Adoption  0.64 1.48 
International Category Adoption  0.03 0.12 
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Figure 1.5 and 1.6 present a step ahead forecast versus the observed cumulative number of 
adopters at both the local and the global level. This visualization together with the Mean 
Absolute Deviation (MAD) and the Mean Square Error (MSE) presented in table 1.6, suggest 
that social learning macro diffusion model fits the app-store platforms’ macro app diffusion data 
reasonably well.  
I benchmarked the estimates with Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) paper, and relative to the 
market size the MSE is in reasonably good range. 
Table 1.7. Factor Loading Matrix (Varimax rotation) 
Loadings/Components C1 C2 C3 
Average File size (a proxy for app quality) 0.77 -0.07 -0.09 
Dummy variable of Is Featured 0.82 0.3 0.01 
Average Price -0.06 0.94 -0.28 
Variance of Price -0.05 0.94 -0.19 
Number of Paid app Options 0.97 -0.09 -0.09 
Number of Free app Options 0.96 -0.15 -0.03 
Fraction of Free apps to Paid Apps -0.09 -0.25 0.87 
Average Tenure (time from creation) -0.08 0.67 0.48 
Total number of app Options 0.96 -0.14 -0.03 
 
Table 1.7 presents the result of the factor analysis to extract the latent factor of mobile app 
characteristics. I used Varimax rotation to be able to interpret the factors. I named the factors 
both from supply side and the demand side in table 1.8.  
Table 1.8. Factor Names 
 
 
 
 
Factor Supply side Name Demand Side Name 
C1 Red Ocean app categories Popular Apps 
C2 Paid app categories Investment Apps 
C3 Free app categories Freemiums 
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I limited the factor/principle components to three, as it captures already 0.85% of the variation in 
the data. Number of paid mobile apps and free mobile apps load highly into the first factor, so I 
expected that there is high demand for these mobile apps that has brought app 
developer/publishers to develop many mobile apps. Further, Ghose and Hann (2014) use the 
average file size of a mobile app as a proxy for the quality of the mobile apps, and this mobile 
app category feature also loads highly into the first factor, so I may be able to call the first factor 
as popular mobile apps. The average and variance of the prices load highly into the second 
factor. I called the second factor investment mobile apps, guided by discussion about figure 1.4 
(in the data section), and I refer to the third factor by Freemiums, because the fraction of free 
mobile apps is much higher than paid mobile apps.  
Table 1.9. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Global Adoption 
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Mobile App Categories:
 
        
   Device Tools 0.024 0.000 0.278* 0.192* 50* 580* 0.010* 0.039* 
   eBooks 0.024 0.000 0.274* 0.189* 260* 4540* 0.007* 0.044* 
   Games 0.026 0.000 0.293* 0.202* 80* 1150* 0.009* 0.046* 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 0.025 0.000 0.288* 0.199* 100* 1600* 0.008* 0.048* 
   Humor/Jokes 0.026 0.000 0.297* 0.205* 100* 1410* 0.008* 0.043* 
   Internet/WAP 0.026 0.000 0.296* 0.204* 100* 1580* 0.010* 0.039* 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 0.024 0.000 0.275* 0.190* 90* 1440* 0.009* 0.039* 
   Reference/Dictionaries 0.026 0.000 0.296* 0.204* 90* 1440* 0.007* 0.048* 
   Social Networks 0.026 0.000 0.297* 0.205* 40* 390* 0.008* 0.044* 
   University 0.025 0.000 0.281* 0.193* 130* 2080* 0.009* 0.046* 
       * 05.0≤p  
 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 present the parameter estimates of the social learning diffusion models 
studies over global (across the cities within the app store) and local (within the city of interest). 
Over both local and global diffusion data, the independent random adoption rate for individuals 
in influential segment is not significant statistically across different mobile app categories, 
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except for eBooks (which might be driven by its assortment size). However, this rate is 
significantly higher than dependent adoption rate for this segment, which might suggest that the 
model is properly identifying the behavior of the segment of influentials. For influential segment, 
the rate of independent adoption is very close to the same rate for Everclear music CD that Van 
den Bulte and Joshi (2007) find. However, for this segment, the dependent rate of adoption is 
similar to the same rate for foreign language CD adoption in the mentioned study. This result 
might be driven by the low search cost of influential segment on the app-store, which in turn 
drives their learning less from others.  
Table 1.10. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Local Adoption 
Mobile App Categories:
 
infp
 
infq
 
immp
 
immq
 
infM
 
immM
 
w
 
θ
 
   Device Tools 0.025 0.000 0.282* 0.194* 5* 80* 0.100* 0.046* 
   eBooks 0.024* 0.000 0.278* 0.191* 103* 1952* 0.032* 0.044* 
   Games 0.024 0.000 0.275* 0.189* 3* 56* 0.246* 0.038* 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 0.025 0.000 0.282* 0.194* 7* 120* 0.782* 0.038* 
   Humor/Jokes 0.026 0.000 0.299* 0.206* 6* 99* 0.506* 0.041* 
   Internet/WAP 0.025 0.000 0.285* 0.197* 11* 200* 0.738* 0.041* 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 0.025 0.000 0.282* 0.194* 6* 113* 0.344* 0.043* 
   Reference/Dictionaries 0.026 0.000 0.299* 0.206* 12* 225* 0.940* 0.042* 
   Social Networks 0.025 0.000 0.281* 0.193* 3* 48* 0.658* 0.040* 
   University 0.025 0.000 0.281* 0.194* 6* 113* 0.555* 0.042* 
       * 05.0≤p  
For imitator segment, in almost all the categories rate of independent adoption (mean of 0.288) is 
greater than rate of dependent adoption (mean of 0.198). For this segment, the independent rate 
of adoption is significantly more than the same rate for goods proposed in classical economy that 
Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) report. This difference can be driven by the low search cost of 
mobile apps for imitators. The dependent rate of adoptions is similar to the same rate for 
Everclear music CD that Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) report. For global adoption, across the 
mobile app categories the weight of influential in driving imitators’ dependent choice of 
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adoption is 0.009 which is similar to the same parameter for Everclear music CD. However, this 
rate is 0.50 for local adoption, which is similar to the same rate for John Hiatt music CD (Van 
den Bulte and Joshi 2007). The size of influential segment in the observed sample for global 
adopter data is 0.044 and for local adopter data is 0.042 which is very similar to the same rate for 
Everclear music CD (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007). To sum up, these results might suggest that 
customers adoption behavior for mobile apps is very similar to music CD adoptions, except that 
the independent rate of adoptions for imitators are higher, but the dependent rate of adoptions for 
influentials is less, driven by the lower search cost. 
Table 1.11 summarizes the individual parameters distribution for the choice model that uses local 
number of adopters (unfiltered density) as a proxy for social influence.  The negative mean for 
the preference parameter for each mobile app categories indicates higher preference of outside 
options for customers. In the city under the study, the customers prefer mobile apps in 
Health/Diet/Fitness, Games, Internet/WAP, and device tools relatively more than mobile apps in 
social network, ebooks, and Humar/Jokes categories. Relative to the apple app-store popularity 
statistics (presented in figure 1.3 in data section), the surprising result is high preference of the 
customers for Health/Diet/Fitness mobile apps. This information can help this app-store to target 
its marketing communication message by highlighting this mobile app category.  
The mean for the distribution of download history state parameter is negative and significant. 
This negative effect of history suggests that this app-store is not doing well in retaining the 
customers, perhaps for its appearance and its nonoptimal shopping shelf. However, the effect of 
social influence is positive and significant, which suggests that there is positive spill-over 
(possibly because of awareness effect) of adoption within the population. 
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Table 1.11. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (Local Adopters) 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-6.22* 5.04 -14.327 -2.669 
   eBooks 2α  
-11.34* 3.14 -15.290 -6.381 
   Games 3α  
-4.35* 3.76 -11.222 -2.296 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-4.1 2.18 -5.939 2.982 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-16.32* 5.85 -22.097 -9.715 
   Internet/WAP 6α  
-5.41* 2.29 -8.021 -3.021 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-14.2* 3.49 -18.122 -8.332 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-8.48* 1.92 -11.092 -4.547 
   Social Networks 9α  
-10.54 3.47 -15.530 0.076 
   University 10α  
-5.78* 1.39 -7.791 -2.916 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-27.27* 5.46 -34.350 -13.821 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.02* 0.01 0.011 0.035 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  1.32 0.63 -0.830 1.767 
    Investment apps category 14α  5.34 1.75 -0.922 7.230 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  7.13 4.28 -6.606 10.330 
* p<0.05 
Appendix 1.D presents the same result table for choice model with local imitators, models with 
global imitators/adopters, and model with no social influence. The model with no social 
influence underestimates the preference for mobile apps almost in all the categories except for 
eBook, Humor/Jokes, Reference/Dictionary, and University. In addition, this model 
underestimates the effect of popularity, investment, and free characteristics of the mobile apps. 
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In summary, a model that does not account for social influence returns bias estimates for the 
parameters. 
Table 1.12. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model (Local 
Adopters): CustomerTenure (number of days since registeration on the app-store) explanation of 
the effects 
Parameter explained by Tenure
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-0.00044* 1.01E-04 -0.00058 -0.00023 
   eBooks 2α  
-0.00048* 2.63E-04 -0.00087 -0.00006 
   Games 3α  
-0.00041* 4.46E-05 -0.00049 -0.00032 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-0.0008* 7.30E-05 -0.00092 -0.00061 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-0.00091* 2.49E-04 -0.00126 -0.00046 
   Internet/WAP 6α  0.00011 7.58E-05 -0.00002 0.00025 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-0.00056* 1.29E-04 -0.00081 -0.00035 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-0.00028 1.50E-04 -0.00046 0.00002 
   Social Networks 9α  
-0.00001 9.45E-05 -0.00016 0.00020 
   University 10α  0.00018 1.36E-04 -0.00007 0.00034 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-0.00136* 3.33E-04 -0.00193 -0.00081 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.00006* 7.64E-06 0.00004 0.00007 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  0.00001 2.06E-05 -0.00003 0.00005 
    Investment apps category 14α  -0.00006 6.77E-05 -0.00016 0.00007 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  0.00021 1.35E-04 -0.00003 0.00043 
* p<0.05 
Table 1.12 presents correlation between customer tenure (number of days since registeration on 
the app-store) and choice parameters of customers. Those who register early to the app-store 
(potentially with innovator personality) have higher preference for mobile apps in Internet/WAP 
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and university mobile app categories. This correlation might be relevant as mobile innovators 
might be more interested in improving their performance oriented apps. In addition, these 
customers are more sensitive to download history and social influence. This result is aligned with 
the chasm on the product life cycle theories that argue that if the product does not pass the 
acceptance of early adopters it will fall into the chasm, leading to early failiure.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.7. PARAMETER DISTRIBUTION: Heterogeneity in Individual Choice (Local 
Adopters) 
 
F 
Device tools cat.                            E-book cat.                Logic/puzzle Trivia cat.         Reference/Dictionaries 
                Games cat.                     Health/ Diet/ Fitness app cat.            Social NW cat.            University cat 
         Humor/Jokes cat.                Internet/ WAP cat.                      Individual State               Imitators density 
Popular apps                            Investment apps                       Freemium apps 
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Figure 1.7 presents the distribution of choice parameters. This distribution has heavy tail, which 
highlights the importance of allowing for flexible heterogeneity distribution for the choice 
parameters.   
Table 1.13. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect  
(Local Adopters) 
Total number of users: 1258
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Category specific preference:
 
  
Device Tools 1α  0 1253 
eBooks 2α  0 1258 
Games 3α  0 1258 
Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  53 1205 
Humor/Jokes 5α  0 1258 
Internet/WAP 6α  0 1258 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0 1258 
Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0 1258 
Social Networks 9α  53 1205 
University 10α  0 1258 
States:
 
  
Individual download history State 11α  0 1258 
Latent imitation level 12α  1257 0 
App category characteristics (factors):   
Popularity of app category 13α  1205 53 
Investment apps category 14α  1205 53 
Hedonic apps category 15α  1205 53 
 
Targeting is a relevant application of micro choice modeling for app-stores. Table 1.13 presents 
the distribution of significance and sign of each of the choice parameters at individual customer 
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level.  Knowing the distribution of negative and positive response helps the app-store to target 53 
customers that do not prefer health/diet/fitness or social network mobile apps. This correct 
targeting might help improving the usability of the app store. 
1.8. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
The advantage of the individual specific choice model for the app-store platforms is that it allows 
estimating the implications of the social influence policy for total expected adoption by 
simulation. I ran three counterfactual scenarios using the estimated choice model by modifying 
the level of social influence. Furthermore, I use the estimated model to find the optimal dynamic 
level of social influence to maximize the diffusion over the app-store platform. Formally, I solve 
the following optimization problem: 
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Table 1.14 presents the implications of each of these four policies. Surprisingly shutting down 
the social influence improves the total expected adoptions of mobile apps on this app-store 
platform. This further confirms that this platform does not have enough quality to retain its 
customers. However, an optimal social influence policy shows 13.6% increase in total expected 
adoptions of the platform. This optimal policy decreases adoption of mobile apps in  
Reference/Dictionary category, but increases the expected adoption of mobile app categories in 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia, device tools, and Games the most. A common characteristic of these three 
categories is their popularity, so I tried to explain these improvements by optimal policy with the 
popularity of mobile apps in each of the categories over the Apple’s app-store. 
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Table 1.14. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: Change in the adoption level by intervening 
social influence 
Category specific 
counterfactual results: 
original 
expected 
adoption 
shut down 
social 
influence 
1% more 
social 
influence 
1%less 
social 
influence 
An optimal 
social 
influence 
   Device Tools 875.83 -57% 0.8% -0.7% 55.8% 
   eBooks 189.45 -1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
   Games 187.51 19% -0.3% 0.3% 58.6% 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 22.21 0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 
   Humor/Jokes 255.09 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
   Internet/WAP 1042.20 23% -0.4% 0.5% 14.1% 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 249.12 25% -0.6% -0.2% 109.1% 
   Reference/Dictionaries 1262.09 16% -0.4% 0.3% -36.2% 
   Social Networks 21.66 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
   University 18.08 -1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 
Total improvement 4123.25 1% -0.1% 0.1% 13.6% 
 
Table 1.15 presents the result of regressing the improvement under optimal social influence 
policy on popularity rank of the mobile app category. The correlation between mobile app 
category popularity and the improvement under optimal policy is positive and significant.  This 
result suggests that more popular mobile app categories have more improvement under optimal 
policy. This result indicates that this app-store can improves its adoption by 13.6% if it can use 
social influence to increase the adoption of more popular mobile app categories. 
Table 1.15. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: Explain optimal social influence improvement 
with popularity rank of the app category on the app-store 
  Coefficients Standard Error p-value t Stat 
Intercept -0.185 0.147 0.245 -1.254 
Category popularity rank 0.050* 0.015 0.010 3.388 
  * p<0.01 
 Finally figure 1.8 presents social influence level for this optimal policy. This policy suggests 
early increase in the social influence by potentially a viral marketing campaign. 
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Figure 1.8. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: an optimal social influence strategy to increase 
expected adoption level by 14% (log scale) 
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1.9. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I developed an approach that combines macro diffusion model with micro choice 
model to allow app-stores to target their customers and proposed Dirichlet Process to model 
customers’ heterogeneity, and Unscented Kalman Filter to estimate social influence measure. 
Then, using a large data set from an African app-store, I showed that social influence is an 
important factor in determining adoption choice of customers. My results demonstrate that 
ignoring social influence in modeling customers’ adoption can bias the choice parameters’ 
estimates. Furthermore, my results indicate that social influence on mobile app adoption choices 
is effective locally (within the city of the study) rather than globally (over the internet). I 
benchmarked the mobile app adoption process against the same process for classical economy 
goods, and I find that mobile app adoption process is similar to the same process for music CDs. 
I further illustrated how estimated model can be used to analyze counterfactual scenario where 
the app-store platform optimizes its intervening social influence. This counterfactual analysis 
showed that, if this app store runs viral marketing campaign focusing on more popular mobile 
app categories, it can increase its total adoption by 13.6%. I believe that my modeling approach, 
proposed estimation method, and derived empirical insights in this paper can be of interest to 
both practitioners and scholars in academia. 
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2.1.ABSTRACT 
I developed a structural model that accounts for bidders’ learning and their anticipation of winner 
and loser regrets in an auction platform. Winner and loser regrets are defined as regretting for 
paying too much in case of winning an auction and regretting for not bidding high enough in 
case of losing it, respectively. Using a large data set from eBay and empirical Bayesian 
estimation method, I quantify the bidders’ anticipation of regret in various product categories, 
and investigate the role of experience in explaining the bidders’ regret and learning behaviors. I 
also showed how the results can be used to increase eBay's revenue significantly. The 
counterfactual analyses showed that shutting down the bidder regret via appropriate notification 
policies can increase eBay’s revenue by 24%. 
Keywords: winner and loser regret in auctions, affiliated value auction, emotionally rational 
bidders, Bayesian updating structural model 
 
2.2.  INTRODUCTION 
It is not uncommon to regret one’s own bidding decision at the end of an online auction. Whether 
this is about regretting for giving up too easily on a bidding war or regretting for losing self-
control and bidding too high, bidders more than rarely feel discomfort about their final bids. 
eBay forums are filled with questions like “I won an auction but regret: What can I do?”, and, in 
fact, eBay tries to educate its users for bidding without regrets5. Winning an auction on eBay is a 
contract to complete the sale, and not honoring this contract has serious consequences, including 
                                                 
5
 Bertolucci, Jeff. "Big Data Analytics: Descriptive Vs. Predictive Vs. Prescriptive - InformationWeek." 
InformationWeek. December 31, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://www.informationweek.com/big-
data/big-data-analytics/big-data-analytics-descriptive-vs-predictive-vs-prescriptive/d/d-id/1113279. 
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being banned from any transactions on its website. Therefore, the desire to avoid these 
consequences, along with the bad experiences one can have about the product, seller, or one’s 
own bidding behavior or even the common sense lead to an anticipation of end-of-auction regret 
during the bidding period.  
I consider two types of regret that are studied in the auction literature: Bidders might feel winner 
regret when they win an auction but feel they pay too much, since their winning depends on 
them being the most optimistic among the auction participants about the market value of the 
auction item and/or the honesty of the seller (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003b). On the other hand, a 
bidder might feel loser regret when she loses an auction in which the winning bid turns out to be 
less than her valuation of the item. Clearly, the latter type of regret realizes when the bidders bid 
naively (or strategically) instead of bidding their true valuations of the items. Intuitively, 
anticipation of winner (resp. loser) regret should make the bidders lower (resp. increase) their 
bids.  
There are many studies in the auction literature that show that the anticipation of both types of 
regret significantly affects the bidding behaviors of auction participants in various settings. 
Experimental studies such as Filiz Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Katok (2008) study these effects under the first-price sealed-bid auction setting and show that 
they have significant implications on the bidding behavior. Although, in theory, the second price 
nature of eBay auctions implies that bidders should not experience winner regret (see, for 
example, Ariely and Simonson 2003), Bajari and Hortacsu (2003a) and Yin (2006) investigate 
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the ``winner’s curse6” in eBay auctions and suggest that eBay bidders anticipate it too, and hence 
act strategically7. I also focus on eBay markets in this paper.  
Auction platforms, such as eBay, act as a two sided market by connecting sellers and bidders 
without taking ownership of the auction item. Auctions in these platforms involve a vast amount 
of different sellers, bidders, and products in different categories, and hence they exhibit a high 
level of heterogeneity in behavior. Although many descriptive and predictive tools are studied in 
the auction literature to deal with this heterogeneity and large data sets (e.g., Park and Bradlow 
2005; Bradlow and Park 2007; Zeithammer and Adams 2010), the prescriptive analyses remain 
limited8. However, counterfactual analyses relying on structural models that control for 
consumers’ decision processes can have remarkable contributions. One such contribution is 
being able to investigate the effects of notification policies (such as notifying bidders about the 
similar auctions in the past) on the platform revenue. To work towards filling this gap, in this 
paper, I developed a structural model to explain the bidder behaviors in an online auction 
platform. 
Considering all the requirements for a viable explanation of the auction platforms, I asked the 
following questions: Can I design a computationally tractable system to estimate bidders’ 
bidding behaviors in an online auction platform? To what extent do bidders anticipate winner 
                                                 
6
 I use the term “winner regret” to refer to the explained phenomenon, but “winner’s curse” is also used in the 
literature. 
7
 Zeithammer and Adams (2010) suggest that sealed-bid second price auction is not a good abstraction for eBay 
auctions. Bidders’ naivety can also result in this inconsistency. I comment more on this issue in Results section. 
8
 Bertolucci, Jeff. "Big Data Analytics: Descriptive Vs. Predictive Vs. Prescriptive - InformationWeek." 
InformationWeek. December 31, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. http://www.informationweek.com/big-
data/big-data-analytics/big-data-analytics-descriptive-vs-predictive-vs-prescriptive/d/d-id/1113279. 
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and loser regret and how do they vary in bidders’ experience and learning behavior? What is the 
effect of intervening bidders’ regret by notification policies on the auction platform’s revenue? 
To answer these questions, I developed my model considering many important aspects of 
bidders’ behaviors. In particular, I account for the emotionally laden context of auctions where, 
in addition to the regret anticipation, the bidders do not know the item’s market value and learn 
about the value of the product during the bidding process, for example, by gaining additional 
information about the auction item or resolving some of the uncertainties about the seller or 
about their own needs (Hossain 2008, Zeithammer and Adams 2010, Okenfels and Roth 2002). I 
also consider the fact that bidders tend to bid incrementally in online auctions (Chakarvarti et al. 
2002; Zeithammer and Adams 2010), and have different levels of experience which affects their 
bidding behaviors (Ariely et al. 2005; Wilcox 2000; Srinivasan and Wang 2010). I further take 
into account both common and private value components of the auction item (i.e., affiliated 
value), and bidders’ learning from the current highest bid during the bidding process. Due to the 
emotionally laden context of eBay auctions, I assume that bidders might lose their global focus, 
as Ariely and Simonson (2003) suggest, so they show inertia and generally do not search across 
auctions (Haruvy and Leszcyc 2010).  
I used the following estimation strategy to identify the parameters of my model: First, at each 
discrete time period during the bidding process, I modeled the utility of a bidder consisting of her 
expected profit, i.e., the difference between her valuation and bid, and anticipated winner and 
loser regrets. Second, assuming the observed bid at each period is the one that maximizes the 
bidder’s utility for a given valuation level, I derived –using the first order condition for the utility 
function— the bidder’s revealed latent valuation for the auction item at that time period. Finally, 
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I assumed that this derived latent valuation (which is now a function of the bidder regret, among 
others) consists of a common value, a private value, and a component consisting of bidder’s 
learning the value of the auction item from the highest observed bid. This approach allows me to 
identify the regret parameters. 
More specifically, since there is a common value component of the auction item, the number of 
bidders also matter in this process. To account for the bounded rationality and incomplete 
information in the model, I considered that the bidders perceive the observed bid and number of 
bidders as a noisy measure of the latent bid and the latent number of bidders. I modeled the 
bidders’ Bayesian learning of the latent bid and the latent number of bidders using Kalman Filter 
theory, which Jap and Naik (2008) introduced to the auction literature. In this structure, I 
assumed that bidders’ beliefs about the latent bid and latent number of bidders follow a first 
order Markov process. Similarly, I assumed that the common value element of valuation follows 
a first order Markov process as well, with a drift and a common time varying signal.  
To account for heterogeneity and to avoid over-fitting the data with a large number of 
parameters, I clustered the bidders and utilized the eBay-specified auction clusters, and shrunk 
the bidder specific (regret and valuation) and auction specific (evolution of bids and the number 
of bidders) parameters within these bidder and auction clusters. I used a mixture normal 
distribution model to cluster the bidders using their observed characteristics, which are used as 
proxies for bidders’ experience level. Finally, I optimized the Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) of 
the model given the segment and cluster membership of each of the bidders and auction items 
over a large eBay data set. To optimize MAP, I used simulated annealing method, which is a 
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metaheuristic global optimization method used both in robotics and portfolio optimization in 
finance (Crama and Schyns 2003; Zhuang et al 1994)9.  
I estimated this model over an eBay data set that I crawled and scraped from the web in May 
2014. This sample consists of around 58,000 bids of around 12,000 bidders in around 1,600 
auctions that offered items for sale in 19 different categories presented in Table 1. The estimation 
results show that, in all auction categories, both winner and loser regrets are significant and I find 
a positive relationship between winner and loser regret. I also find that those who are more 
regretful stick to status quo, i.e., they update their valuations less frequently and learn less from 
others. Furthermore, I find that experience can explain the heterogeneity in the bidders’ learning, 
updating, and regretting behavior.  
I further used the estimated model to analyze a counterfactual scenario where the auction 
platform shuts down the bidders’ winner regret. This analysis shows that, if an auction platform 
can shut down winner regret of bidders by its notification policies, it can increase its revenue by 
24%. I also observed that shutting down winner regret can cause the highest bid to increase two 
to four folds in some auctions. 
Using notification policies to affect the bidders’ behaviors is not uncommon in eBay. For 
instance, my personal interview with an eBay scholar suggested that eBay is concerned about 
bidders’ loser regret that might lead to a potential churn effect. Therefore, they use notifications 
to inform the bidders who might lose the auction if they do not change their bids. Empirical 
evidence of significant (winner and/or loser) regret of bidders might invoke using similar 
                                                 
9
 I used this optimization approach because the Quasi Newton, Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) 
optimization, or Bayesian sampling methods are computationally intractable over large data sets. 
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notification policies in online auction platforms10. Such policies are studied in the experimental 
literature as well, and shown to be effective in influencing the regret levels of bidders (see, for 
example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2008). 
I believe the contributions of my paper can be of interest to both practitioners and scholars in 
academia. My contributions are threefold: First, I consider bidders’ anticipation of winner and 
loser regret in the affiliated value setting, and propose a tractable empirical Bayesian method to 
estimate a structural model of bidder demand in an online auction platform. This model allows 
the auction platforms to run counterfactual scenarios. In this way, I contribute to the line of 
descriptive and predictive auction models for auction customer relationship management 
(Bradlow and Park 2007, Park and Bradlow 2005, Jap and Naik 2008, and Zeithammer and 
Adams 2010). 
Second, I model the learning and affiliated value of bidders, and, by allowing for incremental 
valuation revelation in the proposed model, I allow for the incremental naïve bidding behavior. 
The importance of these features in a model are emphasized by Okenfels and Roth (2002), 
Hossain (2008), and Zeithammer and Adams (2010). This aspect of my model contributes to the 
stream of papers that model common and private value auctions structurally (e.g., Laffont et al. 
1995, Bajari and Hortacsu 2003, Haile et al. 2003, and Haile and Tamer 2003). Unlike these 
papers, I consider the auctions as emotionally laden social contexts. To the best of my 
knowledge, I am the first to model the bidders’ Bayesian learning and affiliated value updating 
processes to account for bidders’ updating their uncertain valuations. 
                                                 
10Notifications providing information about similar auction items, such as the highest bids, paid amounts, and 
number of bidders in those auctions can help to influence the winner regret of bidders. Similarly, more granular 
information about the sellers might help with the trust issues, which again can affect the winner regret level. 
60 
 
Third, I contribute to the auction regret literature by proposing a method that identifies regret 
parameters structurally using field data. Importance of bidders’ anticipation of winner and loser 
regret are emphasized in the literature, for example, by Ariely and Simonson (2003), Filiz Ozbay 
and Ozbay (2007), and Engelbrecht Wiggans and Katok (2008). The latter two studies use 
experiments to show that notification policy can affect the bidders’ feeling regret and potential 
over and under bidding. I used real company data in this paper, and my structural modeling 
approach allows the auction platforms to quantify the impacts of new policies, target different 
bidders, and customize their operations conditional on bidder behaviors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I review the relevant literature. 
Section 3 provides a detailed description of data. Section 4 describes my structural model and 
how the empirical Bayesian method can be used to estimate the parameters of the model using 
eBay data. I interpret the estimation results in Section 5, and explain how I can use the estimated 
parameters in testing a counterfactual scenario where the auction platform shuts down the bidder 
regret in Section 6. Next, I test the robustness of some of my assumptions and methods in 
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 presents my concluding remarks and discussion for future research 
directions. 
 
2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
My paper resides at the intersection of four streams of literature: (1) customer relationship 
management using auction big data; (2) bounded rationality, trembling hand, learning, and the 
affiliated value of bidders; (3) the emotionally rational or regretful bidders; (4) the theoretical, 
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experimental, and empirical studies of auctions. I explore each one of them in the following 
sections. 
 
2.3.1. Customer Relationship Management of Auction Platforms 
Numerous studies investigate the behavior of bidders on the auction platform to estimate the 
demand or to extract information that can be used in customer relationship management and 
targeting.  For example, Park and Bradlow (2005) propose a stochastic model to identify the 
bidders, the conditions in which they bid, and the amount of their bids, which are useful for 
customer relationship management. Bradlow and Park (2007), further extend their research by 
proposing a record breaking stochastic approach to recover the latent number of bidders in the 
context of the first price auction. Both studies acknowledge that empirical literature has 
demonstrated flaws in the theoretical prediction of auctions, but they argue that these flaws can 
be corrected by a model which accounts for the behavioral aspect of the bidders’ decision 
making. More recently, another predictive study conducted by Jap and Naik (2008) uses the 
Kalman Filter theory to develop a ``Bid Analyzer” that allows one to estimate the distribution of 
auction participants’ latent bids. All of these papers call for new studies to model the structural 
aspect of bidders’ decisions for policy experimentation. 
To model the bidder behavior structurally, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) make the simplifying 
assumption that the eBay auction with proxy bidding approximates a second price auction. Their 
study employs a data set from a 1998 coin auction on eBay to estimate a reduced form common 
value model (for tractability), but it calls for studies that model affiliated value (i.e., existence of 
both common and private value elements).  Although their proposed model relies on the 
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assumption that bidders are fully rational, they try to recover winner curse from measuring the 
amount shed by a bidder when a new bidder enters the auction. Zeithammer and Adams (2010) 
carry out a series of statistical tests to cast doubt on the assumptions that the proxy bidding 
mechanism is equivalent to the second price sealed bid auction, and that bidders’ bids are equal 
to their valuations. They recommend employing a reduced form modeling approach. In 
discussing Zeithammer and Adam’s study (2010), Hortacsu and Nielsen (2010) and Srinivasan 
and Wang (2010) note that, although some of its tests are questionable, its main hypothesis is 
strongly supported. Both of these commentaries call for a structural model based on Zeithammer 
and Adam’s new findings, particularly those indicating that both naïve and sophisticated bidders 
might exist on eBay, and bidders’ experience plays an important role on their bidding behaviors. 
Yao and Mela (2010) take the auction platform as a two sided market, and jointly model the 
choices of bidders and sellers structurally to extract the value of the customer lifetime and the 
impact of the commission policy on the auction platform revenue. They consider only one 
auction category and model bidders’ disutility in the form of historical cost function, rather than 
in the form of winner and loser regret. In parallel with their paper, Haruvy and Leszczyc (2010) 
also model the disutility of bidding in the form of the inertia of bidders within an auction. They 
attribute this inertia to search cost.  
All of the above studies unanimously suggest that future policy experiments is possible only by a 
structural model of bidder learning in which heterogeneity is explained by experience measures. 
They also agree that such a study should model common and private values jointly, in the form 
of an affiliated value model. Built over the above studies, I model the bidders’ anticipation of 
winner and loser regret structurally. Understanding such consumer behaviors can benefit the 
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auction platforms by allowing it to target its policies toward helping naïve consumers learn, if 
such learning is predicted to improve the revenues of auction platforms. 
2.3.2. Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Affiliated Value of Bidders 
There are many papers discussing that consumers are bounded rational, and their action is 
subject to flaws (see, for example, Simon 1972; Selten 1975; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Camerer and Weber 1992; Hey and Orme 1994; Camerer and Ho 
1994; Kahneman 2003). Various theories explain why consumers behave bounded rationally, 
from decision making and psychology perspectives (Simon 1972; Ellison 2006; Salant 2011; 
Kaufman 1999). Bounded rationality is referred to as naïve bidding in the auction context.  
Naive bidders are known to bid in an ad-hoc manner or by matching their bids with others bids. 
In particular, Ely and Hossain (2008) define the naive bidder as the one who acts as if the 
amount she pays conditional on winning equals to her bid in eBay auctions. Additionally, 
Okenfels and Roth (2002) also define naïve and inexperienced bidder as a bidder who mistakenly 
treats the eBay auction as an English first-price auctions in which the winner pays the maximum 
bid.  
Furthermore, Kagel et al. (1987) posit that the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize 
second-price auction outcomes, as bids consistently exceed private values. Other studies posit 
that experience and learning can reduce bidders’ bounded rationality, fostering more rational 
behavior. For example, Wilcox (2000) finds that experience leads to behavior which is more 
consistent with auction theory although the proportion of experienced bidders who behave in a 
manner inconsistent with the theory is quite large.  
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Ariely et al. (2005) find that experience reduces but does not eliminate considerable incremental 
bidding. In this respect, Ockenfels and Roth (2002) examine the multiple-bid phenomena to 
consider how bidders get information from other’s bids, and then revise their willingness to pay 
in an auction with independent values. To describe bidders’ learning, Hossain (2008) suggests 
that bidders do not always know their exact private valuation for a good and so learn 
spontaneously from the posted price.  He concludes that bidders obtain information about their 
own and others’ preferences as they participate in the auction. 
These experimental studies are particularly relevant to my research in the sense that they 
emphasized the role of naïve bidder, learning, and experience. However, built over these studies, 
my paper integrates these processes in a structural model to help the auction platform manage 
and target its bidders. Moreover, in contrast to these studies, my paper accounts for behavioral 
regularities that stem from bidders’ anticipation of winner and loser regret, another form of 
bounded rationality. 
2.3.3.  Emotionally Rational or Regretful Bidders 
Several studies explain the bounded rationality of auction bidders by referring to bidders’ 
uncertainty about the value of the commodity, which suggests that bidders might anticipate 
winner and loser regret in their decision. In particular, Holt and Sherman’s (1994) theoretical 
study describes the acceptance of a bid as an informative event because it signals an 
overestimation of unknown value. They mention that winning/losing might result in regret, so 
the bidder might anticipate winner/loser regret in her decisions. In testing a regret theory in a 
first-price sealed-bid auction setting, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that the anticipation of 
winner and loser regret can be modified by a notification policy. Also, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
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Katok (2008) find a similar phenomenon, and they conclude that the policy of revealing losing 
bids may decrease the auction holders’ revenue. Although experiments are helpful for making 
causal inferences, an auction site might need a structural model to run counterfactual analysis 
and to target its bidders.  
Regret construct has been the subject of many studies in the consumer behavior, psychology, 
decision science, behavioral economics, and marketing literature. A stream of literature in 
psychology and consumer behavior defines regret as a negative psychological response which 
occurs when an individual believes that a present situation would have been better if only she 
had decided differently (Peluso 2011; Gilovich and Medvec 1995; Van Dijk and Zeelenberg 
2005; Simonson 1992; Zeelenberg et al. 2000; Inman and Zeelenberg 2002; Roes 1994). This 
regret can affect the consumers’ decision-making through counterfactual thinking (Roes 1994). 
In particular, the consumer might consider the possible negative outcome of a previous choice in 
her future decisions and so might regulate her behavior to decide differently ex ante, by being 
regret averse (Peluso 2011; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007; Boles and Messik 1995; Tsiros and 
Mittaal 2000).   
Many studies in psychology literature classify the different types of regrets according to action 
and inaction regret categories. The first category refers to consumers’ feelings of sorrow for what 
they have done, and the second refers to consumers’ feelings of sorrow for what they have not 
done. The former is analogous to winner and the latter to loser regret discussed in the auction 
literature (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2008). Furthermore, 
action regret has short term effect and evokes intense feeling, and inaction regret has long term 
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effect and evokes wistful feelings (Gilovich et al. 1998; Gilovich and Medvec 1995; Keinan and 
Kivetz 2008).  
Bell (1982) argues that, after making a decision under uncertainty, the decision maker may 
discover the relevant outcomes by learning that another alternative would have been preferable. 
This learning creates a sense of loss or regret that, if incorporated explicitly into the expected 
utility framework, better predicts individuals’ decisions. According to Loomes and Sugden 
(1986), the violation of the conventional expected utility suggests that important influential 
choice factors are overlooked, perhaps because of the misspecification of the conventional 
theories. They propose an alternative approach, formulating a theory of expected modified utility 
to account for the individual’s capacity to anticipate feelings of regret and rejoice. Such theory 
rests on two fundamental assumptions: First, many people experience the sensations called regret 
and rejoice; and, second, they try to anticipate and take into account those sensations in making 
decisions under uncertainty. Guided by the mentioned study’s observation and suggestions, 
many theoretical studies incorporated regret to explain how the optimum pricing strategy might 
change in a new setting that incorporates regret (Popescu and Wu 2007; Nasiry and Popescu 
2011; Heidhues and Koszegi 2008; Su and Zhang 2009; Diecidue et al. 2012; Nasiry and 
Popescu 2012; Ozer and Zheng 2012). All of the above mentioned studies are useful in 
expanding the domain of knowledge about consumers’ regret and the effect of such phenomenon 
on the consumers’ decisions. However, none of them has modeled both the rational and 
emotional aspects of bidders’ decision making in the context of the online auctions, where 
bidders’ values are affiliated. In this context, the bidders learn the value of the commodities by 
observing others bids as well. 
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2.3.4.  Theoretical, Experimental, and Empirical Auctions studies 
I classify the papers in this section into three categories based on the modeling assumption about 
the bidders’ valuations: independent private value, common value, and affiliated value models. 
The model of independent private value assumes each bidder has a different private value known 
only to him (Laffont et al. 1995; Guerrere et al. 2000; Haile and Tamer 2003). In respect to the 
common value assumption, Haile et al. (2003) proposes a non-parametric test for first-price 
sealed-bid auctions based on the fact that winners curse might exist in such auctions. Bajari and 
Hortacsu (2003) also assume that eBay’s auction can be approximated with second-price sealed-
bid auction to estimate a structural model of common value to recover winner curse. However, 
they acknowledge that a better option might be assuming that the eBay auction is affiliated value. 
Finally, affiliated value is a form of valuation that is drawn from a joint distribution of 
valuations, consisting of both private and common value component (Li et al. 2002; Campo et al. 
2003). Although these studies expand the domain of knowledge about the implication of various 
assumptions, they do not consider bidders’ emotional response and bounded rationality. 
Chakravarti et al. (2002) call for future studies of this issue by emphasizing that the learning 
process might alter the valuations of bidders by an “information cascade”. They suggest that 
such learning and value affiliation might induce strategic emulation of preceding bidders without 
considering private signals. In this paper, I incorporate learning, value affiliation, and emotion in 
a structural model. 
Structural models can consider either consumers’ learning, in the form of an adaptive Bayesian 
learning model, or the consumers’ expectation, in the form of a forward-looking approach. 
Zeithammer (2006) argues that buyers can benefit from forward-looking strategies if they take 
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into account the information provided by the announcements of upcoming auctions.  He 
implicitly states that a forward-looking model for bidders in online auction is intractable, so in 
developing such a model, he uses several simplifying assumptions. Given all these simplifying 
assumptions, it is not clear that a forward looking approach has much more merit than the 
Bayesian adaptive-learning approach. Further, it is not clear how an emotionally laden 
environment of an auction might foster the forward-looking behavior of the bidders. 
Smith (1989) notes that auction contexts are often emotion-laden and suggests that the outcomes 
reflect communal legitimization of both price and allocation given uncertainty about value, 
preferences and fairness. Chakravarti  et al. (2002) suggest that the individual and social nature 
of the value determination processes is a fertile area for future research. Furthermore, whether 
bidders experience regret or not when bidding aggressively and winning may depend on their 
cognitive skills for counterfactual reasoning and their facilities with motivational processes (e.g., 
dissonance and attribution) for managing the emotions of victory and defeat, according to Tsiros 
and Mittal (2000). 
The Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) studies focus on 
experimentally attributing underbidding and overbidding to regret theory; Astor et al. (2011) 
finds that aforementioned studies’ theoretical predictions for the effect of regret holds, by 
employing an approach that combines auction experiment with psychological measures that 
indicate emotional involvement. Furthermore, Greenleaf (2004) shows that the auction sellers 
also anticipate regret and rejoice when they set the reserve price, which is the lowest auction 
price that the seller will accept.  Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) proposes a utility theory that 
depends not only on the profit, but also on the regret of the outcomes (e.g., money left on the 
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table). Further, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) points out that in the case of independent 
private value first-price sealed-bid auctions, bidders bid above risk neutral Nash equilibrium, 
which can be explained only by regret theory.  
Overall, built on the aforementioned studies, I develop a general model that nests all learning, 
experience, value affiliation, and bidders’ anticipation of winner and loser regret in a structural 
form that allows an auction platform to target its customers and run counterfactual policies. 
Without a model that controls for all these mechanisms, the revenue implication of bidders’ 
regret for the auction platform may not be clear. 
2.4. DATA 
I acquired the data set by crawling and scraping a sample of auctions from eBay website, during 
May 2014. It consists of 58,285 bids of 12,247 bidders on 1,647 auction items within various 
auction categories. eBay’s revenue is based on a complex system of fees for services, including 
listing product features ($0.10 to $2) and a Final Value Fee for each sale (10% of the total 
amount of the sale, i.e., price of the item plus shipping charges), and it exceeded $17.90 billion 
in 2014. Millions of collectibles, décor, appliances, computers, furnishings, equipment, domain 
names, vehicle, and other miscellaneous items are sold on eBay daily. Generally, sellers can 
auction anything on the site as long as it is not illegal and it does not violate the eBay prohibited 
and restricted item policy.  
eBay uses a bidding mechanism called proxy bidding. This mechanism asks the bidder to submit 
the maximum amount she is willing to pay for the item, which is called a proxy bid. Then, 
eBay’s software bidding agent (called proxy engine) bids incrementally on the bidder’s behalf up 
to this maximum value, which remains hidden from other bidders until someone outbids it. As 
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new proxy bids enter, the proxy engine sets the current winning bid to the second highest 
bidder’s maximum value plus the minimum increment specified by eBay. The current winning 
bid is displayed on the auction board throughout the auction. At the end of the auction, the bidder 
with the highest proxy bid wins the item and pays a price equal to the second highest bidder's 
maximum bid plus the increment. This process makes eBay auctions a hybrid of the English and 
second-price sealed bid auctions. Table 2.1 presents a possible path for the proxy and observed 
bids in an auction where the starting price is $25 and the minimum increment is $1. 
Table 2.1. A sample bid sequence on an eBay auction with $25 reservation bid and $1 minimum 
increment 
Bid 
number 
Max. bid 
(unobservable) 
Bid on the auction board 
(observable) 
1 $50 $25 
2 $40 $41 
3 $70 $51 
4 $65 $66 
 
In eBay’s website, I observe both the amount that each bidder puts in as her proxy bid and the 
bids automatically generated by eBay’s proxy engine. I filtered the automatic bids out to be able 
to work with the actual bids of the bidders. Note that, in eBay’s system, if someone puts a bid 
between the displayed (automatic) bid and the highest proxy bid, this action will not reveal the 
highest proxy bid – the highest proxy bid will only be revealed after someone outbids it. Hence, 
even though the displayed bids always increase over time, the proxy bids may not be in 
increasing order (see the example in Table 2.1). I sorted the bids before using it in the model 
estimation to overcome this issue. Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of observed bids across six 
sample items.  
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For this study, I randomly selected 19 auction categories. The selected categories have both 
luxury and widely available goods, so the sample allows to test whether the regret levels are 
different across these two categories. For instance, a bidder might regret more for losing a luxury 
item auction than losing a necessity item auction. Table 2.2 shows the categories that I use in this 
study along with the number of auctions in each category. I classified the first nine categories as 
luxury good categories, and the next ten categories as the widely available goods.  
Table 2.2. Auction categories in the eBay data 
Auction category Number of 
auction Items 
Jewelry and Watches 149 
Collectibles 103 
Crafts 78 
Pottery and Glass 74 
Antiques 68 
Art 70 
Entertainment Memorabilia 88 
Tickets and Experiences 91 
Stamps 72 
Toys and Hobbies 93 
Books 84 
Clothing, Shoes and Accessories 84 
Gift Cards and Coupons 85 
Music 86 
Consumer Electronics 83 
DVDs and Movies 87 
Dolls and Bears 84 
Health and Beauty 74 
Video Games and Consoles 93 
 
Table 2.3 presents a sample of auction items. For each auction item, I know its title, category, 
number of bidders, number of bids, and the duration of the auction. I call this auction specific 
information. In my data set, the average number of bidders and bids in each auction are 9.52 and 
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49.19 with standard deviations of 4.58 and 19.40, respectively. The average duration of auctions 
is 4.74 days with a standard deviation of 1.67 days. 
 
Figure 2.1. Evolution of Bids in six sample auctions 
Table 2.3. Sample auctions in the eBay data 
Auction Item Title 
auction 
category 
winning 
bid 
number 
of bids 
number 
of 
bidders Ended 
Vintage Original Co-op 
porcelain sign Collectibles $1,000.00  92 12 
May 18, 2014 
, 2:15PM 
$3/1 Pantene Product 
Coupons Shampoo 
Conditioner Styler 
Gift Cards & 
Coupons $17.50  30 5 
May 19, 2014 
, 6:30PM 
Genesis Breyer P-Orridge 
"Naked Eye" Autographed 
Camera w/ Original 
Negatives 
Entertainment 
Memorabilia $900.00  75 9 
May 22, 2014 
, 2:00AM 
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Figure 2.2 presents the evolution of the number of bidders for a sample of six auctions in 
different auction categories. An interesting observation in these auctions is a spike at the rate of 
entrance at the last minutes. This behavior is known as sniping in the auction literature. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Evolution of number of participating bidders in six sample auctions 
 
eBay employs feedback as a reputation mechanism for its members to decrease their uncertainty 
about bidder and seller characteristics. While buyers can leave sellers negative, neutral or 
positive feedback, sellers can leave buyers positive feedback or choose not to leave feedback. 
Over time, eBay members develop a feedback profile, or reputation, based on these ratings. This 
information appears next to the members’ name and on the members’ profile.  
In my data set, each bidder attends only one of the auctions. I observe each bidder’s feedback 
score, number of bids on the item in question, total number of bids within the last 30 days, total 
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number of items / categories bid on within the last 30 days, and number of bid activity with the 
current seller. This bidder specific information capture different types of proxies for the 
experience of the bidders, and, hence, I utilize them in my analyses. For example, while bidding 
on one auction category might show high level of concentration, bidding on three categories 
might show high level of differentiation.  
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics of average bidder characteristics within each auction 
category. It shows significant heterogeneity among bidders in different auction categories. 
Another important observation from Table 2.4 is that, on average, bidders in each auction 
category have bid at least three times for the same item, which suggests a multiple (incremental) 
bidding behavior. This behavior, which is also reported in the auction literature for similar 
settings (see, for example, Zeithammer and Adams 2010) suggests that bidders might not enter 
their valuations as proxy bids, as second-price sealed bid auction theory suggests. 
Table 2.4. Summary statistics of the average bidder characteristics within each of 19 auction 
categories 
Characteristic Mean SD min max 
size 644.53 238.21 453 1550 
avg. feedback score 714.53 260.39 342 1301 
sd feedback score 2763.37 1897.84 745 8033 
avg. Number of bids on this item 4.84 0.74 3 7 
sd Number of bids on this item 8.05 1.93 4 13 
avg. total number of bids in 30 days 195.16 100.57 56 504 
sd total number of bids in 30 days 493.74 260.94 110 1065 
avg. Number of items bidded on in 30 
days 93.63 57.41 30 264 
sd Number of items bidded on in 30 days 251.42 197.83 53 1001 
avg. Bidding Activity with current Seller 28.63 8.51 17 50 
sd Bidding Activity with current Seller 31.11 4.05 24 40 
avg. Number of categories bided on 2.05 0.39 1 3 
sd Number of categories bided on 1 0 1 1 
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2.5.MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
I developed an agent-based structural model to predict the revenue implications of possible 
auction platform policies, such as the notification policy, by counterfactual analyses. I model 
bidders’ actions in a Bayesian adaptive-learning structure. The term adaptive-learning refers to 
the bidders’ updating beliefs about the value of the item, the distribution of the bids, and the 
number of bidders conditioned on observing noisy signals (Jap and Naik 2008). Bayesian 
learning approach is appropriate in my setting, because auctions are emotionally laden settings, 
in which users’ preferences are correlated (Chakravarti et al. 2002). In this environment, majority 
of bidders are naïve, so they learn the value of the auction items by observing others’ bids 
(Hossain 2008; Zeithammer and Adams 2010; Okenfels and Roth 2002).  Furthermore, another 
advantage of the Bayesian-learning approach is that it is computationally tractable in the auction 
context11. 
2.5.1  Modeling the valuation of auction items 
I identify the anticipated loser and winner regret of the bidders by first modeling the bidder’s 
valuation with a dynamic adaptive utility maximization approach. This approach incorporates the 
anticipated regret of the bidder in the utility specification. Then --using the first order condition 
for the utility function--I derive the latent valuation of the bidders and embed it into another 
valuation specification combining the affiliated values of bidders and learning from others in the 
bidding process. This method provides the required identifying equations for the anticipated 
loser and winner regrets for each bidder. 
                                                 
11
 Forward-looking approaches are intractable in this setting; see, for example, Zeithammer (2006), which proposes 
many restrictive simplifying assumptions to deal with the intractability of a forward-looking model. 
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2.5.1.1. Dynamic adaptive utility maximization approach: 
I first specify the utility of an emotionally rational bidder. In a second price auction setting, the 
term “emotionally rational bidder” refers to a bidder that, rather than bidding her private value as 
suggested by the auction theory, acts naively by comparing her bid with the bids of the 
population. The reason of this comparison might be a lack of information about the value of the 
auction item and/or about the seller or bidder’s past bad experiences. In this way, the bidder 
anticipates a possible regret for potentially winning or losing with his current bid, so ex-ante the 
bidder compares her bid with the highest bid of the population. To quantify this phenomenon, I 
adopt the utility function format that Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) and Filiz Ozbay 
and Ozbay (2007) specify for emotionally rational bidders. Formally, the utility is defined as 
          
)()()()()()( 111 tttit
vzb itttitbz iittititit
zdGzvzdGzbbGbvu
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−≤≤−≤−
−−−−−= ∫∫ βα
                  (1)
 
where itu  denotes the utility of bidder Ii ..1=  at the time of bidding the t’th bid, Tt ..1= , in a 
particular auction (I suppressed the auction subscripts for ease of exposition). itv  denotes the 
time varying value of bidder i at time t, and itb  denotes the bid that bidder i raises at time t. tz  
denotes the maximum bid among all other participating bidders and tG  is the cdf of tz .  Note 
that )(1 itt bG −  is the probability of winning the auction (based on the beliefs at time t-1) after 
 
 
Rational gain from Winner regret 
 Loser regret 
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bidding itb  at time t. iα  and iβ  denote the winner and loser regret parameters of bidder i, 
respectively. All the notation I use in this paper is summarized in Table 2.5.  
Table 2. 5. Notation 
Notation Description 
itu  
The utility of bidder Ii ..1=  at time of bidding the tth bid, Tt ..1= , in auction 
j, which is suppressed for ease of presentation 
itv  
The time varying value of bidder i at time of raising tth bid in auction j; The 
measure of the valuation of bidder i at time of raising tth bid in auction j 
itb  The bid that bidder i raises at time t 
1−tG  The time varying belief of bidders about the distribution of maximum bid tz  
response of all other participating bidders 
iα  The winner regret parameter of bidder i 
iβ  The loser regret parameter of bidder i 
(.)1−tg  The density function, or derivative of cumulative distribution function of bids (.)1−tG  
jtb  The tth bid in auction Jj ...1=  
jtθ  The latent tth bid in auction Jj ...1=  
jtε  The Normally distributed noise of entering the bid into the system, or 
observation noise, which has auction specific variance of jvσ  
jτ , jγ  The evolution and drift factors of the latent bid, in system equation 
jtω  the noise of evolution of the latent bids within the auction, which has auction 
specific variance of jwσ  
(.)tF  The time varying cumulative distribution function of bids; The auction specific 
subscript j is suppressed 
(.)tf  The time varying density function of bids, assuming that the distribution is 
normal; The auction specific subscript j is suppressed 
tn  
The time varying number auction participants; The auction specific subscript j 
is suppressed 
jtn  The observed number of bidders at time of tth bid in auction j 
jtκ  The latent number of bidders at time of tth bid in auction j 
jtτ  The time trend, or the count of bids that have entered so far 
jι  The average rate of entrance parameter 
jη  The rate of sniper entrance 
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jt1ξ
 The normally distributed system noise, which has the variance of ξσ j1  
jt1ζ
 The normally distributed observation noise, which has the variance of ζσ j1  
itb−  The maximum bid that others have raised until the tth bid 
itϕ  The affiliated value of bidder i when tth bid is raised 
jtϑ  The auction specific time varying common value element of this valuation 
iδ  The parameter of revelation of the value 
it
2ζ
 The private signal error term, which has the auction specific variance of ζσ j2  
jt2ξ
 
The common signals that bidders receive, and it has auction specific variance 
of ξσ j2  
id  The vector of measures for experience of bidder i 
cm  The mean of this vector across members of cluster c 
cpi  The propensity of population membership in segment c 
),,,( iiiii ρδβα=Θ  The vector of regret, valuation and learning parameter of bidder i 
iInd The segment that individual i is its member 
jf
 
The information vector of the auction item j, with n information items (i.e., 
columns) 
'θ  The latent prior of membership of an auction in an auction cluster 
nz  The latent cluster index of feature j 
n
jf
 
The nth observed information item of auction js information vector 
'α  and 'β  The parameters of the LDA model to estimate 
),,,( jjjjj ηιτγψ =  The auction specific parameters of the evolution of belief about the bids and 
number of bidders 
jclus  The cluster membership index for auction j 
 
This utility specification has three components12: The first component is the expected profit of 
the bidder from winning the auction. The second component is the anticipated winner regret for 
                                                 
12
 A criticism to the proposed utility specification might be that bidders might search across different auctions. 
However, studies such as Haruvy and Leszcyc (2010) show that bidders have inertia, and unless there is an 
incentive, they do not search across auctions. Ariely and Simonson (2003) also posit that when bidders are 
emotionally involved with the auction, they lose their global view of all the options that are available to them (i.e., 
search), so they act bounded rationally, and only focus on selecting the bid amount. 
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paying higher: Winner regret is defined as a multiplier of the difference between the bidder’s bid 
and highest bid of others in case the bidder wins the auction, and it depends on the distribution of 
maximum bids of other bidders. The third component is anticipated loser regret, which occurs 
when the bidder loses an auction even though the winning bid is lower than her valuation. In this 
case, loser regret is defined as a multiplier of the difference between the bidder’s valuation and 
the winning bid. The underlying assumption for this specification is that bidding is a noisy 
process, so bidders form a belief about the distribution of the latent bids, which I describe next. 
Consistent with the suggestion that bidders learn during the auction13 (Hossain 2008, 
Zeithammer and Adams 2010, Okenfels and Roth 2002) and bidding is a noisy process (Jap and 
Naik 2008), I assume that the mean of bids follows a first order Markov process. Formally, I 
define 
),0(~, jvjtjtjtjt Nb σεεθ +=
                                                                             
(4) 
),0(~,1 jwjtjtjjtjjt N σωωγθτθ ++= −                                                        (5) 
where jtb  denotes the t’th bid in auction Jj ...1= , jtθ  denotes the latent bid, and jtε  denotes the 
normally distributed noise of entering the bid into the system (i.e., trembling hand of Selten 
1975) or observation noise (i.e. bounded rationality of Simon 1972), which has auction specific 
variance, jvσ . jτ  and jγ denote evolution and drift factors of the latent bid, respectively, and jtω  
                                                 
13
 As mentioned in the Introduction, bidders can learn via various processes, such as gaining additional information 
about the auction item or resolving some of the uncertainties about the seller or about their own needs, etc. This 
type of learning is different than learning the value of the item from the bidders of the other auction participants. 
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denotes the noise of evolution (or the unobserved evolution factor) of the latent bids within the 
auction, which has auction specific variance, jwσ . 
Let Bi be the random variable denoting the latent bid of bidder i, (.)tF  and (.)tf  be the time 
varying cumulative distribution and density functions of latent bids (uniform across bidders), 
respectively (assuming the density function exists), and tn  be the time varying number of 
auction participants. Cumulative distribution and density functions for maximum bid of other 
1−tn  bidders at time t are formally defined as (I suppress the auction index j for ease of 
exposition): 
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)()()1()( 2 ttnttttt fFng t θθθ −−=                                                             (7) 
Many studies such as Park and Bradlow (2005) and Bradlow and Park (2007) propose methods 
to recover the latent number of bidders. In this study, for the purpose of parsimony and 
simplicity, I assume that customers use the same Bayesian updating structure for the evolution of 
both the bids and the number of bidders. This assumption is reasonable since there is potential 
observation noise for the number of bidders14.  
                                                 
14
 Usually bidders only skim through the bids to get a high level understanding of number of bidders, and since each 
bidder bids multiple times, double counting or missing one bidder might be completely natural for bounded 
rational bidder. In addition, bidders do not know if any bidder has left the auction or not at the time of 
consideration, so the cumulative number is a noisy signal.  
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Formally, I use the following first order Markov process to specify the evolution of the actual 
number of bidders15:  
),0(~, 111 ζσζζκ jjtjtjtjt Nn +=
                                                                        
(8) 
),0(~, 1111 ξσξξτηικκ jjtjtjtjjjtjt N+++= −                                        (9) 
where jtn  and jtκ  denote the observed and latent number of bidders at time of t’th bid in auction 
j, respectively. jι  denotes the average rate of entrance between bidding times and jη  is the 
change in that entrance rate, which is multiplied by jtτ , which denotes the time trend in the 
auction. This specification allows me to model the sniping behavior explicitly (see, for example, 
Roth and Ockenfels 2000 for further discussion of sniping). jt1ζ  is the observation noise, 
normally distributed with mean zero and variance ζσ j1 , and jt1ξ  is the system noise in the rate 
of entrance and exit, also normally distributed with mean zero and variance ξσ j1 . Therefore, 
bidders update their expectations about the latent number of bidders at each point in time by 
observing the cumulative number of distinct bidders, who have bid up until that moment.  
The last step of the model development in this approach is deriving the expression for valuation. 
I assume that, at each time t, bidders optimize their utility by selecting the optimal bid, itb , given 
the valuation that they decide to reveal at the time. As a result, the bid, itb , satisfies the following 
first order condition: 
                                                 
15
 Given that theory and many empirical studies suggest that bidders are bounded rational for various reasons, it is 
reasonable to assume that bidders follow a simpler parsimonious approximation, such as my model, rather than a 
complex one. 
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Inverting equation (3) gives a measure for bidders’ valuation. Hence, valuation is specified as 
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However, bids itb  are noisy, so a better measure of valuation consists of the expectation of the 
right hand side of equation (10) over the distribution (.)1−tF  of latent bids itθ . Therefore, 
valuation takes the following form: 
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The right hand side of the equation (11) is fully specified, but in order to estimate the unknown 
regret parameters, another specification of itv  is required. To derive such a specification, the 
affiliated valuation and learning theory provides an appropriate ground, which I analyze next.  
2.5.1.2. Affiliated valuation and learning approach: 
In this approach, I model a bidder’s valuation of an auction item as a combination of three 
components: a common value, a private value, and a component consisting of bidder’s learning 
the value of the auction item from the bids of other participants (see Hossain 2008; Zeithammer 
and Adams 2010; and Okenfels and Roth 2002 for further justification of this specification). As a 
result, the time varying valuation has the following specification: 
                                                         ittiiit bv ϕρ += −− )1(                                                         (12) 
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where )1( −− tib   denotes the bid that the bidder sees in the auction board at t-1, and itϕ  denotes the 
affiliated value of bidder i when tth bid is raised. The affiliated value consists of a private signal 
that only the bidder receives, and a common signal that all the bidders receive. To control for 
both types of these unobserved signals, I model the affiliated value evolution in the state space 
format, where the private signal is the error of the observation equation, and the common signal 
is the error of the valuation state equation. In addition, I assume that these signals affect the 
valuation higher at higher value items, and lower when the value of the item is lower (i.e., the 
signals are heteroscedastic). Therefore, consistent with Zeithammer and Adams (2010), I 
consider a log-log model of affiliated valuation evolution, which has the following form:  
),0(~,)log()log(
),0(~,)log()log()log(
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                                 (13) 
where itϕ  denotes the affiliated value of bidder i that raises t’th bid, and jtϑ  denotes auction 
specific time varying common value element of this valuation. iδ  denotes the parameter of 
revelation of the value, and it2ζ  denotes the private signal error term, which has the auction 
specific variance of ζσ j2 16. jt2ξ  denotes the common signals that bidders receive between time 
t-1 and t, and it has auction specific variance of ξσ j2 . This specification allows the bidders to 
reveal their private values gradually when they bid multiple times. I incorporated this hiding 
                                                 
16
 In an ideal scenario, each bidder would have different distribution for their private values. However, this 
assumption significantly complicates the model and makes it impossible to estimate the bidder-specific 
parameters using the available data set. My data set is sparse in the sense that many bidders do not raise their bids 
more than three or four bids within each auction. 
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process to allow for the later bids to be systematically higher, consistent with the Zeithammer 
and Adams (2010), and Okenfels and Roth (2002).  
2.5.1.3. Identification of loser and winner regret: 
Assuming that the two approaches discussed above –dynamic utility maximization and affiliated 
valuation and learning approaches-- give the same valuation for a particular auction item, I can 
combine equations (11) - (13) in the following way: 
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(14) 
For each bidding time t, the set of equations (4)-(9) and (14) provides the required identifying 
equations for the anticipated loser and winner regrets for each bidder. 
2.5.2.  Accounting for heterogeneity 
eBay auctions and their participants’ behaviors show high level of heterogeneity, as also 
mentioned in the Data section. Although bidders bid multiple times (incrementally), the number 
of observations is not enough to identify each bidder’s parameters, so I use a level of shrinkage 
through Bayesian prior on the auction specific and individual specific parameters. Many studies 
including Srinivasan and Wang (2010), Wilcox (2000), and Ariely et al (2005) emphasize the 
influence of experience on the behaviors of the bidders. I use the bidders’ information as a proxy 
for their experience at the hierarchical level in order to shrink the parameters of bidders with 
similar experience. I ran the estimation procedure in two steps: In the first step, I segment the 
bidders into K clusters and in the second step, I condition on the segment index of bidders while 
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running the estimation procedure17. This two-step approach helps speeding up the estimation 
procedure.  
In the same manner, to account for heterogeneity in the auction specific parameters, I shrink 
auction parameters given the eBay-specified auction clusters. Similar to bidder specific 
parameters, I conditioned on the cluster membership in the estimation procedure to shrink the 
auction specific parameters. In Section 2.7, I tested applying a clustering technique on the 
auctions too, rather than using the eBay-specified clusters. My main model results turned out to 
be robust to this method, which suggests that eBay auction clusters were indeed informative. 
2.5.3. Estimation Procedure 
 
The total number of parameters of the model is large, mainly to account for heterogeneity: There 
are four parameters, ),,,( iiiii ρδβα=Θ , for each of the 12,603 bidders, and 10 parameters, 
),,,( jjjjj ηιτγψ =  and the variances of six state-space equation error terms 
),,,,,( 2211 jjjjwjvjj ξζξζ σσσσσσ=Σ , for each of the 1646 auctions. This makes a total of 66,872 
parameters. This large number of parameters over a data set of 58,285 bids most likely causes 
over-fitting problem. However, Bayesian shrinkage of parameters across clusters allows me to 
identify the model. Additionally, I put constraints on the evolution of bids and the number of 
bidders to be able to identify the model more efficiently. These constraints assure that the 
evolution parameters of both the bids and the numbers of bidders are non-negative. I also put 
constraints on the valuation growth and learning from others’ bids, consistent with the theory 
                                                 
17
 It is not clear whether or not the model would over-fit and learn noise rather than the actual behavior of bidders if 
I had incorporated unobserved parameters of bidder responses in a form of a mixture normal model embedded 
within the estimation procedure. 
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which suggests that valuation is positive, and the bidder can either learn from the highest bid to 
increase her valuation or not learn at all. Finally, I rounded up the latent number of bidders 
recovered from the state space model, as the number of the bidders should be an integer number.  
I explain my estimation algorithm in this section and provide a pseudocode of it in Appendix C.  
2.5.3.1 Clustering estimation: 
In the first step of the estimation procedure, I clustered the bidders based on the observed data. 
To cluster bidders with similar experiences, I assume, in each segment, the experience of 
members is a noisy measure of the segment’s mean experience, so I use a mixture normal fuzzy 
clustering18. Formally, the likelihood of the mixture normal clustering approach has the 
following structure: 
∏∑∏
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                                              (15) 
where id  denotes the vector of measures for experience of bidder i. m=(m1,…,mK), v=(v1,…,vK) 
where cm  and cv  denote the mean and variance of id  across members of cluster c, respectively, 
and ),...,( 1 iKii pipipi =  where icpi  is the propensity of population membership in segment c. I 
maximize this likelihood function with respect to (m, v, pi ) using an Expectation Maximization 
(EM) algorithm, which, for each bidder, provides a probability distribution for segment 
memberships. Finally, I assign each bidder to the segment with the highest probability. 
Therefore, for the shrinkage parameters, I formally have: 
                                                 
18
 The term “fuzzy” is used for methods which estimate a distribution for the cluster memberships, rather than 
assigning the bidders to certain clusters. 
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),|(.~ iii dIndMVNΘ                                                                           (16) 
where iInd denotes bidder i’s segment. This specification provides flexible patterns of bidders’ 
responses.  
I used Mclust package in R to perform this clustering. This package uses the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) for model selection.  
To cluster similar auctions, I utilized the eBay-specified auction clusters. Formally, I obtain the 
following structure: 
),|(.~ jjj DclusMVNΨ                                                                           (18) 
where  jclus  denotes cluster membership index of auction j. 
In summary, the model uses the hierarchical multivariate normal prior for both bidder specific 
and auction specific parameters, conditional on their segment and cluster membership (I use 
jclus  to denote the cluster membership index of auction j). This procedure accounts for 
heterogeneity in these entities, and prevents over-fitting to the data and learning noise.  
2.5.3.2.Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) optimization: 
In the second step, given the segment and cluster membership information of each bidder and 
auction, I optimized Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) of the model parameters over the data19. 
Considering the assumption that bidders update their belief about the distribution of the bids 
sequentially, I use Kalman Filter theory (Kalman and Bucy 1961). Introduced by Jap and Naik 
(2008) to auction literature, Kalman Filter starts with a prior on the distribution of latent 
                                                 
19
 Alternatives such as Gibbs and Metropolis Hasting sampling methods are computationally intractable over large 
data sets. 
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measures, and it updates the posterior distribution of the latent measures sequentially, using 
Kalman gain factor (the variance of signals proportion) to weight the observed signal and the 
prior in a Bayesian updating process. The advantage of Kalman Filter to other filters is its closed 
form, which significantly improves the estimation speed. To estimate the latent state space model 
with Kalman Filter, I used a Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization (MCEM) approach 
suggested by De Valpine (2012). This approach embeds Kalman Filter in the optimization 
method. In other words, given the non-state parameters ),,( ΣΨΘ=Φ , the procedure estimates 
the mean and variance of the latent space, and then uses Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the 
full joint likelihood of the observation ty  and the latent state ),,( tttt ϑκθ=∆ , which has the 
following form: 
∏
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The posterior of the model has the following form: 
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where ),...,( 1 jjTjj θθθ = , ),..,( 1 jjTjj κκκ = , ),...,( 1 jjTjj ϑϑϑ = , and (.).ˆδ
 
denotes the Dirac delta 
function20. The first, second, and third lines denote likelihood of error terms of the state space 
equations (4) and (5) --specified for the belief of bidders about the bid distribution-- equations 
(8) and (9) --specified for the belief of bidders about the number of bidder distribution--, and 
equation (14) --specified for the evolution of affiliated valuations, respectively. The fourth and 
fifth lines denote the likelihood of error terms of equation (16) and (18), respectively, specified 
as hierarchy over individual and auction specific parameters. The sixth line specifies prior on the 
variance of the three state space equations, and the mean and variance parameters of the 
hierarchy. I can rewrite the model parameters’ posterior based directly on the error terms of the 
state space equations and hierarchy over individual and auction specific parameters as follows:  
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I use an MCEM approach to compute the maximizing parameters of the posterior of the model in 
(20). This iterative method starts with an initial set of parameter estimations and alternates 
between an Expectation (E-) step and a Maximization (M-)21 step until convergence.  
                                                 
20
 Dirac delta function is a generalized distribution that is zero everywhere except at the point that its subscript 
specifies. It represents a normal distribution at the limit when the variance equates to zero. 
21
 I actually applied the Generalized EM algorithm where, in the M-step, rather than computing the maximizing 
parameters, I settled with a point that improves the objective. This algorithm has similar properties with EM 
algorithm (see, McLachlan and Krishnan 2008, for further details). 
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For the E-step of each iteration, I first perform a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to project the 
bidder (resp., auction) specific information to the bidder (resp., auction) specific parameters 
within each segment as follows:  
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The estimated parameters of these WLS’s, ( )()( ˆ,ˆ iindiind σµ , )()( ˆ,ˆ jclustjclust σµ ), are then used to 
compute the prior probabilities of the bidder-specific and auction-specific parameters (fourth and 
fifth lines in equation (20), respectively). I computed the likelihood contribution of the belief of 
bidders about the bids and the number of bidders, and the evolution of the valuations (first, 
second, and the third lines of equation (20)) using Kalman filtering and backward smoothing 
methods to derive the evolution of the state parameters in each bidding time. I used Monte Carlo 
sampling method to integrate out the latent state variables. The details of these methods are 
explained in Appendix C. I used DLM package in R to run the Kalman filtering and backward 
smoothing. 
For the optimization problem in the M-step of each iteration, since a closed form solution for the 
gradient of the maximum a posteriori of the model is not available, methods such as gradient 
descent, quasi Newton, and conjugate gradient are computationally intractable. Calculating the 
gradient numerically will also increase the run-time of the estimation algorithm cubically in the 
number of the parameters, i.e. )( 3TJPO . Therefore, I used simulated annealing method, which 
is a generic probabilistic heuristic method for global optimization.  
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Simulated annealing method uses only function values, so it is relatively slow. It starts with an 
initial value and, at each iteration, a new point is randomly generated. The algorithm accepts all 
new points that improves the objective, but also, with a certain probability that gradually 
decreases, it might accept points that worsen the objective. By accepting the latter type of points, 
the algorithm avoids being trapped in local minima in early iterations and is able to explore 
globally for better solutions. (See Belisle 1992 for further discussion of this algorithm.) To the 
best of my knowledge, I am the first to use simulated annealing in the marketing/OM fields, but 
it is used in other fields (for example, Crama and Schyns 2003 use this method for complex 
portfolio optimization, and Zhuang et al 1994 use it for robotics calibration). 
I terminated the MCEM algorithm when the Euclidian difference between the parameter 
estimations of two consecutive iterations became smaller than a pre-specified tolerance or after a 
maximum number of iterations (I used 1e-8 as the tolerance and 2,000 as the maximum iteration 
number in this study).   
2.6.  RESULTS 
I start presenting the results with the bidder segments that I estimated in the first step. The BIC 
criterion suggests clustering the bidders into 47 segments. Table 2.6 presents the summary 
statistics of average bidder characteristics within each bidder segment. As expected, there is 
considerable heterogeneity between segments.  
The optimal MAP is estimated to be -94,280,085. Given that this model is estimated on 
approximately 60,000 bids of 12,000 bidders in 1,600 auctions, this value is in the expected 
range. Table 2.7 presents the summary statistics for the bidder-specific parameter estimations: 
columns 2-5 are across 19 auction categories and columns 6-9 are across estimated 47 bidder 
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segments. The estimated parameters show significant heterogeneity in bidders’ parameters across 
bidder segments. On the other hand, there is not much heterogeneity across auction categories, 
which suggests that regret and valuation/learning characteristics are more individual specific 
than category specific.  
Table 2.6. Summary statistics of the average bidder characteristics within each of 47 bidder 
segments 
Characteristic Mean SD min max 
Size 260.55 275.02 3 992 
avg. feedback score 3471.21 12399.80 48 84027 
sd feedback score 3635.04 8480.39 5 45365 
avg. Number of bids on this item 8.57 7.67 1 35 
sd Number of bids on this item 6.79 6.77 0 26 
avg. total number of bids in 30 days 680.32 1072.73 3 4530 
sd total number of bids in 30 days 630.98 1066.22 0 5814 
avg. Number of items bid on in 30 days 257.57 412.59 1 1631 
sd Number of items bid on in 30 days 266.91 449.57 1 2099 
avg. Bidding Activity with current Seller 24.47 20.19 1 100 
sd Bidding Activity with current Seller 19.34 11.72 0 40 
avg. Number of categories bid on 2.19 0.57 1 4 
sd Number of categories bid on 1.13 0.64 0 3 
 
Winner (resp. loser) regret parameter is significant in 44 (resp. 45) out of the 47 bidder segments 
at p<0.01 and it is significant in two (resp. one) categories at p<0.05. This significance is 
consistent with the findings of Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) suggesting when there is an element 
of common value in the valuation, there is potential winner regret anticipation in eBay auctions. 
Table 2.7 also indicates that the mean of average loser regret is slightly higher (in magnitude) 
than winner regret, but the means are fairly close to each other.  
The significance of both winner and loser regrets and their close magnitudes, on average, are not 
consistent with the suggestions of Ariely and Simonson (2003), which state that the second price 
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systems used by online auctions like eBay decrease the probability of winner regret, while 
maximizing loser regret. Therefore, my results indeed support the results of Zeithammer and 
Adams (2010) suggesting sealed-bid second price auction is not a good abstraction for eBay 
auctions. Another possible explanation for this inconsistency is bidders’ naïve bidding behaviors 
which do not conform to second price auction theory. The magnitudes of the regret values do not 
support the claim of Gilovich et al. (1998) either: They suggest that action regret (analogous to 
winner regret) incites more intensive feeling than inaction regret (analogous to loser regret), 
which incites wistful feeling.  
Table 2.7.  Summary statistics for the bidder specific parameter estimations 
within each auction category (19) within each bidder segment (47) 
Parameter min max Mean SD min max Mean SD 
avg. winner regret 
-
1.38 -1.24 -1.31 0.04 -1.67 -0.52 -1.28 0.19 
se winner regret 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.10 0.08 
avg. loser regret -1.4 -1.28 -1.33 0.03 -1.7 -0.79 -1.34 0.13 
se loser regret 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.006 0.03 0.49 0.10 0.09 
avg. valuation param. 1.17 1.28 1.23 0.03 0.79 1.42 1.22 0.10 
se valuation param. 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.004 0.02 0.27 0.08 0.06 
avg. learning param. 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.03 0 0.81 0.27 0.12 
se learning param. 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.26 0.09 0.06 
 
Looking at the estimation results from the auction category perspective shows that both winner 
and loser regret are significant in all the categories at p<0.0001. To test the hypothesis that 
luxury and widely available goods convey different levels of regret, I ran pairwise t-test between 
the parameters of regret in widely available and luxury goods categories. However, the results, 
which are presented in Table 2.8, did not show any significant difference between luxury and 
widely available good auctions in terms of regret levels.  
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Table 2.8. t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
For Winner Regret For Loser Regret 
  
Widely 
Available Luxury 
Widely 
Available Luxury 
Mean -1.334 -1.317 -1.319 -1.330 
Variance 0.934 0.982 0.946 0.957 
Observations 6024 6024 6024 6024 
Pearson Correlation 0.008 
  
0.002 
  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
  
0 
  
Df 6023 
  
6023 
  
t Stat -1.002 
  
0.609 
  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.158 
  
0.271 
  
t Critical one-tail 1.645 
  
1.645 
  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.316 
  
0.542 
  
t Critical two-tail 1.960   1.960   
 
Table 2.7 shows that the mean of the average valuation revelation parameters   across bidder 
segments is 1.22, i.e., at each increment, on average, the bidders reveal 22% more than their 
previously revealed valuation. The mean of average learning parameters across bidder segments 
is 0.27, which implies that, on average, the bidders weigh the highest observed bid 27% while 
updating their valuations by learning from the highest bid. Comparison of the estimated 
valuation and learning parameters suggests that bidders put more weight on their own valuation 
than learning from the highest bid. A possible explanation for the low learning level is shill 
bidding, as Boze and Daripa (2011) suggest. In shill bidding, the seller bids on the auction by 
herself or through one of her affiliate to cause others to bid higher. It might be possible that the 
bidders consider such shill bidding, so they discount their learning from the highest bid.  
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Figure 2.3. Histogram of regret and valuation evolution parameters across bidder segments 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of regret, learning, and valuation revelation parameters across 
bidder segments. These distributions have long tails, and, indeed, Shapiro-Wilk normality tests 
reject normality for these distributions at p<0.01, so Gaussian distribution does not represent 
them well. This observation lends support to the importance of allowing flexible response 
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patterns by clustering the data and shrink different bidders’ parameters across their 
corresponding segment parameter means. 
Table 2.9. Relation between the winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation 
parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across forty seven bidder segments 
  
winner 
regret 
loser 
regret 
valuation 
revelation learning 
winner regret 1 
loser regret 0.427 1 
valuation revelation 0.662 0.589 1 
Learning 0.135 0.474 0.613 1 
 
 
Table 2.10. Relation between the winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation 
parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across forty seven bidder segments 
Regressand Regressor Estimate SE t-stat p-value 
Winner regret 
Intercept -0.43 0.27 -1.61 0.11 
loser regret 0.63** 0.20 3.16 0.00 
Winner 
Regret      
 Intercept -0.78** 0.20 -3.901 0.000 
 Learning 0.94** 0.13 7.305 0.000 
valuation 
revelation -0.59** 0.17 -3.418 0.001 
Loser Regret 
 Intercept -1.64** 0.16 -10.118 0.000 
Learning 0.33** 0.10 3.149 0.003 
valuation 
revelation 0.17 0.14 1.193 0.239 
** Two tail 0.95% confidence interval significance 
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Table 2.11. Explaining winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation parameters 
iδ  and the learning parameter iρ estimates across 47 bidder segments 
Regressand Regressor Estimate SE t-stat p-value 
Winner Regret )64.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept -1.278* 0.017 -75.449 0.000 
Segment Size 0.000 0.000 0.564 0.576 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.001* 0.000 6.344 0.000 
Number of Bids on This item -0.004 0.003 -1.570 0.125 
total number of bids in 30 days 0.013* 0.004 3.574 0.001 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.000 0.000 -1.456 0.153 
Bid activity with current Seller 0.003* 0.001 2.430 0.020 
Number of categories Bid on Mean 0.044 0.046 0.964 0.341 
Loser Regret )30.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept -1.341* 0.016 -83.916 0.000 
Segment Size 0.000 0.000 -0.737 0.466 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.001* 0.000 4.261 0.000 
Number of Bids on This item -0.004 0.003 -1.734 0.091 
total number of bids in 30 days -0.001 0.003 -0.311 0.758 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.000 0.000 -1.025 0.312 
Bid activity with current Seller 0.000 0.001 -0.455 0.651 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.027 0.043 -0.635 0.529 
Learning value from bids )64.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept 0.271* 0.017 16.326 0.000 
Segment Size 0.000 0.000 1.168 0.250 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.001* 0.000 9.030 0.000 
Number of Bids on This item 0.003 0.003 1.216 0.231 
total number of bids in 30 days 0.002 0.004 0.601 0.551 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.000 0.000 -0.208 0.836 
Bid activity with current Seller 0.001 0.001 0.590 0.559 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.023 0.045 -0.507 0.615 
Valuation update )41.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept 1.269* 0.016 79.126 0.000 
Segment Size 0.000 0.000 -0.215 0.831 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.001* 0.000 4.782 0.000 
Number of Bids on This item 0.004 0.003 1.521 0.136 
total number of bids in 30 days -0.011* 0.003 -3.148 0.003 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.000 0.000 1.859 0.071 
Bid activity with current Seller 0.000 0.001 -0.213 0.833 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.010 0.043 -0.242 0.810 
* Two tail 0.95% confidence interval significance 
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I evaluated the correlation between bidder-specific parameters as well. Table 2.9 shows the 
correlation matrix for regret and learning parameters across 47 bidder segments and Table 2.10 
shows the regression analysis between these parameters. The results show that winner regret is 
positively correlated with loser regret. I explain this result by the type of bidders: Some bidders 
might be emotional, so they account for both winner and loser regret emotions, and the others 
might be less emotional so they generally regret less. I also find a negative relationship between 
learning less from others (status quo tendency) and feeling winner regret, consistent with Inman 
and Zeelenberg (2002) findings. In other words, I find that bidders who update their valuations 
based on the new auction board bid less, anticipate more winner regret than others.  
I also explain the estimated regret and learning parameters based on the observed characteristics 
of the bidder segments. These characteristics are good proxies for the bidders’ experience and 
important factors on bidders’ behaviors, as I discussed earlier. Table 2.11 presents the result of 
this analysis. The results show that bidders with more feedback score (i.e., more experience) are 
less regretful, and learn more from the bids on the auction board. I also find that bidding in 
several categories correlates with more loser regret and the valuation update correlates positively 
with the bidders’ feedback score. The latter result suggests that bidders with more experience 
reveal their value more, which is consistent with the dominant strategy of rational bidders in the 
auction literature.  
Table 2.12 presents the summary statistics for the auction-specific parameter estimations. The 
average of the parameter for the belief about the growth of bids is 1.77 across all auction items, 
which suggests that bidders believe that bids will exponentially grow as new bids enter. This 
exponential growth is consistent with the form of the evolution of bids in figure 2.1. The average 
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drift parameter is 5.58 across all auction items, which suggests the dollar value that bidders 
expect a new bid will increment the previous bid after the growth. The average rate of entrance 
between two bids is 1.05 across auction items, suggesting bidders expect 1 new bidder watch the 
auction and ready to bid between two consecutive bids. The last minute rush rate is 2.09 across 
auction items, which suggests that bidders expect the rate of entrance to triple at the end of the 
auction. This is consistent with the sniping behavior. 
Table 2.12. Summary statistics for the auction specific parameter estimations 
 
within each auction category 
(19) 
Parameter min max Mean SD 
avg. growth of bids 1.5 2 1.77 0.11 
se growth of bids 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.04 
avg. drift of bids 5.36 5.81 5.58 0.12 
se drift of bids 0.08 0.2 0.12 0.03 
avg. last minute flood 0.9 1.26 1.05 0.09 
se last minute flood 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.05 
avg. mean entrance rate 1.84 2.26 2.09 0.11 
se mean entrance rate 0.08 0.24 0.14 0.04 
 2.7.  COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
Notification policies are shown to be effective in influencing the bidder’s feeling and 
anticipating regret (see, for example, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). Such a notification policy 
for an auction platform such as eBay might suggest sending emails of auction winning bid and 
amount paid statistics to the users, or to present such information on the website.  Notification 
policies can be conditioned on the bidder behavior to target only naïve bidders. However, to 
implement a policy change, the auction platform should be able to predict the revenue 
implications of such an action accurately. From this aspect, in addition to allowing for targeting 
bidders, the key advantage of modeling the bidders’ decision structurally is the capability to 
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study counterfactuals. My empirical results show that the bidders experience significant winner 
regret on eBay auctions. Therefore, I studied a counterfactual scenario where an auction platform 
shuts down the winner regret using its notification policy (I first assumed that loser regret is still 
in effect). 
To run this counterfactual scenario, I set the winner regret parameters to zero while keeping all 
the other parameters in their estimated values. Given this new setting, I started from the first bid, 
and, at each point in time, I computed the optimal bid of a given bidder by running a Broyden–
Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) optimization algorithm on the utility function of the bidder, 
presented in equation (1). Given this new optimal bid, I then updated the time varying 
parameters of belief about the distribution of the latent bids, by running Kalman Filter, and I 
computed the optimal bid of the next given bidder. In this way, I simulated the bids of all the 
bidders at each point in time and determined the winning bid and the amount paid for each 
auction item in the new environment with no winner regret. 
Figure 2.4 presents the results of this analysis on six auction samples. The results show that 
shutting down the winner regret can increase the winning bid two to four times in some auctions. 
The results resemble a step function in some proximity, because, as a result of this shut down, 
some bidders bid so much higher than others that the other bidders’ bids became irrelevant, as 
they are prone to raise a bid with a lower value.  
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Figure 2.4. Counterfactual analysis of shutting down winner regret (blue line the optimal bidding 
when regret is shut down, and red line the observed) 
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Table 2.13. Counterfactual analysis of shutting down only winner and both winner/loser regret 
 
I further studied the revenue implications at auction platform level. Table 2.13 presents the 
results of this counterfactual analysis within each auction category, and across all the auctions. 
By shutting down the bidders’ winner regret through a notification policy, on average, the 
auction platform can improve its revenue of each item by 32%, and its total revenue by 24%. 
Considering category-based improvements indicates that “Stamps” and “DVD and Movies” have 
the highest improvement, when I shut down the winner regret. Significant improvements by 
Auction Category 
Number of 
Auctions 
Average 
improvement of 
shutting down  
winner regret 
Average 
improvement of 
shutting down 
both winner and 
loser 
Jewelry and Watches 149 28% 28% 
Collectibles 103 36% 32% 
Clothing, Shoes and      Accessories 84 25% 16% 
Crafts 78 28% 31% 
Pottery and Glass 74 27% 22% 
Antiques 68 40% 49% 
Toys and Hobbies 93 29% 30% 
Stamps 72 61% 43% 
Books 84 28% 30% 
Tickets and Experiences 91 18% 5% 
Art 70 25% 21% 
Gift Cards and Coupons 85 40% 38% 
Music 86 44% 27% 
Consumer Electronics 83 19% 17% 
DVDs and Movies 87 53% 39% 
Dolls and Bears 84 27% 39% 
Entertainment Memorabilia 88 23% 13% 
Health and Beauty 74 37% 40% 
Video Games and Consoles 93 39% 38% 
Total improvement 24% 24% 
Average improvement across all auctions 32% 29% 
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shutting down winner regret occur in widely available good categories such as DVD’s and 
movies, music, health and beauty, books, and gift cards and coupons, in which usually non-
expert bidders bid on (stamps and antiques are exceptions). However, smaller improvements 
occur in tickets and experiences, entertainment memorabilia, and art, which most likely attract 
more expert bidders. To test this hypothesis I regressed the counterfactual revenue improvement 
of the auction items on the characteristics of bidders and price. Top part of Table 2.14 presents 
the results. They suggest that the number of bid on a specific auction item and the total number 
of items bid on are positively correlated with the improvement in revenue. This can be explained 
by incremental bidders, i.e., those who bid a lot are naive incremental bidders, and shutting down 
winner regret improves the revenue more, when bidders are naïve. Furthermore, a high number 
of auction items bid on is a signal of the bidder’s not concentrating on one auction item to win, 
which is another proxy for less experience of the bidder. 
As notification policy might have the potential to remove both types of regrets together, I also 
experimented the effect of shutting down both winner and loser regret. Since winner and loser 
regrets affect the bids in the opposite directions, intuitively, such a shutdown should decrease the 
amount of revenue improvement of shutting down only the winner regret, and, indeed, on 
average, it improves each auction’s highest bid by 29% and the total revenue by 24%, slightly 
less than shutting down only the winner regret. Regressing the counterfactual revenue 
improvement on the characteristics of bidders and price did not provide us statistically 
significant relations in this case (estimation results are presented in bottom part of Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.14. Counterfactual revenue improvements explained by the characteristics of bidder on 
each auction bidder category 
Shutting down winner regret  
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value 
Intercept 0.1559 0.0921 1.6935 0.0905 
Feedback 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9519 0.3413 
Bids on this item 0.0035 0.0020 1.7814 0.0750 
Total bids in 30 days 0.0000 0.0001 -0.3022 0.7625 
Number of items bided on 0.0009 0.0004 2.5731 0.0102 
Activity with the Seller 0.0006 0.0011 0.5675 0.5704 
Number of Categories bid on 0.0231 0.0303 0.7613 0.4466 
 
Shutting down both types of regret  
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value 
Intercept 0.166 0.084 1.987 0.047 
Feedback 0.000 0.000 -0.611 0.542 
Bids on this item 0.002 0.002 1.358 0.175 
Total bids in 30 days 0.000 0.000 0.404 0.686 
Number of items bided on 0.000 0.000 0.756 0.450 
Activity with the Seller 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.994 
Number of Categories bid on 0.035 0.027 1.266 0.206 
 
2.8. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
I first checked the robustness of my results to some of the modeling assumptions. One 
assumption in my model is that bidders use their own bids as a proxy for how much they are 
going to pay in case they win the auction22. Therefore, they compare their bids with their beliefs 
                                                 
22
 Even if bidders might be aware of the second price nature of eBay auctions, it still make sense to make this 
assumption, since the bidders do not know whether there will be new bids between the one on the auction board 
and their bids before the auction ends. Therefore, it is possible that they will pay a price very close to their own 
bids even if they win.  
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about the maximum bid of other bidders (since the maximum bid of others is not directly 
observable). I tested an alternative utility specification assuming that when a bidder bids itb at 
time t, she considers the fact that she would pay an amount between her bid and the currently 
displayed maximum bid, in case she wins the auction. I model this situation by replacing itb  with 
itiitib max)1( λλ −+  where itmax  is the maximum bid that is shown on the auction board and 
iλ  is the parameter (to be estimated from data) of expected proportion of the current bid 
difference that can be possibly filled by new bids.  
I found that this new specification does not change the inference significantly. In the new 
specification, winner and loser regrets are still significant at p<0.05 across all bidder segments 
except one, and their magnitudes, on average, do not change significantly. Other insights derived 
from the main model did not change either, so I concluded that my utility specification is robust 
to this assumption.  
I further checked the robustness of my estimation algorithm to the clustering approaches. First, I 
tested applying a different clustering method on the auctions, rather than using the eBay-
specified clusters. In particular, the descriptions in the item titles in Table 2.3 suggest that the 
auction categories may not be the best way to classify auctions, since the keywords in the 
product titles also provide useful information for classification. For example the words 
“Shampoo”, “Conditioner”, and “Styler” in the title of the auction item which is classified as 
“Gift Card and Coupon”, might suggest that this item is actually closely related to items in 
“Health and Beauty” category. Or the word “Original” appearing in the descriptions of items that 
are in “Collectible” and “Entertainment and Memorabilia” categories might suggest that bidders 
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behave similarly for these two items, as a response to this signal. This observation led me to use 
a model that incorporates not only the auctions’ structured information, but also unstructured text 
description of the auction items.  
To be able to incorporate text data, I used frequency matrix of words, and after augmenting it 
with the auction item information, I used a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model to cluster 
the auction items based on their observed characteristics. Similar to bidder specific parameters, I 
used a two-step approach, 23 i.e., I first clustered the auctions using the LDA model and then I 
conditioned on the segment membership in the estimation procedure to shrink the auction 
specific parameters. 
I used a topic modeling package available in R, to run LDA using Variational Bayesian 
Expectation Maximization (VBEM) method, over a data set of key word frequency and auction 
information. To create auction key word frequency matrix, I used WordNet python interface to 
lemmatize the keywords after parsing them, and I only kept the keywords that are available in 
the dictionary. I explain the details of the LDA estimation procedure in the online companion.  
This procedure grouped the auctions into 50 clusters24. The average number of bidders (resp. 
bids) in each cluster ranges from 6 to 13 (resp. 25 to 63) and the average auction duration ranges 
from 4 to 6 days25. The optimal MAP in this case is estimated to be -99,276,228 (5.3% less than 
the estimated main model MAP). The estimation and counterfactual results can be found in the 
                                                 
23
 I did not use LDA in the estimation procedure, mainly for its detrimental effect on the run time. 
24
 If I use k-means algorithm, I observe that within group sum of square uniformly decreases as the number of 
clusters increases (see Figure B.2 in Appendix). However, I used 50 clusters, since some clusters become highly 
sparse if I use more than 50 clusters. 
25
 Except one (outlier) cluster that, on average, lasts one day with one average number of bids and bidders. 
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online companion. Overall, my insights derived from the main model do not change 
significantly.  
Second, to check the robustness of my results to the clustering method used for the bidders, I 
tested using a k-means algorithm instead of mixture normal fuzzy clustering. Appendix B 
presents the change in within group sum of square based on the number of clusters using k-
means algorithm, 26 and compares the summary statistics of clusters derived by both approaches. 
These analyses show that both clustering methods provide similar clusters for bidders. The 
optimal MAP in the case of k-means algorithm is estimated to be -103,428,091, which is 9.7% 
less than the estimated main model MAP. Furthermore, my main insights are not affected 
significantly in this case either27. 
 
 
2.9. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, I developed a structural model that accounts for bidders' learning and their 
anticipation of winner and loser regrets in an auction platform and proposed an empirical 
Bayesian estimation method to calibrate the parameters of this model. Then, using a large data 
set from eBay, I showed that bidders anticipate significant levels of regret in various product 
categories. My results also demonstrate that experience can explain the heterogeneity in the 
bidders' learning, updating, and regretting behavior. 
I further illustrated how the estimated model can be used to analyze a counterfactual scenario 
where the auction platform shuts down the bidders' winner regret. This counterfactual analysis 
                                                 
26
 The elbow of the curve in Figure B.1 is around 50, which suggests that the range of the optimal number of clusters 
that BIC criterion suggests in mixture normal clustering (47 clusters) is robust. 
27
 Estimation results of this model is available upon request from author. 
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shows that, if eBay can shut down winner regret of bidders by appropriate notification policies, it 
can increase its revenue by 24%. I believe that my modeling approach, proposed estimation 
method, and derived empirical insights in this paper can be of interest to both practitioners and 
scholars in academia. 
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3.1. ABSTRACT 
The cornerstone of the new marketing era consists of user generated content. This information is 
useful for reducing consumer uncertainty, generating new ideas for new products, and managing 
the customer relationship. To motivate users to generate content, practitioners use video game 
elements such as badges, leaderboard, and reputation points for user achievements, in an 
approach called Gamification. To allow Gamification platforms to target their users, I profile 
user segments by an ensemble method over LDA, mixed-normal and k-mean clustering, and then 
I develop a model of state-dependent choices of content generating users. This model captures 
long tail distribution of user heterogeneity by Dirichlet Process, and investigates the effects of 
fun and social elements of Gamification, reputation points, rank in the leaderboard, and badges 
(i.e. gold, silver, bronze) on the users’ probabilities to contribute content. I used a big data set of 
approximately 11,000,000 choices made by 36,000 users across 250 days on Stackoverflow to 
estimate the mixed binary logit model of users’ content contribution choices. I show that 
estimating the model on smaller random samples generate biased results. The estimation results 
demonstrate that users show heterogeneous significant positive and negative inertia, reciprocity, 
intrinsic motivation, and responses to badges, reputation points, and leaderboard ranks. I found 
interesting sensitivity patterns to Gamification elements for users with different nationality, 
which allows the Gamification platform to create targeted messages. The counterfactual analysis 
suggests that the Gamification platform can increase the number of contributions by making 
earning badges more difficult.  
111 
 
Keywords: Gamification, user generated content, mixed logit with DP prior, semi parametric 
Bayesian, ensemble segmentation, targeting 
3.2. INTRODUCTION 
An underutilized marketing resource is user generated content, a type of online contents that 
customers generate and use. User generated content is an important tool for generating word of 
mouth buzz, collecting new product development ideas, decreasing consumers’ uncertainty about 
an experience goods, engaging brands, and managing customer relationships. However, to use 
this resource effectively, marketers might need to know how to motivate users to generate more 
favorable and high quality content. To motivate the users, marketing practitioners have started to 
use the video games concepts such as badges and points for user achievements, and leaderboards, 
for user popularity, in a method called Gamification. 
According to Gabe Zicherman, the author of “game based marketing”, Gamification is the use of 
game play mechanics for non-game applications (Zichermann and Linder 2010). In other words, 
Gamification is the process of using game thinking and mechanics to engage an audience and 
solve problems (Van Grove 2011). Studies show that game play itself stimulates the human brain 
(releasing dopamine), so Gamification aims to bring the proven mechanics from gaming into 
marketing (Bosomworth 2011). Gartner predicts by 2016, Gamification will be a vital tool for 
brands’ and retailers’ customer loyalty and marketing. However, this report highlights that firms 
112 
 
are skeptical about the longevity and the real efficiency of Gamification as a tool to motivate 
customers28.  
As a result, given the interest in and skepticism about the effects of Gamification mechanics on 
motivating users, this study asks the following questions: How to model the choices of 
consumers in response to Gamification mechanics? How to weigh emotional elements such as 
fun in relation to the mechanical elements, such as badges and leaderboard? How to design a 
scalable and flexible targeting approach that is feasible on massive streaming Gamification 
platform data? Are the social aspects of public good contributions, such as reciprocity and 
reputation, important in motivating users to provide content in a gamified context? 
Answering each of these questions helps the Gamification platform to form a different targeted 
policy to increase the users’ content contributions. For example, depending on whether badges 
are good or bad motivators, the Gamification platform might modify the thresholds of earning 
them. As points sum up to build the users’ reputation, depending on whether different users 
respond positively or negatively to their reputation changes, the Gamification platform can send 
a customized list of tasks with different difficulty level to users. In the customized list, the 
Gamification platform might prioritize tasks to make sure that the community replies to the 
request of target users who are positively reciprocal. In addition, given that Gamification is about 
user empowerment, the Gamification platform might want to send positive empowering 
messages to failed users who have high inertia.  
                                                 
28
 Gartner's Gamification predictions for 2020. Growth Engineering website. http://www.growthengineering.co.uk 
/future-of-gamification-gartner/. Accessed June 7, 2015. 
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To respond to these questions and take into account the emotional nature of the motivation 
process, the current study builds its model in the light of the state-dependent utility model in the 
consumer choice literature. In particular, I included in the state-dependent utility model the 
elements that might define the observed motivation state of users. A user decides whether or not 
to contribute, based on this utility. First, I included in the model heterogeneous stimulation level 
in a form of user specific random effects, guided by the studies in the consumer behavior 
literature (Mittelstaedt 1976; Joachimsthaler and Lastovicka 1984; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 
1992). Second, I considered the number of badges in different categories (i.e. gold, silver, 
bronze) to have different effects, guided by the Gamification literature (Wei et al. 2015; Li et al. 
2015; Deterding 2012; Antin and Churchil 2011; etc.). Furthermore, I allowed the users of 
different segments to respond differently to the same type of badges.  
I considered the social aspect of users’ decisions at two levels: first, the reciprocity and the 
reputation points at state of user utility level; and second, the reach of users at hierarchical level, 
guided by the literature on behavioral aspect of decision making (Bolton et al. 2013; Bolton et al. 
2004; Yoganarasimhan 2013; Lee and Bell 2013; Toubia and Stephen 2013). I also considered 
that the effects of badges and reputation points in motivating users might be different in the short 
and long term, similar to the effect of loyalty program rewards and promotions in the marketing 
literature (Liu 2007; Jedidi et al. 1999, Mela et al. 1997; Lewis 2004). 
To estimate the model I use a data set I scraped from StackOverflow by my Python crawler. The 
data set includes approximately 11,000,000 contribution choices of 36,000 users over a course of 
approximately 230 days. StackOverflow is a question and answer website, where registered users 
can post their programming questions, and the other community members can respond. The 
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StackOverflow business model is based on the traditional job listing, Curriculum Vitae search, 
and unobtrusive advertising. It uses Gamification concepts such as reputation points, badges, and 
a leaderboard to motivate its users. Community members can up-vote or down-vote a question or 
an answer, and StackOverflow keeps track of the votes a user receives as reputation points. The 
platform (i.e. StackOverflow) uses these votes later as a measure to define who receives badges 
at gold, silver, and bronze levels in different knowledge domains. These domains are specified 
by tags that a user attaches to the question. In addition, these reputation points define the rank of 
each user on the leaderboard. I selected StackOverflow as a source of the data for this study, 
because it implements a successful Gamification mechanics on its question and answer platform 
(e.g., Antin and Churchill 2011; Wei et al. 2015; Li et al. 2015). To use this data, I wrote a web 
crawler, and I synthesized the data from various web pages based on the user identity.  
Estimating the model over the big data set allows the Gamification platform to target its policies 
effectively, if the estimates capture the heavy tail of user-heterogeneity parameter-distribution. I 
employed a mixed binary logit model with hierarchical Dirichlet process, which allows the 
number of response parameters to increase with sample size. Allowing the number of parameters 
to increase with the sample size allows the estimation procedure not only to learn the tail more 
effectively, but also to learn more about the infinitely complex real phenomena as more data 
becomes available.  
To the best of my knowledge no studies in marketing have estimated a choice model over such a 
big data set. Instead, marketing scholars resort to a linear-probability data-fitting approach to 
estimate consumers’ parameters (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011). An alternative approach is to 
sample from the data, but throwing away data might not be a relevant strategy for targeting. I 
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showed the estimates for the model using samples with different sizes.  The results showed that 
estimating the model over a smaller sample sizes results in biased estimates. As a result, 
importance of a quick, flexible, and scalable method is highlighted.  
The results show that users can be segmented into competitors (20%), collaborators (21%), 
achievers (25%), explorers (11%), and uninterested (22%) users. The users show heterogeneous 
significant positive and negative response to the badges, leaderboard ranks, and reputation 
points. In addition, users show heterogeneous significant positive and negative inertia, intrinsic 
motivation, and reciprocity. These results suggest that the Gamification platform can condition 
its targeted message on the users’ responses to increase their content contributions. Particularly, 
my results identify that certain nationalities are sensitive to certain Gamification elements. For 
example, American users show significant inertia, increase their contribution when earning silver 
badges, but decrease their contribution when their reputation is greater. However, European 
users increase their contribution when their reputation is greater, but they decrease their 
contribution when they earn Gold badges.  
Given the estimated parameters, and the two sided sword effects of the badges, I used a 
counterfactual analysis to study the effect of modifying the threshold of badges on the response 
of users. The results suggested that the Gamification platform may want to increase the 
thresholds of earning the badges rather than decreasing them, to make badges harder to achieve. 
This recommendation parallels the recommendation in studies on loyalty program effectiveness 
in the marketing literature that suggests increasing the reward threshold is a good choice. In the 
Gamification context, this decision is important because badges are once-in-a-lifetime elements, 
without expiry date.  
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In summary the current study contributes to the literature in marketing in the following ways: 
First, although a stream of literature in marketing focuses on various factors that affect the 
valence of user generated content, and its impact in reducing customer uncertainty (e.g., Weiss et 
al. 2008; Moe and Schweidel 2012; Godes and Silva 2012; Mallupraganda et al. 2012), the user 
motivation to contribute content is understudied. The current study tries to narrow this gap by 
determining which Gamification elements can drive motivation of users to contribute content.  
Second, although many practitioners and social psychologists emphasize the role of Gamification 
as a motivator (Wu 2011; Deterding 2012; Conejo 2014), quantitative measures of Gamification 
elements such as badges and leaderboard to help the Gamification platform to target its policies 
are understudied. Two studies in progress by Wei et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2015) use a 
difference in difference and a hidden Markov model to identify such effects. However, both of 
these studies assume that the users select the number of contributions, rather than whether to 
contribute or not. Also these studies do not account for heterogeneity in users’ responses to the 
Gamification elements. Therefore, in the current study I modeled the binary choice of the users 
while allowing for state-dependency and heterogeneity. Finally, I use ensemble method over 
LDA, mixed normal, and k-mean clustering methods to profile user segment behaviors, and 
mixed binary logit model with hierarchical Dirichlet Process prior to recover user specific 
parameters. These contributions should be of interest to both practitioners and scholars.  
3.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study draws upon several streams within the literature that have investigated, including: (1) 
User Generated Content (UGC); (2) Gamification mechanisms and rewards in loyalty programs; 
(3) Optimal stimuli level and state dependent choice models; (4) Behavioral aspects of decision 
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making (altruism, reciprocity, endowment effect, etc.). Given the breadth of these areas across 
multiple disciplines, what follows is only a brief review of these relevant streams. Table 3.1 
presents a list of relevant studies in each literature stream.  
Table 3.1. The relevant streams of litrature in five clusters 
Research Area References 
User Generated Content and 
free rider problem 
Mallapragada et al.  (2012); Godes and Silva (2012); Moe and 
Schweidel (2012); Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006); Chaudhuri (2011); 
Chen (2008); Weiss et al. (2008). 
Gamification elements 
,Mechanism, and Loyalty 
Li et al. (2015); Wei and Zhu (2015); Conejo (2014); Bittner and 
Shipper (2014); Salcu and Acatrinei (2013); Roth and 
Schneckenberg (2012); Kopalle et al. (2012); Zhang and 
Breugelmans (2012); Wu (2011); Zichermann and Cunningham 
(2011); Pink (2009); Liu (2007); Shugan (2005); Kivetz and 
Simonson (2002); Bolton et al. (2000). 
State dependent choice model, 
and optimal stimuli 
Dubé et al (2008); Seetharaman (2004); Seetharaman (1999); 
Guadagni and Little (1983); Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1992);  
Joachimsthaler and  Lastovicka (1984); McAlister (1982); 
Mittelstaedt et al. (1976); Lewis(2004); Jedidi (1999). 
Behavioral aspect of Decision 
Making, Altruism, reciprocity 
Toubia and Stephen (2013); Lee and Bell (2013); Yoganarasimhan 
(2013); Bolton et al. (2004); Andreoni(1990); Cornes and Sandler 
(1994); Bolton et al. (2013); Churchill (2011); Chen et al. (2010); 
Raban (2009); Chiu et al. (2006); Ren and Kraut (2011); Tedjamulia 
et al. (2005). 
Big Data Estimation Methods McMahan et al. (2013); McMahan (2011); Genkin et al. (2007); Le Cessie and Van Houwelingen, (1992); Murphy (2012). 
 
3.3.1. User Generated Content (UGC) 
User generated content in marketing refers to the contents that are both produced and consumed 
by the same consumers, for example question and answers, blogs, Twitter, social networks, and 
YouTube videos (Mallapraganda et al. 2012). UGC can also be considered as a form of public 
goods, because one cannot exclude others from using it after and during usage. Marketing and 
economics scholars have studied UGC from two perspectives: consumption and production. 
From the consumption perspective, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) find that UGC can have a 
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positive effect on sales. In addition, Weiss et al. (2008) find that the consumers’ goal and the 
social history of the producer affect how consumers perceive the value of UGC. From the 
production perspective, Godes and Silva (2012), Moe and Schweidel (2012), and Mallapraganda 
et al. (2012) suggest that the UGC creation process is subject to selection bias due to social 
influence and the heterogeneity in preferences of the product adopters who enter with different 
order and at different times. Although these studies are useful, none of them discuss how the firm 
can affect the UGC creation process by motivating users.  
The public good literature in experimental economics fills the gap by studying these incentive 
compatible mechanisms (Chen 2003). By relaxing strong rationality assumptions, these studies 
find that punishing altruistically and monetarily, grouping likeminded individuals, and passing 
advice across generations can motivate the users (Chaudhuri 2011). Although these studies are 
helpful, they neglect that users’ emotion can also be relevant. In particular, psychological studies 
emphasize that having fun, earning virtual rewards, setting goals, and empowering can also 
motivate users to contribute UGC. In the current study I focused on quantifying the effect of 
such psychological factors on the users’ choice to generate content, in a gamified context.  
3.3.2. Gamification mechanisms and rewards in loyalty programs 
To motivate users in a non-gaming environment, Gamification uses elements from video games 
(Bittner and Shipper 2014). Gamification elements can be classified according to three 
categories: dynamics, mechanics, and components (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011).  Game 
dynamics involve personal-psychological elements of the sense of progression, emotions, 
relationships, and narratives. Game mechanics involve social-psychological elements, including 
feedback, rewards, competition, cooperation, and transactions. Game components include 
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achievements, levels, points, badges, leaderboards, and virtual goods.  Studies relevant to 
Gamification can be classified into two groups: quantitative and qualitative studies of general 
Gamification, and the Gamification role in marketing. Only two studies quantify the effect of 
Gamification elements. First, Li et al. (2015) use difference-in-difference reduced-form to 
identify the aggregate level effect of badges on users’ number of content contributions. Second, 
Wei et al. (2015) aim to quantify these effects structurally by a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), 
but they consider that users plan how many contents to contribute, rather than plan at each point 
whether to contribute or not (i.e. binary choice). Although helpful, both of the studies fail to 
control for the users’ heterogeneity and effects of users’ inertia.  
However, the qualitative studies of Gamification emphasize the role of user inertia. These studies 
emphasize the psychological need of consumers to experience pleasure, fun and empowerment, 
based on self-determination theory (Wu 2011). Unlike monetary rewards, fun and pleasure are 
process-focused motivators, rather than outcome-focused motivators (Shen et al. 2015). In 
Gamification, outcome-focused motivators include social status and reputation. Gamification 
captures these outcome-focused motivators in points, leaderboard, and badges (Deterding 2012). 
These studies are helpful, but for marketing purposes, a Gamification platform needs a formal 
model to quantify the effect of Gamification elements to target users based on their behavior. 
Marketing scholars have studied Gamification elements qualitatively. Bitter & Shipper (2014) 
shows in a case study that Gamification is useful for advertising. Salcu and Acatriney (2013) 
discuss a case study in which Gamification has worked in the affiliated marketing program. Roth 
and Schnechenberg (2012) find that Gamification is useful for innovation and creativity. Conejo 
(2014) posits that Gamification can revolutionize loyalty programs. In particular, Gamification 
120 
 
differs from conventional loyalty programs given its emphasis on fun, meaningfulness, and 
empowerment, in addition to point rewards. The loyalty programs’ point rewards have been the 
subject of many marketing studies (Bolton et al. 2000; Shugan 2005; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; 
Kopalle et al. 2012, Zhang and Bregelman 2012; Liu 2007; Jedidi et al. 1999; Mela et al. 1997; 
Lewis 2004). These studies support a model of Gamification elements to control for 
heterogeneity and short and long term effects, but they do not quantify the effects of 
Gamification elements on users’ content contribution. 
3.3.3. Optimal stimuli level and state dependent choice models 
Inertia and state dependence that qualitative Gamification studies suggest is the subject of two 
groups of studies in consumer research and marketing science. Consumer research scholars 
emphasize that, to engage in exploratory behavior, consumers need to be emotionally motivated 
until they reach their heterogeneous optimal estimation level (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992; 
Joachimsthaler and Lastovicka 1984; Mittelstaedt et al. 1976; Seetharaman et al. 1999; 
McAlister 1982). Marketing science scholars use fixed effects to model this optimal stimulation 
level, and they use lagged instant or cumulative choices to control for heterogeneous users’ state 
dependence (Guadagni and Little 1983; Dube et al. 2008). These studies further emphasize that 
the modeler should allow for a flexible heterogeneity structure to avoid confounding state 
dependence with heterogeneity. Built on the above research, this study adopted a heterogeneous 
agent-based state-dependent choice-model, rather than the rule-based simulation approach that 
Ren and Kraut (2011) adopt to run counterfactual Gamification policies. 
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3.3.4. Behavioral aspects of decision making 
Gamification policies aim to motivate users to behave in certain ways, for example to create 
content. Online content can be considered as a form of public good, because upon publishing its 
consumption cannot be controlled. Behavioral economics literature concludes that the impure 
altruism model can explain the public good creation (Cornes and Sandler 1992; Andreoni 1990). 
In particular, the impure altruism model considers that users might have both private and public 
incentives to contribute. In marketing literature, Toubia and Stephen (2013) classify user’s 
heterogeneous factors of utility to contribute content into two groups: intrinsic and extrinsic (or 
image and prestige related). Tedjmulia et al. (2005) argues that, under specific circumstances, the 
extrinsic factors can affect intrinsic factors, either positively by internalization or negatively by 
over-justification. Chiu and Want (2006) argue from social psychological perspective that, 
content creation is more influenced by intrinsic factors such as fun and playfulness than extrinsic 
factors such as reciprocity and reputation. However, many other studies emphasize the 
importance of social capital and reputation, as a substitute for monetary incentives, in content 
creation (Raban 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Toubia and Stephen 2013). Furthermore, Antin and 
Churchill (2011) discuss that Gamification badges and leaderboards can influence extrinsic 
factors such as reputation, status affirmation, and group identification, and intrinsic factors such 
as goal setting, and instructions.  
All in all, many marketing modeling studies have emphasized the role of social factors such as 
reputation and reciprocity on users’ choices in various contexts (Bolton et al. 2004; Bolton et al. 
2013; Banks et al. 2002; Yoganarasimhan 2013; Lee and Bell 2013). However, no study has yet 
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modeled individual users’ content creation choices in terms of Gamification policies that aim to 
motivate users both intrinsically and extrinsically. The current study aims to narrow this gap. 
 
3.4. DATA 
I collected the data for this study from StackOverflow, because many studies find that it provides 
a successful Gamification application (e.g., Antin and Churchill 2011; Wei et al. 2015; Li et al. 
2015). Stackoverflow is an open online platform for professional and enthusiast programmers. It 
was founded in 2008, by a firm which later established Stack Exchange, a network of question 
and answer websites focused on diverse topics (ranging from physics to writing) and modeled 
after StackOverflow. In 2014, StackOverflow had 4 million users, and among these users, 77% 
asked and 65% answered questions. During this period, they generated 11 million questions and 
displayed an exception level of heterogeneity in their content creation. For example, only 8% of 
the users answered more than 5 questions. StackOverflow raised $6 million venture capital 
money in 2010, and its business model is based on three key activities: job listing (like 
traditional classified advertising), Curriculum Vitae search, and unobtrusive display advertising. 
The platform is rigid in its focus, requesting the users to ask only questions relevant to its topic 
and refrain from raising questions that are opinion based or lead to open ended chat. The 
moderators monitor the violation of this rule through the community members’ reports. 
The community of content creator users plays a key role in managing StackOverflow’s day to 
day activities, but the community notifies moderators in exceptional cases, for example when the 
etiquette is not preserved. StackOverflow selects lifetime moderators through a democratic 
voting procedure, but moderators can resign. According to StackOverflow, moderators act as 
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liaisons between the user community and Stack Exchange. StackOverflow asks users to register 
and log in before asking a question, but to answer a question, a user must either sign up for an 
account or post as a guest, in which case the user must register her name and email address.  
On Stackoverflow, a user who asks a question has the option to review the answers and to accept 
an answer as correct. In addition, everyone can vote up or down on either each question or 
answer. To be able to vote, the user must first register. The sum of all the up-votes and down-
votes that a user receives for contributing contents (i.e. questions and answers) is called the 
user’s reputation points. Web surfers can observe a user’s reputation level on her profile page 
and the leaderboard. According to StackOverflow, reputation is a rough measure of how much 
the community trusts the user’s expertise, communication skill, and content quality and 
relevance. In addition to the weekly reputation information, the leaderboard presents the previous 
week’s information about user’s rank and rank change. The leaderboard provides an informal 
way of tracking reputation within the community. It acts like a leaderboard of a league, and it 
only tracks the users’ points above a threshold of 200 points. 
Contributing users can also earn badges as hallmarks of their achievements. Badges have three 
categories or levels: gold, silver, and bronze. In addition, badges are specific to knowledge 
domains. In this study, I refer to this detail by using a domain knowledge tag because it is 
directly relevant to the tag that user attaches to her question. In particular, when a user posts a 
question, the StackOverflow platform requires her to attach a relevant tag to make the question 
appear to relevant audience, or sub-community. The total up-votes a user earns by answering the 
questions relevant to the tag nominate a user for tag badges. The threshold for gold, silver, and 
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bronze badges, are 1000, 400, and 100 respectively, fixed across the tags (or knowledge 
domain). Table 3.2 presents a sample of these badges. 
Table 3.2. Sample set of Bandges in different knowledge domains (tags) 
Tag Badge Name Type Definition 
vcl Bronze 
Earn at least 100 total score for at least 20 non-community 
wiki answers in the vcl tag. 
entity-framework Silver 
Earn at least 400 total score for at least 80 non-community 
wiki answers in the entity-framework tag.  
r Gold 
Earn at least 1000 total score for at least 200 non-
community wiki answers in the r tag. These users can 
single-handedly mark r questions as duplicates.  
ggplot2 Silver 
Earn at least 400 total score for at least 80 non-community 
wiki answers in the ggplot2 tag. 
statistics Bronze 
Earn at least 100 total score for at least 20 non-community 
wiki answers in the statistics tag.  
regex Bronze 
Earn at least 100 total score for at least 20 non-community 
wiki answers in the regex tag.  
linux-kernel Silver 
Earn at least 400 total score for at least 80 non-community 
wiki answers in the linux-kernel tag.  
sql-server-2008 Gold 
Earn at least 1000 total score for at least 200 non-
community wiki answers in the sql-server-2008 tag. These 
users can single-handedly mark sql-server-2008 questions as 
duplicates.  
html-helper Silver 
Earn at least 400 total score for at least 80 non-community 
wiki answers in the html-helper tag. 
google-app-engine Silver 
Earn at least 400 total score for at least 80 non-community 
wiki answers in the  google-app-engine tag. 
 
I collected the data for this study, by automatically scraping the Stack Overflow website. The 
sample includes the 36,915 users who appeared in the leaderboard during the first week of June 
2014, and identified themselves by an English name that can be captured by the python crawler 
and scraper code. I observed users’ choices including choices to comment, review, revise, accept, 
and post-answers. Table 3.3 presents the definition of each of the activities that I observed from 
users. The activity that I am interested to model is aggregate number of users’ contribution, 
which includes commenting for clarification, answering a question, and revising an answer. To 
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control for potential reciprocity of users, I include the total number of accepted posts, reviews, 
and asking activities in the reciprocity variable. 
Table 3.3. Type of activity, description and inclusion in the dependent or independent variable 
Activity Name 
Observation
s in data set Type (Proxy) Definition 
Comment 1,995,665 Dependent 
(Choice) 
Includes the activity of asking for clarification, 
suggesting correction, providing meta 
information about the post (so that not confuse 
with answer), it is short (600 character), only 
limited Markup, URL, disposable, and it does not 
have revision history, and it can be deleted 
without warning to the author by the moderator. 
Accepted 80,446 Independent 
(Reciprocity) 
Includes the activity of the questioner to review 
the answers and only accept the one that it finds 
suitable.  
Post Answered 671,772 Dependent 
(Choice) 
Includes the activity of answering the question 
that is raised on the platform.  
Review 1,017,029 Independent 
(Reciprocity) 
Includes the activity of the questioner to review 
the answers that is posted to her question. 
Post Asked 129,526 Independent 
(Reciprocity) 
Includes the activity of the questioner to ask a 
question.  
Revision 812,992 Dependent 
(Choice) 
Includes the activity of revising the answering 
post that is raised on the platform. 
 
I collected these choices’ data for 238 days of the sample period, namely from June 2014 to 
January 2015. In the sample, I observed 11,276,186 users’ choices. Table 3.4 shows the 
frequency of users’ declaration of their website and nationality. Given the identifier of the users, 
I also collected the leadership board information, namely the total reputation points per week, the 
weekly reputation, the rank, and the rank change, to synthesize with the main data. In addition, I 
collected the history of each user’s badge earnings. 
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Table 3.4. Sample Observations’ statistics 
Observations Frequency 
Users 36,915 
website 13,194 
USA 9,434 
UK 2,362 
Australia 1,133 
India 2,142 
Europe 7,142 
Asia 482 
South America 659 
China 208 
Middle East 892 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the total number of content contributions taken from a sample of four users 
over time.  As can be seen, considerable heterogeneity exists in the users’ content contribution 
levels, and on some days, users do not contribute at all. The number of zero contributions of 
different users, and the heterogeneity in the number of the contributions might offer evidence to 
explain why a simple regression and a homogeneous response model might not return unbiased 
estimates. In addition, a great number of non-contribution choices might suggest that the user 
thinks more about whether to contribute than about how much to contribute. 
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For each of the users, I also scraped the profile information: tenure, last seen date, the number of 
profile views, reputation, the number of gold, silver and bronze badges earned, the number of 
answers, the number of questions, the total amount of reach (i.e. approximate total number of 
people who viewed the user’s posts), user’s website, and user’s country. Table 3.5 shows the 
basic statistics of these variables before and after the observation period. The average number of 
reputation points, badges, questions and answered increased between 10% and 30%. 
To better understand the heterogeneity in users’ behavior, I segmented users by clustering their 
observable cross sectional information profile for pre-study period. These profiles are consisted 
of binary indicator and count data. There are various methods to cluster this data. K-means 
partition based clustering might be relevant for its employing similarity index based on 
Euclidean distance. Mixture Normal Fuzzy model based clustering might be relevant for its 
assumption that observations of a given clusters are noisy measures of cluster centers. Finally, 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model based clustering method might be relevant for its 
assumption that each profile attribute might be relevant contingent on the cluster that the 
observation belongs to. Hubert and Arabie (1985) suggests adjusted random index for comparing 
clustering results. This method compares the pair assignment of two clustering results and by 
assuming generalized hyper geometric distribution creates an index that bounds to 1 under 
perfect agreement, and 0 under random partition (Yeung and Ruzzo 2001).  
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Figure 3.1. Contribution of a sample of four users over time 
To have computational tractability, I randomly sampled 20,000 from 36,000 users for clustering, 
and ran three clustering methods to segment these users. Elbow measure of the within cluster 
sum of square suggested that k equal to 30 is optimal for k-means clustering method. Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) measure suggested that five clusters are enough for mixture normal 
129 
 
fuzzy clustering method, and Log Likelihood measure suggested that 13 clusters in LDA method 
represents the data better. I used random adjusted measure to compare the partition membership 
result of these three methods. Table 3.6 presents the result of this comparison. Mixture Normal 
and K-means clustering generate more similar result than other couples.  
Table 3.5. Sample Observations’ basic statistics 
Pre Post 
Variable AVG SD Min Max AVG SD Min Max 
Reputation Points 
6,213.9
9 
17,650.1
5 1 
685,46
3 
8,066.6
1 
21,221.3
8 1 
773,02
0 
Number of Gold 
Badges 5.51 8.04 2 301 6.70 9.19 2 344 
Number of Silver 
Badges 20.98 44.88 2 4,597 24.83 50.68 2 5,233 
Number of Bronze 
Badges 40.86 66.08 2 5,951 46.30 71.74 2 6,507 
Number of 
Answers 188.86 527.00 0 29,950 207.56 574.53 0 31,537 
Number of 
Questions 36.22 73.04 0 1,688 40.30 78.05 0 1,737 
 
Table 3.6. Adjusted Random Index measure for clustering agreements 
  LDA Mixture Normal K-means 
LDA 1.0000     
Mixture Normal 0.0005 1.0000   
K-means 0.0000 0.3420 1.0000 
As it is not clear which method to choose, I used ensemble method (similar to Strehl and Ghosh 
2003) to create results that are more robust to the type of clustering method, rather than using 
each of these methods In this approach. I combine the results of cluster membership of 
observation pairs using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering method. For ease of exposition 
and interpretability, I cut the tree at the level with five clusters. To interpret the segments, this 
study adopts the terminology of Gamification to classify the users into four groups based on 
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whether the focus is on action versus reaction, or on context versus players (Wu 2012): 
collaborators (focus on interaction and players), competitors (focus on action and players), 
explorers (focus on context and interaction), and achievers (focus on context and action). Table 
3.7 presents the definition of each of the segments and the proxy variable relevant to the context. 
Table 3.7. Gamification Segment Names 
User Segment 
Name Focus 
proxy 
variables Definition 
Competitors 
Player & 
Action 
High level of 
reputation 
and badges 
 Users will go to great lengths to achieve rewards 
that confer them little or no gameplay benefit simply 
for the prestige of having it. 
Collaborators 
Player & 
Interaction 
High number 
of answers 
Users gain the most enjoyment from a game by 
interacting with other users, and on some occasions, 
computer-controlled characters with personality 
Explore 
Context & 
Interaction 
High number 
of Questions 
 Users find great joy in discovering an unknown 
glitch or a hidden Easter egg. 
Achievers 
Context & 
Action 
Personal Site 
in the Profile 
Users thrive on competition with other users, and 
prefer fighting them to scripted computer-controlled 
opponents 
 
Table 3.8 presents the behavioral segmentation result based on ensemble method. Users in 
collaborator segment consist 20% of the sample and show high level of answering activity, 
although they have not earned significantly more reputation points and badges. Users in achiever 
segment consist 25% of the sample and declare their website more than users in other segments, 
and all of them are American. Users in Explorer segment consist 11% of the sample and ask 
significantly more questions than others. Users in competitor segment consist 20% of the sample 
and have earned more badges and reputation points than others. Finally, I identified users in 
uninterested segment that consist 22% of the sample and do not declare their nationality and 
behave poorly relative to other users with respect to all measures. In fact this information can 
help the Gamification platform to target its customers. 
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Table 3.8. Gamification Segment Names (heat map configured at row level) 
Segment Name Collaborators 
Uninterested 
Users Achievers Explorers Competitors 
Whole 
Sample 
Segment Size 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.11 0.20 1.00 
Website 0.44 0.00 0.51 0.38 0.46 0.36 
USA 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.26 
UK 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Austrailia 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
India 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Euroupe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.19 
Asia 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
South America 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
China 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Middle East 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Tenure 1,584.87 1,333.64 1,788.74 1,691.32 1,623.44 1,601.01 
Seen since 30.26 22.65 33.75 366.40 25.60 66.70 
profile Views 1,301.65 172.23 846.11 886.31 1,095.88 848.84 
Reputation Points 7,638.74 1,906.79 6,664.90 7,084.18 8,237.01 6,183.55 
Gold Badges 3.10 0.66 2.92 3.82 3.55 2.69 
Silver Badges 23.78 7.61 22.85 25.10 25.94 20.56 
Bronz Badges 46.31 18.68 43.90 48.57 49.88 40.57 
Answers 237.29 54.21 196.26 212.68 251.88 186.61 
Questions 33.78 19.30 30.29 60.24 36.46 33.24 
Reach 5,690,175.70 220,400.60 4,689,612.80 4,582,561.20 5,917,558.80 4,149,459.60 
 
It is important to note that users fall within the continuum of these classifications, and the noted 
assignments only discriminates based on the strength of each of the proxy signals (i.e. number of 
questions, number of answers, level of reputation, declaration of a personal webpage), for ease of 
interpretation. Figure 3.2 presents the median and the quantiles variations of the total number of 
answers that each user reviews or accepts (i.e. contribution received), the total reputation points 
of the user, her weekly reputation points and rank evolution across 238 days of the study. The 
variation in these variables further suggests that an aggregate non-agent-based model might miss 
the underlying dynamics in the data.  
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Figure 3.2. Evolution of Explanatory Variables Over time (Median shown in Black, and the 
interval between 25% and 75% interval is colored gray) 
 
Finally, figure 3.3 illustrates the evolution of the total number of gold, silver and bronze badges. 
The data reveals peaks in the number of badges earned.  I did not find the exact explanation for 
the peaks from the platform change of the thresholds perspective, but, as the peak is not far from 
the beginning of the sample, it might be relevant to the seasonal summer period when the 
programmers have more free time to contribute. Another seasonal peak takes place in September, 
an occurrence which again might reflect another demand shock because Google shows the same 
type of StackOverflow search trend peak in both July and September. There is also a periodic 
structure in the evolution of the badges. The programming nature of the questions explains this 
cyclical pattern. Generally, the users on StackOverflow are more active during workdays than 
during weekends.  
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Figure 3.3. Evolution of Total number of Gold, Silver, and Bronze Badges Granted to Users in 
the Sample 
 
Before discussing the model, it might be worthwhile to note that, to preserve the data of 
11,000,000 contribution choices, with approximately 42,000 heterogeneity parameters, the old 
tabular data structure is not a viable option for the commodity computing devices. Therefore, I 
used a big data tool, called Apache Spark, which is built on the Hadoop map-reduce structure for 
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data cleaning. The map-reduce structure simply creates a data flow of map and reduce 
operations. Map operations create assignment outcomes for each of the data points in parallel, 
across multiple machines (i.e. like a function with each data point). The reduce operation 
aggregates the outcomes of map operations, based on the group flags in parallel, across multiple 
machines (i.e. like aggregate functions). The data structure of map-reduce consists of pairs of 
key (for grouping purposes) and value (the actual data). I used the same structural of key-value 
pairs of map-reduce model, rather than the tabular structure. In particular, I kept each of the 
variables in a separate file with a key for user and time indices on separate lines. Furthermore, I 
used a sparse matrix structure to reduce the size of the badges’ explanatory variables data. Next, 
I present my proposed model. 
 
3.5. MODEL 
I start this section with explaining the choices of the Gamification platform. In particular the 
Gamification elements that I considered include: fun element, badges, leaderboard, and 
reputation points. For example, a Gamification platform might work on the positive environment 
of social interaction between content producers and consumers, by putting emphasis on different 
contents (e.g., easy vs. hard, polite vs. not polite questions), to make the engagement more fun. It 
can also manipulate the threshold of earning badges, to make earning badges harder or simpler. 
In addition, a Gamification platform can send empowering messages to users whose rank fall on 
the leaderboard. To find the effect of each of these policies, the Gamification platform should 
measure the response of the users to the Gamification incentives. 
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In the context of this study, the choice of users to create content can be in the following forms: to 
post an answer, to revise, or to comment on a question or an answer. As a result, I considered the 
outcome of the user choice positive if the user makes any of these choices, and negative if the 
user selects none. I recognize that based on their unobserved state dependent utility, the users 
contribute content to the platform by answering questions and commenting and revising the 
answers. This state includes information about the number of contributions that users have had 
and the number of Gamification assets and recognitions (e.g., badges, leaderboard rank, and 
reputation points) they have earned recently and cumulatively. Formally, I define users’ state-
dependent utility of user i  at day t  in week w  for contributing content, in the following form: 
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                       (1) 
where iα denotes the fixed stimulation threshold parameter for user i  for contributing content. 
1−itcont denotes total number of contents that user i  has contributed until day t . 1−itrcv  denotes 
total number of answers and comments that user i  has received until day t  for the question she 
has raised. 1−iwcrep denotes the cumulative number of reputation points user i  has earned until 
week w . 1−iwrep  denotes the number of reputation points user i  has earned at week 1−w . 
1−iwrnk denotes the rank of user i  in leaderboard published at the end of week 1−w . 1−∆ iwrnk  
denotes the first order rank difference of user i  between week 1−w and week 2−w . 1−itbdg
denotes the vector of number of gold, silver, and bronze badges user i has earned at day 1−t . 
1−itcbdg denotes the vector of cumulative number of gold, silver, and bronze badges user i has 
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earned until day t . itε denotes idiosyncratic unobserved utility error term for user i  at day t . 
)..,( 81 iiii γγα=Λ denotes the vector of individual specific choice parameters to estimate. 
Assuming that a contributor has a random state dependent utility, and that the distribution of the 
random error term is extreme value, a logit function can model the probability of observing a 
user contribution. As a result, the likelihood of a user’s multiple contributions in a day, follow 
binomial distribution. Similarly, a mixed logit function can model the choice of multiple users 
with heterogeneous choice parameters within the population. Next I explain the rationale behind 
choosing the variable that might explain the observed states of the users, in terms of the 
Gamification components, inertia, and reciprocity.  
The proposed utility model includes user fixed effect iα  to capture users’ heterogeneous optimal 
stimulation level, to represent that users require motivation to contribute content (Salcu and 
Actrinei 2013; Mittelstaedt 1976; Joachimsthaler and Lastovicka 1984; Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1992).  
The total cumulative number of contributions 1−itcont acts as proxy for the fun that a user 
experiences. As a result, a lag cumulative number of contributions might be a state variable to 
capture the effect of the fun elements of the Gamification platform. Furthermore, the number of 
content received (i.e. answer to the posted question) acts as the proxy for the social utility of the 
user. As a result, I included the lagged total number of asked questions, answers reviewed and 
answers accepted by a user 1−itrcv  as a proxy for the users’ reciprocity state. Another proxy for 
the social utility 1−iwcrep  of users to contribute content is the level of reputation points, i.e. the 
number of up-votes a user has received for comment and answers (Bolton et al. 2013; Bolton et 
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al. 2004; Yoganarasimhan 2013; Lee and Bell 2013; Toubia and Stephen 2013). As the 
reputation point might have both instant and long term effects, the utility of the user incorporates 
both the weekly level 1−iwrep , and the cumulative level of user reputation 1−iwcrep  (Wei et al. 
2015; Li et al. 2015). Another Gamification element that is proxy signal for social status of user 
is the lagged leaderboard absolute rank 1−iwrnk  and rank change 1−∆ iwrnk . The latter one might 
be relevant for potential endowment effect. In other words, an individual might be regretful for 
losing the last week rank or forgone social status.  
Last but not least, badges might also affect users’ motivations to contribute content, for both 
intrinsic (empowerment effect), or extrinsic (social status function) motivations (e.g., Antin and 
Churchill 2011; Wei et al. 2015; Li et al. 2015). The total number of badges earned at each badge 
category (i.e. Gold, Silver, Bronze) 1−itcbdg  and the number of badges earned in previous days
1−itbdg might both affect the choice of user to contribute as they show the progress of users in the 
Gamified environment to their social surroundings. In addition, like the effect of any marketing 
policy, short term and long term effect of earning the badges might be different (Liu 2007;Jedidi 
et al. 1999, Mela et al. 1997; Lewis 2004). As a result, consistent with Wei et al. (2015) and Li et 
al. (2015), my consumer utility model includes both lagged cumulative 1−itcbdg  and instant 
number of each of the badges 1−itbdg . Figure 3.4 shows box and arrow diagram of the 
components of the state-dependent utility of users to contribute content. Table 3.9 summarizes 
the definition of variable and parameters. 
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Figure 3.4. Box and Arrow Model of State Dependent Utility of a user to contribute 
 
Last but not least, to control for the unobserved heterogeneity in users’ responses to each of the 
Gamification elements, the model of the users’ state-dependent utility allows for flexible patterns 
of response, through a random coefficient model of users choices, by putting hierarchical 
Bayesian Dirichlet Process (DP) prior on iΛ . This approach allows the number of parameters to 
increase with the size of the sample, increasing learning as new data is observed.  
This approach assumes a mixture of multivariate normal distributions over the parameters’ prior, 
to allow for thick tail skewed multimodal distribution. I accommodated user heterogeneity by 
assuming that iΛ  is drawn from a distribution common across users, in two stages. I employed a 
mixture of normal as the first stage prior, to specify an informative prior that also does not 
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overfit. The first stage consists of a mixture of K  multivariate normal distribution, and the 
second stage consists of prior on the parameters of the mixture of normal density, formally: 
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whereb denotes the hyper-parameter for the priors on the mixing probabilities and the parameters 
governing each mixture component. K denotes the number of mixture components. },{ kk Σµ  
denotes mean and covariance matrix of the distribution of individual specific parameter vector 
iΛ for mixture component k. kpi denotes the size of the thk '  component of mixture model, and φ
denotes the normal density function distribution. iz  denotes information set about user i, which 
here can include indicator of publishing personal website on the profile, indicator of stated 
nationality from USA, UK, Australia, India, Europe, Asia, South America, China, Middle east, 
Tenure (the number of days since registration on the Gamification platform), Seen (the number 
of days since last date that user logged in), number of profile views from internet browsers, total 
number of reputation points and badges accumulated, number of answered and asked questions, 
and the total number of internet browser reached by contributing to the platform, until the start of 
sample period. ∆ denotes the parameter of correlation between choice response parameter and 
information set about user i . 
To obtain a truly non-parametric estimate using the mixture of normal model it is required that 
the number of mixture components K  increase with the sample size. I adopted the approach 
proposed by Rossi (2014), called non-parametric Bayesian approach. This approach is equivalent 
to the approach mentioned above when K  tends to infinity. In this structure, the parameters of 
mixture normal model have Dirichlet Process (DP) prior. Dirichlet process is the generalization 
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of Dirichlet distribution for infinite atomic number of partitions. This process represents the 
distribution of a random measure (i.e. probability). Dirichlet process has two parameters, the first 
is the base distribution, which is the prior distribution on the parameters of the multivariate 
Normal-Inverse Wishart (N-IW) conjugate prior distribution for the distribution for the partitions 
that the choice parameters are drawn from, and the second parameter is the concentration 
parameter. Formally, the prior for the individual specific choice parameters has the following 
structure: 
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where )(0 λG denotes the base distribution or measure (i.e. the distribution of hyper-parameters 
of the prior distribution of the partitions). λ  denotes the random measure, which represents the 
probability distribution of ),,( υνa . denotes the hyper-parameters of the prior 
distribution of the partitions that the choice parameters belong to, which represent the behavior 
parameters of the latent segments. d  denotes the number of choice parameters per user (in my 
case d is equal to 15). dα denotes the concentration (also referred to as precision, tightness, or 
innovation) parameter. The idea is that DP is centered over the base measure )(0 λG  with N-IW 
with precision parameter dα  (larger value denotes tight distribution). ),,,,,( υυνν srsrsr aa denotes the 
hyper parameters vector for the second level prior on hyper parameters of prior over the 
partitions distribution of the choice parameters. 
),,( υνa
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Dirichlet Process Mixture (DPM) is referred to the distribution over the probability measure 
defined on some sigma-algebra (collection of subsets) of spaceℵ , such that the distribution for 
any finite partition of  ℵ  is Dirichlet distribution (Rossi 2014). In my case, the probability 
measure over the partitions for mean and variance of random coefficient response parameters of 
individual choice parameters sigma-algebra has the Normal-Inverse-Wishart conjugate 
probability. For any subset of users U of ℵ : 
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By De Finetti theorem, integrating (marginalizing) out the random measure G results in the joint 
distribution for the collection of user specific mean and covariance of random coefficient choice 
parameters as follows: 
dGGpGpp )()|,(),(
....
Σ=Σ ∫ µµ
                                                 (5) 
This joint distribution can be represented as a sequence of conditional distributions that has 
exchangeability property: 
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 (6) 
The DP process is similar in nature to Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP) and Polya Urn. In the 
CRP, there is a restaurant with infinite number of tables (analogous to partitions of mean and 
variance of the individual choice random coefficients). A user entering the restaurant selects the 
tables randomly, but he selects the table with probability proportional to the number of users that 
have sat on the table so far (in which case the user behaves similar to the other users who are 
sitting at the selected table). If the user selects a new table, he will behave based on a parameter 
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that he randomly selects from restaurant user behavior parameters (so not necessarily identical to 
the parameters of the other tables). The Polya Urn process has also the same structure. In this 
process, the experimenter starts by drawing balls (representing the parameter of response for 
each user) with different colors from the urn. Any time the experimenter has a ball with a given 
color drawn from the urn, he will add an additional ball with the same color to the urn, and he 
also returns the drawn ball. The distribution of number of customers sitting at each table in CRP 
and number of balls in each color in Polya Urn follow DP. 
Table 3.9. Utility model Variables Definition 
 
Variable Description 
State Dependent Utility( itU ) State dependent utility of user i  at day t  in week w  
Individual Specific Fixed Effect )( iα  Fixed effect, or fixed optimal threshold level of user i  
Contribution State ( 1−itcont ) Total contribution level of user i , up until the current contribution point in day t , demeaned and then  normalized by one hundred 
Reciprocity State ( 1−itrcv ) Total number of contribution received (answers received for her question) by user i , up until day t , divided by a hundred 
Reputation State ( 1−iwcrep ) Total number of reputation points received by user i , up until week w  
Weekly Reputation ( 1−iwrep ) 
Total number of reputation point received by user i , at the previous week 
(i.e. week 1−w ) 
Leaderboard rank ( 1−iwrnk ) Rank of user i , in the leaderboard at previous week (i.e. week 1−w ) 
Leaderboard rank change ( 1−∆ iwrnk ) 
First order rank difference for user i ’s in the leaderboard from the other 
week to the previous week (i.e. week 2−w to week 1−w ) 
Instant Badge category ( 1−itbdg ) 
A vector of number of gold, silver, and bronze badges user i  earned at the 
previous day (i.e. day 1−t ) 
Cumulative Badge Category 
 ( 1−itcbdg ) 
A vector of total cumulative number of gold, silver, and bronze badges user 
i  earned until the previous day (i.e. day 1−t ) 
81.. ii γγ  User i  specific parameters of state dependent utility of user i  
itε  User i  and day t   specific type one extreme value error 
 
An alternative way is the approach proposed by Dube et al. (2010) to fit models with 
successively large numbers of components and to gauge the adequacy of the number of 
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components by examining the fitted density associated with the selected number of components. 
However, the process of model selection is tedious for big data sets in this case.  
To sum up, in this section I modeled the state dependent utility of users to contribute content to 
the gamified platform. I control for potential self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity of 
users by defining Dirichlet Process prior on the mixed logit choice model parameters. I also 
controlled for potential reciprocity and inertia (potential fun) by including the number of 
contributions sent and received by user until a given choice occasion. 
 
3.6. ESTIMATION 
In order to identify the choice model, I used a random coefficient (mixed) binary logit 
specification, which has a fixed scale. To set the location of the utility, I normalized the utility of 
no contribution option to zero. To minimize the concerns about self-selection, I use different 
fixed effect (stimulation level to contribute content) for different users. To minimize concerns 
about endogeneity (omitted variable), I control for potential correlations between choices of 
various users and unobserved heterogeneity by incorporating multi-modal mixture normal prior 
on the users’ choices parameters (in a form of DP prior).  I also control for potential confounding 
effects of inertia and reciprocity by incorporating the number of send and received contributions. 
In addition, by random coefficient structure, the modeling approach also minimizes the concern 
for Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), as it allows for heterogeneity in the 
individual specific choice behavior parameters.  
Estimation of the proposed model over a big data set consisting of approximately 11,000,000 
million choices of approximately 37,000 users involves various computational and statistical 
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issues, including over-fitting and computational tractability. First, the large number of 
parameters may cause over-fitting the sample, and this over-fitting may reduce generalizability 
of results. Bayesian shrinkage with flexible DP prior helps to identify the large set of individual 
specific parameters, without over-fitting. Second, optimization approaches that use sum of 
gradient, like the Newton Ralfphson and batch gradient-descent methods, are expensive over this 
kind of enormous data-set like the one used in this study. To deal with the same type of 
computational tractability issue in estimating a logit model, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) resort to 
a linear probability model for a data set of only 2.5 million observations, with a much lower 
number of parameters. An alternative approach is to sample a subset of data and estimate the 
parameters. However, throwing away data by taking small sample might not be a relevant 
approach for targeting users.  
To avoid the sample selection issue and show the effect of sample size, I take random samples of 
1K, 5K, and 10K users from approximately 37K users by stratified sampling from strata that are 
generated from k-mean, mixture normal fuzzy clustering, and Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
clustering. In addition, I separate cross sectional variable of information set about users before 
the sample period into fixed (e.g., nationality, webpage declaration) and dynamic (number of 
question, answers, badges, and reputation points) items. I estimated both the models that 
incorporate only fixed information set and complete information set (both fixed and dynamic 
variables) at hierarchy level. 
The mixture normal distribution is subject to label switching problem (i.e. the permutation of 
segment assignment returns the same likelihood). However, I immunized myself to this problem 
by limiting my inference to the joint distribution rather than user segment assignment. To 
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estimate the content contribution choice model, I used multinomial logit with DP prior on the 
user specific hyper-parameter (Bayesian semi-parametric) estimation code from Bayesm package 
in R. This method uses Metropolis-Hasting Random-Walk (MH-RW) method to estimate 
conditional choice probabilities on cross-sectional units (i.e. users). The limitation of MH-RW is 
that random walk increments shall be tuned to conform as closely as possible to the curvature in 
the individual specific conditional posterior, formally defined by: 
),,,|()|(),,,,|( ∆ΣΛΛ∝∆ΣΛ iiiiiii zpypzyp µµ
                            
 (7) 
Without prior information on highly probable values of first stage prior (i.e. .)|( ip Λ ), tuning the 
Metropolis chains given limited information of cross-sections (i.e. each user) by trial is difficult. 
Therefore, to avoid singular hessian, the fractional likelihood approach proposed by Rossi et al. 
(2005) is implemented in the used approach. Formally rather than using individual specific 
likelihood, MH-RW approach forms a fractional combination of the unit-level likelihood and the 
pooled likelihood as follows: 
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where w denotes the small tuning parameter to control the effect of pooled likelihood
∏
=
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)|( . β denotes a parameter chosen to properly scale the pooled likelihood to the 
same order as the unit likelihood. in  denotes the number of observations for user i . Using this 
approach, the MH-RW generates samples conditional on the partition membership indicator for 
user i  from proposal density ),0( 2ΩsN , so that:  
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where iΛˆ denotes the maximum of the modified likelihood )(* iil Λ , and ΛV  denotes normal 
covariance matrix assigned to the partition (i.e. segment) that customer i  belongs to. 
This approach considers that 
.iΛ is sufficient to model the random coefficient distribution. To 
estimate the infinite mixture of normal prior for choice parameters, a standard data augmentation 
with the indicator of the normal component is required. Conditional on this indicator, I can 
identify a normal prior for each customer i parameters. The distribution for this indicator is 
Multinomial, which is conjugate to Dirichlet distribution, formally: 
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As a result posterior can be defined by: 
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where )( ij zδ denotes indicators for whether or not jz i = . This result is relevant for DP as any 
finite subset of user choice-behavior parameters’ partitions has Dirichlet distribution, and finite 
sample can only represent finite number of partitions. Exchangeability property of partitions 
allows the used estimation approach to sequentially draw customer parameters given the 
indicator value as follows:  
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The next portion of this approach’s specification is the definition of the size of the finite clusters 
over the finite sample that is controlled bypi . Rossi (2014) suggests augmenting Sethuraman’s 
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stick breaking notion for draws ofpi . In this notion, a unit level stick is iteratively broken from 
the tail with proportion to the draws with beta distribution with parameter one and dα , and the 
length of the broken portion defines the thk '  element of the probability measure vector pi (a 
form of multiplicative process), formally: 
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In this notion, dα determines the probability distribution of the number of unique values for the 
DP mixture model, formally by: 
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where *I denotes the number of unique values of ),( Σµ in a sequence of i  draws from the DP 
prior. )(kiS denotes Sterling number of first kind, and γ denotes Euler’s constant. Furthermore, to 
facilitate assessment, this approach suggests the following distribution for dα , rather than 
Gamma distribution: 
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whereαr and αs can be assessed by inspecting the mode of dI α|* . φ denotes the tunable power 
parameter to spread prior mass appropriately. An alternative to Gibbs sampler employed by this 
approach might be collapsed Gibbs sampler that integrates out the indicator variable for partition 
(segment) membership of each user, but Rossi (2014) argues that such an approach does not 
improve the estimation procedure. Appendix 3.A presents the series of conditional distribution 
that this approach employs in its Gibbs sampling to recover individual specific choice 
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parameters. In summary, I used MCMC sampling to estimate the mixture normal multinomial 
logit model of the content contribution choices of samples of 1K, 5K, and 10K users over two 
hundred thirty seven days, in a Gamification environment. 
 
3.7. RESULTS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
I begin this section by discussing the importance of big data. Table 3.10 presents the log 
likelihood of twelve models I have tested. Among samples with 1K users, stratified random 
sample from Latent Dirichlet Allocation clustering has a better fit. In addition, the models that 
use both fixed and dynamic information set of users at hierarchical level explains users’ choice 
better. However, estimating the model over sample with 5K size suggests that potentially the 
LDA stratified sample might not have represented the population because the log likelihood does 
not increase proportionally. In addition, estimate of the model that uses whole information set 
about user at hierarchical level over the sample with 10K size returns relatively better likelihood 
than the same model estimated over sample with 5K size. I announce this model dominant, 
because it uses more information and returns a better likelihood relative to the model estimated 
over its adjacent sample size (i.e. sample with 5K size). 
Table 3.11 presents the distributions of the parameter estimates for the individual content 
contribution choice model that explains choice parameter with whole information set of users 
estimated over a sample with 10K random users. These distributions are visualized in figure 3.5. 
Although I used a flexible mixture normal model, yet the parameter of response has a normal 
bell shape. 
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Table 3.10. MODEL COMPARISON 
Model Description Number 
of obs. Log Lik. 
1 Uniform Sample Choice explained by all variables 237,000 -65,379.08 
2 LDA stratified Sample Choice Explained by all variables 237,000 -61,868.84 
3 K-mean stratified Sample Choice Explained by all 
variables 237,000 -62,554.44 
4 Mixture Normal stratified Sample Choice Explained by all 
variables 237,000 -65,164.39 
5 Mixture Normal stratified Sample Choice Explained by Static HB variables 237,000 -66,374.15 
6 Uniform Sample Choice explained by Static HB variables 237,000 -65,943.30 
7 LDA stratified Sample Choice Explained by Static HB 
variables 237,000 -65,028.38 
8 K-mean stratified Sample Choice Explained by static HB 
variables 237,000 -63,548.60 
9 Sample of 5K explained by static HB variables 1,185,000 -327,701.60 
10 Sample of 5K explained by all variables 1,185,000 -327,765.30 
11 Sample of 10K explained by static HB variables 2,370,000 -656,838.80 
12 Sample of 10K explained by all variables* 2,370,000 -653,301.00 
* Dominant model 
The distribution of the parameter estimates for this and the other model over samples with sizes 
of 1K, 5K, and 10K is presented in appendix 3.B. Comparison of these estimates suggest that 
model that uses only fixed information set of users at hierarchical level overestimates fixed effect 
(or stimulation level), and it underestimates the effect of leaderboard and badges (long term 
effect of silver and bronze badges) elements. In addition, estimating the same model over a 
sample with 5K random users results in underestimation of fixed effect, inertia, rank, and badges 
(except gold), and it overestimates the effect of reputation points and reciprocity. These results 
highlight the importance of employing a bigger data set to get a better estimate of Gamification 
elements.  
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Figure 3.5. HISTOGRAM OF PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice parameters 
 
As hierarchical Bayesian method allows recovering individual specific parameters, I can use 
individual specific parameters to recover significance of parameters. In fact this significance 
information is useful for the Gamification platform to target its users. Table 3.15 presents the 
statistics of significance of parameters across the population. It is interesting to note that 
individual level fixed effect, which I interpret as the stimuli level required to contribute content, 
is positive significant across 2% and negative significant across 2% of all the users. This finding 
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suggests that, when users contribute content, either an intrinsic (for 2% of users) or an extrinsic 
motivation (for 98% of users) exists. 
Table 3.11. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Content Contribution Choice explained by 
whole information set (Sample with 10K explained) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.039 0.301 -0.589 0.599 
States: 
    
    Previous contribution 
-0.004 0.070 -0.099 0.105 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.091 0.411 -0.528 0.229 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.108 0.184 -0.320 0.435 
    Reputation 
-0.500 0.689 -1.636 1.051 
    Rank 
-0.012 0.347 -0.795 0.726 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 0.079 0.488 -0.780 0.965 
    Silver Bade 
-0.105 0.324 -0.678 0.414 
    Bronze Badge 0.011 0.405 -0.764 0.738 
    Cum Gold Badge 
-0.014 0.228 -0.399 0.359 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.006 0.188 -0.295 0.297 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.004 0.134 -0.224 0.237 
 
The number of contents contributed has significant positive effects for 8% of users and 
significant negative effects for 9% of users on their probability of contributing. This result is also 
relevant for the Gamification platforms targeting. The Gamification platform can investigate the 
journey of customers who show inertia (positive effect of previous contribution) and try to 
generate the similar journey for those who show resistance (negative effect of previous 
contribution), through its messaging policy.  In addition, the Gamification platform can also send 
customized positive messages to the users with inertia, to keep them as loyal customers. It can 
also send promotional incentivizing messages to those who show resistance, to motivate them to 
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contribute more (similar to the promotions that are sent to churned customers).  In fact, given the 
domain knowledge of Gamification practitioners, the message for the users with resistance shall 
emphasize the fun aspect of answering other users’ questions (Brittner and Shipper 2014; Wu 
2012; Deterding 2012).  
Table 3.12. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect significance 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 171 239 2% 2% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 819 949 8% 9% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 450 1228 5% 12% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 1041 564 10% 6% 
    Reputation 273 673 3% 7% 
    Rank 619 716 6% 7% 
    Rank Change 1349 1444 13%  14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 258 147 3% 1% 
    Silver Bade 76 127 1% 1% 
    Bronze Badge 263 184 3% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 296 320 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 842 930 8% 9% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 1037 906 10% 9% 
 
The effect of contribution received (or reciprocity) is positive significant for 5% of users and 
negative significant for 12% of users. In other words, when the users’ questions are answered 
more often than others, 5% of users are more likely and 12% of them are less likely to answer the 
community members’ questions. The reciprocity result for 5% of users is consistent with the 
result of studies in information system research of the knowledge market and in the economics of 
impure altruism that emphasize the importance of reciprocity in users’ decisions (Ruben 2009; 
Chen et al. 2010; Chiu and Wang 2009; Bolton et al. 2013; Andreoni 1990; Cornes and Sandler 
153 
 
1994). However, the negative response to receiving answer by 12% of users might be explained 
by users’ shift of focus on their daily life as opposed to participating on the Gamification 
platform. This finding suggests that the Gamification platform owner can employ a prioritizing 
strategy. Such a prioritizing strategy can put higher priority on the questions of users who 
contribute more when the community answers their questions. 
The effect of weekly reputation (instant) is positive significant for 3% and negative significant 
for 7% of users, and the effect of cumulative reputation is positive significant for 10% of users 
and negative significant for 7% of users. This result is relevant for the targeting, and I explain the 
relevance later in this section, but first I explain why the effect can be positive and negative for 
different users. The negative effect may be explained by moral licensing (Wei et al. 2015), or 
reversion to the mean. Moral licensing refers to the process by which a user reduces her pro-
social activity after being nominated as pro-social. The moral licensing might be more relevant 
here, because none of the studies by practitioners and academia has yet defended the mean 
reversion of users in the Gamification context. The positive effect of reputation might be 
explained by the empowerment effect of Gamification that social psychologists emphasize (Wu 
2012). In other words, the reputation points might act as a signal to the user to recognize the 
potential of helping others. 
The effect of rank is positive significant for 6% and negative significant for 7% of users, and the 
effect of rank change, second order lagged effect, is positive significant for 13% of users, and 
negative significant for 14% of users. Recognizing these two different effects is useful for 
targeting in the context of the Gamification platform. The negative second order lagged effect 
resembles the mean reversion behavior. This behavior might be relevant to the anchorage effect 
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of the rank on the leaderboard.  The positive second order lagged effect resembles inertia. In 
other words, when falling in the leaderboard the user gives up and when rising in the 
leaderboard, the user works harder. Although the Gamification platform may not have control 
over the mean reversion of the user, it may be able to affect the users’ negative inertia (i.e. giving 
up when falling in the leaderboard) by positive empowering messages.  
The results for the effects of the gold, silver, and bronze badge categories might also be of 
interest of the Gamification platform, because it can modify the badges’ requirements (threshold 
of points to earn badges) to motivate users. Instant effects of earning Gold badges are positive 
significant for 3% and negative significant for 1% of users. In addition, the long term effects of 
earning Gold badges are positive significant for 3% of users and negative significant for 3% of 
users. Instant effects of earning Silver badges are positive significant for 1% and negative 
significant for 1% of users. In addition, the long term effects of earning Silver badges are 
positive significant for 8% of users and negative significant for 9% of users. Instant effects of 
earning Bronze badges are positive significant for 3% and negative significant for 2% of users. 
In addition, the long term effects of earning Bronze badges are positive significant for 10% of 
users and negative significant for 9% of users. Again, these results are useful for targeting as I 
explain later in this section. 
Potential explanations for observing both positive and negative effects of badges across segments 
are similar to the explanations for observing both positive and negative effects of the number of 
reputation points (i.e. moral licensing vs. empowerment). However, the means of long term 
effects of badges across population is negative. These negative long term effects can be 
explained by the goal setting aspect of badges in a Gamification setting. In other words, users 
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might have set the goal to win badges as hallmark of Gamification, so as they earn these badges, 
they reduce their content contribution. Given these negative effects, the fact that badges are 
once-in-a-life- time effect might suggest the Gamification platform a higher point threshold 
requirement to grant the badges. The counterfactual section quantifies the effect of such policy at 
aggregate level. 
To discuss the targeting aspect of these results, table 3.13 presents the hierarchical parameters’ 
estimates. These results suggest that certain nationalities are more likely to be sensitive to certain 
aspects of Gamification platform. For the sake of brevity, I only review more interesting 
patterns. First, American users show more inertia in contribution. They reduce their contribution 
level, if they have more reputation, but increase it, if they earn silver badges. Second, European 
users increase their effort, if they have more reputation, but English users decrease their 
contribution if they earn gold badges. Third, south Americans are more motivated to contribute 
to StackOverflow. Fourth, Asian users are more reciprocal. They increase their contribution 
when they earn Silver badges, but decrease it when they earn Gold badges. Fifth, Middle Eastern 
users are also more reciprocal.  
These patterns might be relevant for targeting because, if certain nationality responds positively 
for example to gold badges in long term, it might be relevant to guide the users with this 
nationality to earn gold badges easier. However, if users of certain nationality decrease their 
content contribution when they earn gold badges, then it might be relevant to send messages to 
these users that confuses them, making earning gold badges difficult. Similar approaches can be 
designed conditioning on response to silver and bronze badges, and reputation points. In 
addition, if the platform finds users of certain nationality more reciprocal, it can put answering 
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the questions of these users top priority for other users. All these findings can better guide the 
Gamification platform toward increasing their users’ content contributions. 
Table 3.13. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model  
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th 97.5th 
Fixed Effect   
 
 
  
    website -0.043 0.072 -0.140 0.137 
    USA -0.002 0.003 -0.008 0.003 
    UK -0.009 0.010 -0.027 0.010 
    Australia -0.014 0.011 -0.036 0.008 
    India -0.083 0.063 -0.201 0.048 
    Europe -0.005 0.021 -0.044 0.035 
    Asia 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
    South America 0.186* 0.051 0.082 0.300 
    China 0.134 0.107 -0.043 0.336 
    Middle East -0.044 0.085 -0.200 0.101 
    Tenure -0.020 0.021 -0.060 0.021 
    Seen 0.011 0.008 -0.003 0.027 
    Profile Views -0.002 0.006 -0.013 0.009 
    Reputation 0.351* 0.056 0.249 0.460 
    Gold Badges 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.012 
    Silver Badges -0.015 0.012 -0.038 0.009 
    Bronze Badges 0.016 0.013 -0.009 0.042 
    Number of Answers -0.016 0.084 -0.167 0.140 
    Number of Questions -0.025 0.026 -0.074 0.030 
    Reach 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
   
  
           website 0.003 0.134 -0.203 0.260 
           USA 0.167* 0.093 0.007 0.365 
           UK -0.079 0.088 -0.245 0.104 
           Australia -0.024 0.025 -0.071 0.021 
           India -0.010 0.008 -0.026 0.008 
           Europe 0.000 0.007 -0.013 0.013 
           Asia -0.106 0.079 -0.284 0.016 
           South America -0.005 0.006 -0.017 0.005 
           China 0.011 0.019 -0.024 0.052 
           Middle East 0.003 0.018 -0.032 0.037 
           Tenure 0.039 0.119 -0.188 0.291 
           Seen 0.011 0.042 -0.071 0.093 
           Profile Views 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
           Reputation -0.003 0.150 -0.304 0.243 
           Gold Badges 0.091 0.197 -0.337 0.500 
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           Silver Badges -0.090 0.148 -0.390 0.193 
           Bronze Badges 0.048 0.039 -0.036 0.123 
           Number of Answers -0.009 0.013 -0.034 0.016 
           Number of Questions -0.003 0.010 -0.022 0.017 
           Reach 0.397* 0.183 0.029 0.708 
Reciprocity (contribution received) 
   
  
           website  -0.016* 0.007 -0.030 -0.001 
           USA 0.004 0.026 -0.046 0.057 
           UK 0.009 0.026 -0.045 0.059 
           Australia -0.221 0.199 -0.648 0.104 
           India -0.048 0.062 -0.166 0.072 
           Europe 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
           Asia 0.554* 0.200 0.248 0.961 
           South America -0.118 0.228 -0.499 0.368 
           China 0.046 0.195 -0.283 0.447 
           Middle East 0.107* 0.054 0.005 0.210 
           Tenure -0.009 0.016 -0.041 0.024 
           Seen 0.014 0.014 -0.012 0.039 
           Profile Views 0.149 0.132 -0.156 0.375 
           Reputation -0.004 0.006 -0.015 0.007 
           Gold Badges 0.029 0.020 -0.007 0.067 
           Silver Badges -0.004 0.019 -0.040 0.036 
           Bronze Badges 0.272* 0.121 0.029 0.497 
           Number of Answers -0.033 0.044 -0.112 0.054 
           Number of Questions 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
           Reach  -0.337* 0.107 -0.512 -0.082 
Leader Board:         
    Cum Reputation 
   
  
           website -0.148 0.171 -0.455 0.149 
           USA  -0.263* 0.117 -0.500 -0.055 
           UK -0.031 0.041 -0.109 0.049 
           Australia 0.012 0.013 -0.014 0.038 
           India -0.001 0.009 -0.021 0.018 
           Europe 0.210* 0.058 0.101 0.307 
           Asia -0.002 0.004 -0.009 0.005 
           South America 0.010 0.012 -0.013 0.034 
           China 0.011 0.012 -0.011 0.035 
           Middle East 0.059 0.070 -0.077 0.197 
           Tenure -0.020 0.026 -0.069 0.032 
           Seen 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
           Profile Views 0.146 0.118 -0.062 0.331 
           Reputation -0.063 0.098 -0.237 0.117 
           Gold Badges  -0.279* 0.077 -0.435 -0.127 
           Silver Badges 0.026 0.030 -0.029 0.092 
           Bronze Badges 0.000 0.008 -0.016 0.017 
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           Number of Answers 0.001 0.007 -0.014 0.014 
           Number of Questions 0.153 0.199 -0.262 0.588 
           Reach -0.012 0.011 -0.033 0.012 
    Reputation 
   
  
           website -0.013 0.039 -0.091 0.062 
           USA -0.049 0.033 -0.113 0.014 
           UK 0.400 0.219 -0.052 0.776 
           Australia -0.103 0.082 -0.271 0.052 
           India 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.004 
           Europe -0.399 0.284 -0.920 0.090 
           Asia -0.401 0.247 -0.925 0.068 
           South America -0.219 0.230 -0.621 0.225 
           China 0.208* 0.079 0.069 0.376 
           Middle East 0.032 0.025 -0.017 0.080 
           Tenure -0.007 0.019 -0.048 0.028 
           Seen 0.484* 0.231 0.118 0.848 
           Profile Views -0.003 0.009 -0.021 0.016 
           Reputation -0.005 0.038 -0.072 0.073 
           Gold Badges 0.075 0.039 -0.004 0.150 
           Silver Badges 0.415* 0.196 0.023 0.764 
           Bronze Badges 0.029 0.075 -0.121 0.180 
           Number of Answers 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.003 
           Number of Questions  -1.080* 0.274 -1.500 -0.596 
           Reach -0.184 0.248 -0.643 0.321 
    Rank 
   
  
           website -0.255 0.211 -0.658 0.132 
           USA -0.013 0.066 -0.144 0.111 
           UK -0.005 0.023 -0.050 0.041 
           Australia 0.008 0.018 -0.027 0.043 
           India 0.470 0.457 -0.141 1.520 
           Europe 0.008 0.017 -0.024 0.041 
           Asia -0.017 0.056 -0.124 0.094 
           South America -0.044 0.058 -0.158 0.066 
           China 1.017* 0.283 0.487 1.578 
           Middle East -0.059 0.128 -0.301 0.179 
           Tenure 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.006 
           Seen -0.691 0.711 -1.877 0.524 
           Profile Views  -1.450* 0.498 -2.429 -0.675 
           Reputation -0.125 0.371 -0.773 0.603 
           Gold Badges -0.162 0.149 -0.405 0.131 
           Silver Badges -0.057 0.040 -0.133 0.018 
           Bronze Badges 0.005 0.029 -0.050 0.061 
           Number of Answers 0.859* 0.189 0.381 1.097 
           Number of Questions 0.000 0.008 -0.015 0.014 
           Reach 0.038 0.029 -0.018 0.090 
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    Rank Change 
   
  
           website 0.018 0.028 -0.037 0.070 
           USA 0.064 0.139 -0.187 0.349 
           UK -0.054 0.061 -0.168 0.074 
           Australia 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
           India  -0.520* 0.272 -0.963 -0.004 
           Europe 0.242 0.284 -0.449 0.649 
           Asia 0.029 0.193 -0.361 0.397 
           South America 0.058 0.069 -0.094 0.162 
           China 0.009 0.018 -0.024 0.048 
           Middle East -0.009 0.015 -0.038 0.018 
           Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Seen 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Profile Views 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Reputation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Gold Badges 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Silver Badges 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Bronze Badges 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Number of Answers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Number of Questions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Reach 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
   
  
           website 0.00000 0.00002 -0.00004 0.00005 
           USA 0.00001* 0.00001 0.00000 0.00003 
           UK 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00001 
           Australia -0.00028 0.00007 -0.00042 -0.00016 
           India 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 
           Europe 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00003 0.00004 
           Asia 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00006 
           South America  -0.0004* 0.00012 -0.00063 -0.00015 
           China 0.00000 0.00004 -0.00009 0.00008 
           Middle East 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Tenure 0.0008* 0.00018 0.00048 0.00112 
           Seen 0.00022 0.00015 -0.00010 0.00047 
           Profile Views 0.00008 0.00011 -0.00012 0.00030 
           Reputation -0.00001 0.00005 -0.00009 0.00009 
           Gold Badges 0.00002 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00005 
           Silver Badges 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 
           Bronze Badges 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 
           Number of Answers 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Number of Questions 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Reach 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
    Silver Bade 
   
  
           website 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 
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           USA 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 
           UK 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Australia  -0.00004* 0.00001 -0.00005 -0.00002 
           India 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 
           Europe -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00005 0.00001 
           Asia  0.00002* 0.00001 0.00001 0.00003 
           South America 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           China 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Middle East  -0.00001* 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 
           Tenure 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Seen 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Profile Views 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Reputation 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 
           Gold Badges 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Silver Badges 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Bronze Badges 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 
           Number of Answers 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 
           Number of Questions 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 
           Reach 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
    Bronze Badge 
   
  
           website 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           USA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           UK  -0.01716* 0.00725 -0.03297 -0.00624 
           Australia 0.00050 0.00043 -0.00038 0.00127 
           India -0.00228 0.00139 -0.00501 0.00036 
           Europe 0.00058 0.00132 -0.00209 0.00303 
           Asia 0.00847 0.00809 -0.01185 0.02379 
           South America 0.00511 0.00327 -0.00076 0.01180 
           China 0.00000 0.00007 -0.00013 0.00013 
           Middle East 0.01705 0.01298 -0.01084 0.03890 
           Tenure  -0.03556* 0.00920 -0.05325 -0.01680 
           Seen  -0.02181* 0.01065 -0.04569 -0.00412 
           Profile Views 0.00002 0.00352 -0.00689 0.00666 
           Reputation  -0.00215* 0.00105 -0.00430 -0.00027 
           Gold Badges 0.00013 0.00072 -0.00129 0.00150 
           Silver Badges 0.00747 0.00362 0.00147 0.01536 
           Bronze Badges 0.00011 0.00013 -0.00014 0.00035 
           Number of Answers -0.00019 0.00044 -0.00105 0.00065 
           Number of Questions  -0.00109* 0.00048 -0.00207 -0.00009 
           Reach  0.00532* 0.00233 0.00127 0.01005 
    Cum Gold Badge 
   
  
           website -0.00036 0.00097 -0.00239 0.00152 
           USA 0.00000 0.00002 -0.00005 0.00005 
           UK  -0.01033* 0.00231 -0.01565 -0.00638 
           Australia 0.00124 0.00241 -0.00301 0.00601 
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           India  -0.00685* 0.00322 -0.01287 -0.00047 
           Europe 0.00146 0.00110 -0.00076 0.00348 
           Asia 0.00011 0.00033 -0.00052 0.00077 
           South America 0.00001 0.00024 -0.00046 0.00050 
           China  -0.00640* 0.00402 -0.01528 -0.00074 
           Middle East -0.00011 0.00010 -0.00030 0.00010 
           Tenure 0.00034 0.00034 -0.00034 0.00100 
           Seen 0.00066 0.00034 -0.00007 0.00133 
           Profile Views  -0.00568* 0.00216 -0.00947 -0.00058 
           Reputation 0.00064 0.00070 -0.00073 0.00201 
           Gold Badges 0.00000 0.00002 -0.00003 0.00004 
           Silver Badges 0.00758* 0.00139 0.00492 0.01065 
           Bronze Badges 0.00253 0.00222 -0.00187 0.00703 
           Number of Answers 0.00520 0.00313 -0.00062 0.01142 
           Number of Questions -0.00074 0.00072 -0.00207 0.00082 
           Reach 0.00011 0.00024 -0.00036 0.00055 
    Cum Silver Badge 
   
  
           website 0.00001 0.00019 -0.00037 0.00038 
           USA 0.00055* 0.00018 0.00015 0.00076 
           UK 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 
           Australia -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00006 0.00001 
           India -0.00003 0.00002 -0.00006 0.00000 
           Europe 0.00001 0.00010 -0.00015 0.00022 
           Asia -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00008 0.00004 
           South America 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           China 0.00040* 0.00010 0.00019 0.00054 
           Middle East -0.00007 0.00012 -0.00025 0.00019 
           Tenure -0.00007 0.00011 -0.00028 0.00014 
           Seen  -0.00010* 0.00004 -0.00018 -0.00001 
           Profile Views 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 
           Reputation -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00003 0.00000 
           Gold Badges 0.00229* 0.00125 0.00004 0.00403 
           Silver Badges 0.00000 0.00003 -0.00006 0.00006 
           Bronze Badges 0.00004 0.00008 -0.00012 0.00020 
           Number of Answers -0.00002 0.00010 -0.00021 0.00016 
           Number of Questions 0.00100 0.00060 -0.00023 0.00211 
           Reach -0.00040 0.00023 -0.00085 0.00003 
    Cum Bronze Badge 
   
  
           website 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00001 
           USA  -0.00252* 0.00074 -0.00377 -0.00117 
           UK 0.00010 0.00128 -0.00171 0.00337 
           Australia -0.00007 0.00091 -0.00179 0.00139 
           India 0.00033 0.00024 -0.00010 0.00083 
           Europe 0.00000 0.00006 -0.00012 0.00011 
           Asia -0.00002 0.00005 -0.00010 0.00008 
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           South America 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           China 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Middle East 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Tenure 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Seen 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Profile Views 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Reputation 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Gold Badges  -0.000000* 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Silver Badges 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Bronze Badges 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Number of Answers 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Number of Questions 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
           Reach 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
3.8. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS AND ITS MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
An advantage of modeling consumers’ choices from the utility primitive is the capability to run 
counterfactuals. One of the choices of a Gamification platform is to modify the threshold of 
earning badges. Given the heterogeneous short term and long term effects of different badges, a 
priori it might not be clear how changing the thresholds will affect the expected number of 
content contributions at aggregate level. Therefore, given the estimated parameters, I simulated 
the users’ response to perturbation in the number of badges that they receive. As a measure, I 
used the expected total number of contributions, which as the sum of the predicted probability of 
the users’ choices, is analogous to integrating the probability of choices across the population. In 
summary, to find the effect of each of the counterfactual scenarios of modifying the badges, I 
modified the related badge variable, and given the other entire variable and the parameters, I 
summed up the predicted choice probability of each of the users. 
Table 3.14 summarizes the result of the counterfactual analysis of nine scenarios:  shutting down 
or five percent increase or decrease of either silver and bronze badges, gold badges, or all the 
badges. First, shutting down the badges has increased the level of contribution by 3% for the 
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duration of experiment. This result suggests that long term effect of distributing badges without 
expiry can negatively affect the contribution level of users. In addition, while increasing the 
number of silver and bronze badges by reducing the thresholds has negative impact on the 
expected number of contributions, increasing the gold badges by decreasing the threshold results 
has positive impact on the expected number of contributions. Therefore, the platform might be 
better off to increase the threshold for earning silver and bronze badges, but decrease the 
threshold for earning gold badges. If the platform wants to either increase or decrease the 
threshold across all the badges, then the counterfactual analysis suggests increasing the 
threshold, so that the platform extracts as many of users contributions as possible, before 
granting badges. 
Table 3.14. Counterfactual Analysis Result 
Cases 
Expected 
Number  
of 
Contributions 
Absolute 
Change 
Improvement 
Ratio 
Real Case 944,283 - - 
Counterfactual 5% Increase in Silver and Bronze Badges 943,075 -1,208 -0.13% 
Counterfactual 5% Decrease in Silver and Bronze Badges 945,557 1,274 0.13% 
Counterfactual 5% Increase in Gold Badges 945,226 942 0.10% 
Counterfactual 5% Decrease in Gold Badges 943,507 -777 -0.08% 
Counterfactual 5% Increase in All Badges 944,027 -256 -0.03% 
Counterfactual 5% Decrease in All Badges 944,819 536 0.06% 
shut down silver and bronze badges 979,687 35,404 3.75% 
shut down gold badges 944,775 492 0.05% 
shut down all the badges 975,344 31,061 3.29% 
 
 
3.9. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I developed a structural model that accounts for the effects of motivational factor 
of Gamification elements such as Badges and leaderboard on users’ choice to contribute content. 
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To allow Gamification platforms to target their customers, I highlight the importance of 
controlling for user heterogeneity in the model using Hierarchical Dirichlet Process. First, using 
a large data set from Stack Overflow, I segment users’ profile by a method that ensembles 
clustering assignments of LDA, mixture normal and k-mean methods. I showed heterogeneity in 
users’ behavior by segmenting users into competitors, collaborators, achievers, explorers, and 
uninterested users. Then, by estimating the model over a sample of this data set, I showed that 
users’ responses to various Gamification elements are heterogeneous. I showed that small sample 
size can return bias parameters’ estimates. My results demonstrate that users with certain 
nationalities are sensitive to certain Gamification elements.  
I further illustrated how the estimated model can be used to analyze a counterfactual scenario for 
Gamification platform’s badge threshold modifications. This counterfactual analysis shows that, 
if the Gamification platform increases the threshold for earning silver and bronze badges, but 
decreases the threshold for earning gold badges, it can increase users’ contribution. I believe that 
my modeling approach, proposed estimation method, and derived empirical insights in this paper 
can be of interest to both practitioners and scholars in academia. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1.A: DIRECT ACYCLIC GRAPH OF CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Probabilistic graphical approaches are popular in computer science, as they not only prove a 
visual tool to recognize conditional independence, but also they help saving space in representing 
probability distributions, and they facilitate probabilistic queries. Following represents the 
probabilistic graphical representation of the model I studied in this paper. Shaded circles 
represent the observed variables and un-shaded ones represent latent variables or parameters. 
The rectangles, called plate, represent the replication of variables with the number specified at 
their bottom right. 
 
Figure 1.A.1. Probabilistic graphical model of customer mobile app choices under social 
influence 
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t = 1:T 
i = 1:I 
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APPENDIX 1.B: UNSCENTED KALMAN FILTER 
A recursive algorithm to update the latent state variable with Unscented Kalman Filter has the 
following steps. I refer the interested reader to Wan and van der Merve (2001). 
Model has the following form, the first equation observation equation, and the second one state 
equation, with nonlinear functions H and F: 
),0(~,)(
),0(~,)(
1 Υ+=
Ι+=
−
MVNxFx
MVNxHy
kkkk
kkkk
υυ
ηη
 (B1) 
The estimation algorithm: 
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Drawing Sigma points: 
])([ 1111 −−−− +±=ℵ kkkk PLxx λ))  (B3) 
Updating Time: 
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Updating Measurement: 
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APPENDIX 1.C: CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ESTIMATION OF THE 
MICRO CHOICE MODEL 
Conditional distributions of the choice variable include the following: 
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 where this conditional distribution can be estimated by random walk metropolis hasting on the 
weighted likelihood.  
    The priors for normal mixture distribution of the individual and the category specific 
parameters used are: 
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where the first conditional is the standard posterior Polya Urn representation for the mean and 
variance of individual specific random coefficient choice model parameters. *),( ii Σµ  denotes a 
set of unique ),( ii Σµ , which the DP process hyper-parameters depend  only on (a posteriori). 
Given the )*},{( ii Σµ set
dα and based measure parameters (i.e. ϑ,, va ) are independent, a 
posteriori. The conditional posterior of the 0G hyper-parameters (i.e. ϑ,, va ), factors into two 
parts as a  is independent of ϑ,v  given )*},{( ii Σµ . The form of this conditional posterior is: 
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where .,.)|(.φ  denotes the multivariate normal density. .,.)|(.IW  denotes Inverted-Wishart 
distribution. Finally, for Polya representation implementation the following conditional 
distribution is used: 
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I assessed the prior hyperparameters to provide proper but diffuse distributions, defined formally 
by:  
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Finally to complete the exposition, the posterior for the partition (segment) parameters has the 
following form: 
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APPENDIX 1.D: CHOICE PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
Table 1.D.1. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (Local imitators) 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  -9.19* 6.57 -34.490 -3.216 
   eBooks 2α  -8.89* 2.84 -13.253 -3.337 
   Games 3α  -25.82* 8.31 -38.609 -9.519 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  1.17 1.83 -6.588 2.295 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  -0.41 7.11 -31.222 1.509 
   Internet/WAP 6α  -12.11* 3.94 -18.256 -4.378 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  -26.26* 10.30 -51.248 -9.384 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  -17.95* 5.82 -27.128 -6.624 
   Social Networks 9α  -3.23 1.33 -5.043 0.184 
   University 10α  -6.86* 10.07 -49.254 -1.866 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-17.79* 18.37 -93.057 -5.689 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.02* 0.01 0.005 0.032 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  0.39 0.73 -2.766 0.789 
    Investment apps category 14α  -10.73* 3.45 -15.955 -3.700 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  12.67 7.57 -15.563 20.683 
* p<0.05 
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Table 1.D.2. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (Global imitators) 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-2.13* 0.26 -2.79 -1.89 
   eBooks 2α  
-0.6 0.84 -0.68 0.52 
   Games 3α  0.22* 0.37 0.17 1.18 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  1.06 0.86 -1.46 1.53 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-2.68* 0.34 -3.20 -1.63 
   Internet/WAP 6α  
-0.53* 0.28 -1.76 -0.44 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-1.72 0.75 -2.07 1.08 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-1.45 0.46 -1.76 0.64 
   Social Networks 9α  
-1.64* 0.36 -1.97 -0.44 
   University 10α  
-2.05* 0.37 -2.44 -1.61 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-3.3* 0.44 -4.00 -2.15 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.01 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  
-0.08* 0.15 -0.38 -0.06 
    Investment apps category 14α  -0.42* 1.09 -1.24 -0.40 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-0.31* 0.49 -2.29 -0.22 
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Table 1.D.3. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (Global Adopters) 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-24.94* 16.81 -14.327 -2.669 
   eBooks 2α  
-18.31* 12.36 -15.290 -6.381 
   Games 3α  
-18.66* 11.97 -11.222 -2.296 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-13.37 8.16 -5.939 2.982 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-11.26* 6.43 -22.097 -9.715 
   Internet/WAP 6α  
-6.92* 2.54 -8.021 -3.021 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-0.13* 1.06 -18.122 -8.332 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-17.74* 12.56 -11.092 -4.547 
   Social Networks 9α  
-26.77 17.29 -15.530 0.076 
   University 10α  
-9.2* 7.16 -7.791 -2.916 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-35.93* 22.88 -34.350 -13.821 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.01* 0.01 0.011 0.035 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  
-1.05 0.73 -0.830 1.767 
    Investment apps category 14α  19.1 13.08 -0.922 7.230 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-25.79 17.78 -6.606 10.330 
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Table 1.D.4. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (No social influence) 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-20.51* 6.14 -28.162 -2.250 
   eBooks 2α  
-2.43* 0.39 -2.647 -1.372 
   Games 3α  
-11.89 5.26 -19.040 0.482 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-10.4* 3.55 -15.011 -0.619 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-8.9 3.35 -13.168 0.716 
   Internet/WAP 6α  
-21.99* 7.19 -31.258 -2.083 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-16.36* 4.60 -21.876 -1.765 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-7.59 1.80 -8.841 0.232 
   Social Networks 9α  
-10.77* 3.39 -14.949 -0.369 
   University 10α  
-2.44* 0.46 -2.661 -0.457 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-15.84* 4.79 -22.241 -4.298 
    Latent imitation level 12α  
- - - - 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  
-1.77* 0.68 -2.708 -0.254 
    Investment apps category 14α  -7.51* 2.81 -11.425 -1.362 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-9.29* 3.67 -14.263 -0.893 
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Table 1.D.5. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model (Local 
imitators): Tenure explanation of the effects 
Parameter explained by Tenure
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th   
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-0.0032* 9.66E-05 -0.0034 -0.0030 
   eBooks 2α  
-0.0012* 1.42E-04 -0.0015 -0.0010 
   Games 3α  
-0.0005* 1.31E-04 -0.0008 -0.0002 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-0.0023* 1.37E-04 -0.0026 -0.0021 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  0.0006* 7.44E-05 0.0004 0.0007 
   Internet/WAP 6α  0.0022* 1.29E-04 0.0019 0.0023 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0.0028* 1.60E-04 0.0025 0.0031 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0.0004* 9.12E-05 0.0002 0.0006 
   Social Networks 9α  0.0034* 1.46E-04 0.0031 0.0036 
   University 10α  0.0007* 4.04E-05 0.0006 0.0007 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-0.005* 8.06E-05 -0.0051 -0.0048 
    Latent imitation level 12α  0.0001* 5.88E-06 0.0000 0.0001 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  0.0001* 1.13E-05 0.0001 0.0001 
    Investment apps category 14α  0.0025* 6.35E-05 0.0024 0.0026 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-0.0012* 1.09E-04 -0.0014 -0.0010 
* p<0.05 
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Table 1.D.6. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model (Global 
imitators): Tenure explanation of the effects 
Parameter explained by Tenure
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th 97.5th 
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  
-0.0038* 1.61E-04 -0.0041 -0.0035 
   eBooks 2α  
-0.0014* 1.78E-04 -0.0017 -0.0011 
   Games 3α  0.0009* 8.48E-05 0.0007 0.0010 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  0.0046* 4.85E-04 0.0040 0.0054 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  
-0.0061* 3.34E-04 -0.0065 -0.0056 
   Internet/WAP 6α  
-0.0005* 7.52E-05 -0.0006 -0.0004 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  
-0.0035* 1.65E-04 -0.0038 -0.0032 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  
-0.0033* 3.75E-04 -0.0039 -0.0028 
   Social Networks 9α  
-0.0034* 2.16E-04 -0.0037 -0.0030 
   University 10α  
-0.0047* 2.57E-04 -0.0051 -0.0043 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  
-0.0086* 5.63E-04 -0.0095 -0.0077 
    Latent imitation level 12α  
-0.0001* 1.31E-05 -0.0001 -0.0001 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  
-0.0002* 1.72E-05 -0.0002 -0.0002 
    Investment apps category 14α  -0.0016* 9.04E-05 -0.0018 -0.0014 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-0.0005* 8.27E-05 -0.0006 -0.0004 
* p<0.05 
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Table 1.D.7. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model (Global 
Adopters): Tenure explanation of the effects 
Parameter explained by Tenure
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th 97.5th 
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  0.0003* 1.00E-04 1.36E-04 0.00046 
   eBooks 2α  0.00034* 8.80E-05 1.46E-04 4.74E-04 
   Games 3α  -0.00016 1.00E-04 -3.15E-04 6.43E-05 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  0.00028* 7.29E-05 1.38E-04 0.000424 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  0.00027* 9.25E-05 1.04E-04 0.000454 
   Internet/WAP 6α  0.00157* 1.09E-04 1.35E-03 1.76E-03 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0.00072* 9.03E-05 5.92E-04 0.00091 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0.00047* 6.80E-05 3.06E-04 5.76E-04 
   Social Networks 9α  -0.00006 1.00E-04 -2.49E-04 9.45E-05 
   University 10α  0.00071* 9.72E-05 5.37E-04 8.64E-04 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  0.00119* 1.98E-04 8.84E-04 0.001637 
    Latent imitation level 12α  
-0.00001 4.69E-06 -1.43E-05 3.22E-06 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  
-0.00007* 1.65E-05 -9.67E-05 -3.90E-05 
    Investment apps category 14α  -0.00095* 1.17E-04 -1.14E-03 -7.95E-04 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  0.0002* 8.21E-05 7.29E-05 3.66E-04 
* p<0.05 
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Table 1.D.8. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice Hierarchical Model (No social 
influence): Tenure explanation of the effects 
Parameter explained by Tenure
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th 97.5th 
Category specific preference:
 
    
   Device Tools 1α  0.00192* 1.34E-04 1.63E-03 0.002171 
   eBooks 2α  0.00162* 1.21E-04 1.33E-03 1.83E-03 
   Games 3α  0.00024 4.04E-04 -4.20E-04 8.69E-04 
   Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  
-0.00004 1.86E-04 -3.63E-04 0.000259 
   Humor/Jokes 5α  0.00019 1.53E-04 -6.07E-05 0.000484 
   Internet/WAP 6α  0.00164* 2.65E-04 1.15E-03 2.04E-03 
   Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0.00207* 1.44E-04 1.87E-03 0.002432 
   Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0.00292* 1.36E-04 2.58E-03 3.13E-03 
   Social Networks 9α  0.00128* 1.39E-04 1.01E-03 0.001511 
   University 10α  0.00066* 8.36E-05 4.77E-04 7.96E-04 
States:
 
    
    Individual download history State 11α  0.00084* 1.19E-04 6.21E-04 1.08E-03 
    Latent imitation level 12α  - - - - 
App category characteristics (factors):     
    Popularity of app category 13α  0.000005 3.77E-05 -6.62E-05 6.02E-05 
    Investment apps category 14α  0.00023 1.65E-04 -1.11E-04 4.58E-04 
    Hedonic apps category 15α  
-0.00014 2.00E-04 -4.80E-04 1.75E-04 
* p<0.05 
 
 
 
  
178 
 
Table 1.D.9. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect  
(Local imitators) 
Total number of users: 1258
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Category specific preference:
 
  
Device Tools 1α  0 1258 
eBooks 2α  0 1258 
Games 3α  0 1258 
Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  1197 61 
Humor/Jokes 5α  1197 61 
Internet/WAP 6α  0 1258 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0 1258 
Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0 1258 
Social Networks 9α  58 1197 
University 10α  0 1258 
States:
 
  
Individual download history State 11α  0 1258 
Latent imitation level 12α  1217 0 
App category characteristics (factors):   
Popularity of app category 13α  1197 61 
Investment apps category 14α  0 1258 
Hedonic apps category 15α  1197 61 
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Table 1.D.10. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect 
(Global imitators) 
Total number of users: 1258
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Category specific preference:
 
  
Device Tools 1α  0 1258 
eBooks 2α  42 1216 
Games 3α  1250 8 
Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  1208 50 
Humor/Jokes 5α  0 1257 
Internet/WAP 6α  0 1258 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  42 1216 
Reference/Dictionaries 8α  42 1216 
Social Networks 9α  8 1250 
University 10α  8 1250 
States:
 
  
Individual download history State 11α  0 1258 
Latent imitation level 12α  1051 4 
App category characteristics (factors):   
Popularity of app category 13α  8 1250 
Investment apps category 14α  8 1250 
Hedonic apps category 15α  8 1250 
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Table 1.D.11. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect 
(Global Adopters) 
Total number of users: 1258
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Category specific preference:
 
  
Device Tools 1α  0 1258 
eBooks 2α  0 1258 
Games 3α  0 1258 
Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  0 1258 
Humor/Jokes 5α  55 1203 
Internet/WAP 6α  0 1258 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  438 545 
Reference/Dictionaries 8α  0 1258 
Social Networks 9α  0 1258 
University 10α  0 1249 
States:
 
  
Individual download history State 11α  0 1258 
Latent imitation level 12α  607 257 
App category characteristics (factors):   
Popularity of app category 13α  55 1203 
Investment apps category 14α  1203 55 
Hedonic apps category 15α  55 1203 
 
  
181 
 
Table 1.D.12. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect 
 (No social influence) 
Total number of users: 1258
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
Category specific preference:
 
  
Device Tools 1α  0 1258 
eBooks 2α  0 1258 
Games 3α  54 1103 
Health/Diet/Fitness 4α  0 1258 
Humor/Jokes 5α  54 1204 
Internet/WAP 6α  0 1258 
Logic/Puzzle/Trivia 7α  0 1258 
Reference/Dictionaries 8α  54 1204 
Social Networks 9α  0 1258 
University 10α  0 1258 
States:
 
  
Individual download history State 11α  2 1256 
Latent imitation level 12α  
- - 
App category characteristics (factors):   
Popularity of app category 13α  2 1241 
Investment apps category 14α  0 1243 
Hedonic apps category 15α  2 1241 
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Figure 1.D.1. PARAMETER DISTRIBUTION: Heterogeneity in Individual Choice (Local 
Imitators) 
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Figure 1.D.2. PARAMETER DISTRIBUTION: Heterogeneity in Individual Choice (Global 
Imitators) 
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Figure 1.D.3. PARAMETER DISTRIBUTION: Heterogeneity in Individual Choice (Global 
Adopters) 
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Figure 1.D.4. PARAMETER DISTRIBUTION: Heterogeneity in Individual Choice (No social 
influence) 
  
Device tools cat.                            ebook cat.                Logic/puzzle Trivia cat.          Reference/Dictionaries 
                Games cat.                     Health/ Diet/ Fitness app cat.            Social NW cat.            University cat 
         Humor/Jokes cat.                Internet/ WAP cat.                      Individual State               Imitators density 
Popular apps                            Investment apps                       Freemium apps 
186 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.A: LATENT DIRICHLET ALLOCATION 
     LDA is a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model, in which each item of a collection is 
modeled as a finite mixture over an underlying set of topics (Blei et al 2003).  LDA is a 
generative approach; it use naïve conditional independence assumption, and it neglect the order 
of features by assuming exchangeability and using bag of words representation. These 
assumptions bring two main benefits to these approaches: simplicity, computational efficiency.  
Formally the LDA model assumes the following generative process for each item i in a 
collection C consisting of element (feature) e: 
1. Choose N ~ Poisson (ξ ), where N is the number of elements e 
2. Choose )(~ αθ Dir , where θ  is the probability that a given document has primitive 
topic 
3. For each of the N features ni : 
a. Choose a topic )(~ θlMultinomiazn  
b. Choose a feature ni  from ),|( βnn zip , a multinomial probability conditioned on 
the topic 
A k-dimensional Dirichlet random variable θ can take values in the (k-1)-simplex (a k-vector θ  
lies in the (k-1)-simplex if 1,0
1
=≥ ∑
=
k
i
ii θθ ), and has the following probability density on this 
simplex:  
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I represented the Probability Graphical Model (PGM) of LDA in figure 1.4. As figure depicts, 
there are three levels to the LDA representation. The parameters βα , are collection level 
parameters, and they are sampled once.  The variable dθ  has Dirichlet distribution, and it is 
document level variable, so it is sampled once per document. This variable simply defines the 
weight distribution of topics within the document. Finally variables 
ndz and ndw are feature level 
parameters and they are sampled once for each feature within each document. Variable ndz  
defines the topic of n’ths word within document d, and variable ndw  defines the feature instance 
that appears at location n within document d. As I can see an LDA model is a type of 
conditionally independent hierarchical model, and it is often referred to as parametric empirical 
Bayes model. One of the advantages of an LDA model is that it is parsimonious, so unlike 
probabilistic Latent Semantic Indexing (pLSI) model, it does not suffer from over fitting. 
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Figure 2.A.1. Graphical model representation of LDA 
To estimate LDA model, I defined the likelihood of model in the following: 
∏ ∫ ∏ ∑= == Md Nn d
z
ddddd
d
nd
nnn
dzwpzppDp
1 1
),|()|()(|(),|( θβθαθβα  
The key inferential problem to solve for LDA is computing posterior distribution of topic hidden 
variables dd z,θ , the first one with Dirichlet distribution, and the second one with multinomial 
distribution. To normalize the distribution of words given βα , , I marginalized over the hidden 
variables as following: 
∏ ∫ ∏ ∑∏∏∏
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Due to the coupling between θ and β in the summation over latent topics this likelihood function 
is intractable. Therefore to estimate it Blei et al. (2003) suggests using variational inference 
method. Variational inference or variational Bayesian refers to a family of techniques for 
 
 
 
 
θ
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approximating intractable integrals arising in Bayesian inference and machine learning. These 
family of methods are an alternative to sampling methods, and they are basically used to 
analytically approximate the posterior probability of the unobservable variables, in order to do 
statistical inference over these variables. These methods also give a lower bound to the marginal 
log likelihood. This family of lower bounds is indexed by a set of variational parameters. To 
obtain tightest lower bound I used an optimization procedure to select the variational parameters. 
A simple way to obtain a tractable family of lower bounds is to consider simple modifications of 
the original graphical model, by removing dependencies and introducing new variational 
parameters instead. In the LDA model, I used the following variational distribution to 
approximate posterior distribution of unobserved variables given the observed data s follows: 
∏
=
=
N
n
nnzqqzq
1
21 )|()|(),|,( φγθφγθ  
Where (.)1q is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters γ and (.)2q is a multinomial distribution 
with parameters nφ . Variational parameters are result of solving the following optimization 
problem: 
)),,|,(||),|,((),( minarg
),(
** βαθφγθφγ
φγ
wzpzqDKL=  
where KLD represents the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the variational distribution 
and the true joint posterior of latent parameters ),,|,( βαθ wzp .  Formally, KLD  is defined as 
follows: 
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As a result, I can write KL-divergence in the following format: 
)),,|,(||),|,((),;,(),|( βαθφγθβαφγβα wzpzqDLwLogp KL+=  
where  
)],([log)],|,,([log),;,( zqEwzpEL qq θβαθβαφγ −=  
This relation suggests that maximizing the lower bound ),;,( βαφγL  with respect to γ and φ  is 
equivalent to minimizing the KL divergence between the variational posterior probability and the 
true posterior probability. Expanding ),;,( βαφγL  using factorization of p and q gives the 
following: 
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Where (.)Γ is gamma function and (.)Ψ is its derivative. They key for this derivation is the 
following equation: ∑
=
Ψ−Ψ= kj jiiE 1 )()(]|[log αααθ , which is direct derivative of general 
fact that the derivative of log normalization factor with respect to the natural parameter of an 
exponential distribution is equal to the expectation of sufficient statistics. Collecting terms that 
are only related to each of the variational parameters γ and niφ from ),;,( βαφγL , and getting 
191 
 
the derivative respectively give us an algorithm to solve the above optimization problem to find 
variational parameters.  In particular, I can use a simple iterative fixed-point method and update 
two variational parameters by the following equations until convergance: 
∑
=
+=
∝
n
n niii
iqiwni En
1
]}|)[log(exp{
φαγ
γθβφ
 
This optimization is document specific, so I viewed the Dirichlet parameter )(* wγ as providing a 
representation of a document in the topic simplex. In summary, I had the following variational 
inference algorithm for LDA (Blei et al 2003): 
(1) Initialize kni /1:0 =φ for all i and n 
(2) Initialize kNii /: += αγ for all i and n 
(3) Repeat 
a. For n=1 to N 
i. For i = 1 to k 
1. ))'(exp(:1 iiwtni n γβφ Ψ=+  
ii. Normalize 1+t
niφ to sum to 1 
b. ∑
=
++ +=
N
n
t
n
t
1
11 : φαγ  
(4) until convergence 
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This algorithm has the order of )( 2kNO . Given the variational Bayesian method, I had tractable 
lower bound on the log likelihood, a bound which I can maximize with respect to α and β . I can 
thus find approximate empirical Bayes estimates for the LDA model via an alternating 
variational EM (VEM) procedure that maximizes a lower bound with respect to variational 
parameters γ and φ , and then, for fixed values of the variational parameters, maximizes the 
lower bound with respect to the model parameters α and β . The VEM algorithm is defined in 
the following: 
1. (E-step) For each document, find the optimization value of the variational parameters 
}:,{ ** Dddd ∈φγ . This is done as described in the above variational inference algorithm. 
2. (M-step) Maximize the resulting lower bound on the log likelihood with respect to the 
model parameters α and β . This corresponds to finding the maximum likelihood estimates 
with expected sufficient statistics for each document under the approximate posterior which 
is computed in the E-step. The update for the conditional multinomial parameter  β  can be 
written out analytically as: 
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*φβ  
The last concern about LDA is to make sure that sparsity does not  make the likelihood zero, an 
extended graphical model with prior on β , where β is a k*V random matrix(k number of topics 
and V number of features, a row for each component), with independence identically Dirichlet 
distributed with parameter  η  rows assumption. Now  iβ  can be treated as a random variable to 
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be endowed to the posterior distribution of hidden variables, giving us the following variational 
distribution with independence assumption: 
∏∏
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To account for this modification, I only needed to change the variational inference algorithm by 
augmenting the following update of variational parameter λ  as follows: 
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This equation finalizes the plot of VEM algorithm to estimate an LDA model. There is an 
alternative approach proposed by Phan et al. (2008) that uses Gibbs sampling to estimate an 
LDA model. This approach draws from the posterior distribution of p(z|w) by sampling as 
follows: 
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where iz−  is the vector of current topic memberships of all words without the i’th word iw . The 
index j indicates that iw  is equal to the j’th term in the vocabulary. )( ,j Kin−  gives how often the j’th 
term of the vocabulary is currently assigned to topic K without the i'th word, and the dot implies 
the summation over all relevant index instances. id indicates the document in the collection to 
which the word iw  belongs to. In this Bayesian formulation δ and α are the prior parameters for 
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the term distribution of topics β and the topic distribution of documentsθ , respectively. The 
predictive distribution of the parameter θ  and β given w and z are given by: 
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The likelihood for the Gibbs sampling also has the following form: 
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APPENDIX 2.B: K-MEANS CLUSTERING 
 
Figure 2.B.1. Within groups sum of square based on number of clusters in K-Means algorithm 
for bidders 
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Figure 2.B.2. Within groups’ sum of square based on number of clusters in K-Means algorithm 
for auctions 
Table 2.B.1. Cluster center comparison between k-mean and mixture normal fuzzy clustering 
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k-means approach 
mean 261 5913 1531 9 3 867 307 456 134 25 11 2 1 
STD 285 19587 2330 14 3 1569 408 989 169 28 8 2 1 
Mixture normal Fuzzy clustering 
mean 261 3471 3635 9 7 680 631 258 267 24 19 2 1 
STD 275 12400 8480 8 7 1073 1066 413 450 20 12 1 1 
              
196 
 
APPENDIX 2.C: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
We summarize the Monte Carlo (Generalized) Expectation Maximization algorithm using 
pseudo code.  
[Outline of the algorithm] 
Parameters to estimate: 
),,,( jjjjj ηιτγ=Ψ : Auction specific, ),,,( iiiii ρδβα=Θ : Bidder specific 
),,,,,( 2211 jjjjwjvjj ξζξζ σσσσσσ=Σ : Variance of state space 
Clustering step: eBay-specified auction cluster indices are denoted by jclus . Bidders are 
clustered using mixture normal fuzzy clustering to extract iind : index of membership of bidder i 
in bidder segment.  
Generalized E-M algorithm: 
Step 0: Initialize all parameters to estimate Ψ , Θ , and Σ  
E-Step:  
• Compute weighted least square to estimate ),ˆ,,ˆ( auctionkauctionbidderkbidder bb ΣΣ  
• Compute prior over bidder and auction specific parameters 
• Compute expected likelihood function using Kalman forward filtering and backward 
smoothing to estimate the distribution of state parameters. Then use Monte Carlo 
Sampling to integrate over latent state. 
M-Step: Improve the expected likelihood function w.r.t ),,( ΣΘΨ  using simulated annealing 
method and return to step 1a.  
[Details of the algorithm] 
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 [Input data]: a sequence of bid itb  of individual Ii ,...,1=
 
on t’th bid Tt ,...,1=  within each 
auction Jj ,...,1= , and a vector of cross sectional information about each bidder id for each 
bidder, and a vector of cross sectional information about each auction jd  for each auction. 
[Preprocessing]:  
1. eBay-specified auction cluster indices are denoted by jclus . 
2. Identify the segment of each of bidders by estimating mixture normal fuzzy clustering, 
specified in equation (15). With the following EM algorithm: 
[E-step]: Compute “expected” segment of all bidders for each segment by evaluating the 
Gaussian density of the bidder i’s data for each segment: 
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[M-Step]: Compute maximum likelihood of the model given the data’s class membership 
distribution: 
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              The output of this algorithm after convergence is iind  which is the segment of bidder i. 
3. Set initial value for the following parameters vectors: 
[Auction specific parameters] 
),...,(),,...,(),,...,(),,...,( 1111 JJJJj ηηηιιιγγγτττ ====
 
Stacked in ),,,( jjjjj ηιτγ=Ψ , so ),...,( 1 JΨΨ=Ψ  
[Bidder specific parameters] 
),...,(),,...,(),,...,(),,...,( 1111 IIII ρρρδδδβββααα ====
 
Stacked in ),,,( iiiii ρδβα=Θ  so ),...,( 1 IΘΘ=Θ  
[Variance of the state space equations] 
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Stacked in ),,,,,( 2211 jjjjwjvjj ξζξζ σσσσσσ=Σ  so ),...,( 1 JΣΣ=Σ  
[Main procedure to maximize a posteriori] 
1. Compute the prior on the auction specific parameters: 
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Then prior is defined as follows: 
),,ˆ|( )( jauctionkauctionkjclustjNorm dbP ΣΨ =
 
 
2. Compute prior on the bidder specific parameters: 
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Then prior is defined as follows: 
),,ˆ|( )( ibidderkbidderskiindiNorm dbP ΣΘ =
 
3. Compute the likelihood contribution of belief of bidder about the bids: 
For j := 1, …, J do: 
[Kalman Filter on the evolution of bids in equation 4 and 5] 
For t := 1,…,T do: 
[Time updating (Prediction)] 
Project state ahead of a step ahead 
jjtjjt γθτθ += −− 1
 
Project the error covariance matrix a head 
jwjjttjjtt VV στθτθ += −−− ')()( 11
 
[Measurement update (Correction)] 
Compute the Kalman gain 
( )jvjt
jt
jt V
V
K
σθ
θ
+
=
−
−
−
−
)(
)(
1
1
 
Compute estimate with measurement: 
)( −− −+= jtjtjtjtjt bK θθθ
 
Update the error covariance: 
−
−= )()()( jttjtjtt VKIV θθ
 
EndFor 
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For t := T,…,0 do: 
[Backward Smoothing] 
Correction factor  
)(
)(
1+
=
jt
jtj
jt V
V
C
θ
θτ
 
Correct estimate with step ahead state prediction: 
)( 11 ++++ −+= jtjtjtjtjt C θθθθ
 
Update the error covariance: 
( ) Tjtjttjttjtjttjtt CVVCVV )()()()( 1111 ++++++ −+= θθθθ
 
EndFor 
            EndFor 
[Monte Carlo E-Step] 
From the time varying distribution of states draw S sample points  
Compute the following likelihood contribution of the belief about bids based on the 
draws, by integrating out the latent state: 
For j : = 1, …, J do: 
∫ −× jjTjjjjvjtjtNormjvjtjtNorm dPbP θθγτσθθσθ ,...,),,,|(),|( 11  
            EndFor 
4. Compute the likelihood contribution of belief of bidder about the number of bidders: 
Apply Kalman Filter and backward smoothing on the evolution of bids in equation (8) 
and (9). Then, apply the Monte Carlo E-Step (the pseudocode is similar to part (3), so I 
skip it here) 
 
5. Compute the likelihood contribution of the evolution of valuation: 
[Invert the latent bids to recover a measure of valuation] 
For j : = 1, …, J do: 
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An adaptive quadrature algorithm can be used to run the following integration: 
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             EndFor 
Apply Kalman Filter and backward smoothing on the evolution of bids in equation (14). 
Then, apply the Monte Carlo E-Step (the pseudocode is similar to part (3), so I skip it 
here):  
 [Generalized M-Step] 
Evaluate a posteriori of the parameters given the log of priors on auction and bidder specific 
parameters, and log of likelihood contribution of the belief about the bids and number of bidders 
in each auction, by summing them up, and optimize over the following vector of parameters Ψ , 
Θ , and Σ . Due to the high number of parameters and multi-modality, I use simulated annealing 
with adaptive cooling for this step. 
 
APPENDIX 2.D: EXTRA TABLES FOR THE MAIN AND ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
(ONLINE COMPANION) 
Table 2.D.1. Bidder’s characteristics within each auction category 
B
id
de
rs
 
se
gm
en
t 
se
gm
en
t s
iz
e 
bi
dd
er
 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 
sc
o
re
 
(A
V
G
) 
SD
 
(F
D
B
K
 
sc
o
re
) 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f b
id
s 
o
n
 
th
is 
ite
m
 
(A
V
G
) 
SD
 
(N
u
m
.
 
B
id
de
r) 
to
ta
l n
u
m
be
r 
o
f b
id
s 
in
 
30
 
da
ys
 
(A
V
G
) 
SD
 
(to
ta
l n
u
m
be
r 
o
f b
id
s 
in
 
30
 
da
ys
) 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f i
te
m
s 
bi
de
d 
O
n
 
(30
 
da
ys
) 
SD
(nu
m
.
 
ite
m
s 
B
id
ed
 
o
n
)  
A
v
er
ag
e 
n
u
m
.
 
bi
dd
in
g 
A
ct
iv
ity
 
w
ith
 
cu
rr
en
t 
Se
lle
r 
SD
(N
B
CS
) 
N
 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
bi
de
d 
o
n
 
SD
 
(N
 
ca
t. 
B
id
ed
 
o
n
) 
Jewelry and Watches 1550 524 3077 5 10 275 710 127 341 21 28 2 1 
Collectibles 859 863 4916 7 13 243 471 90 201 25 29 2 1 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 453 342 1178 5 8 163 505 95 379 28 33 2 1 
Crafts 558 536 1185 4 6 175 589 74 178 33 34 2 1 
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Pottery and Glass 607 967 4721 5 8 195 447 90 235 26 28 3 1 
Antiques 546 643 1089 5 9 213 477 109 241 24 30 3 1 
Toys and Hobbies 744 920 5589 5 9 159 357 64 170 26 30 2 1 
Stamps 651 1188 1899 5 8 504 940 227 346 20 25 1 1 
Books 482 651 1612 5 6 171 803 74 355 32 33 2 1 
Tickets and 
Experiences 489 574 1224 3 4 56 119 33 85 40 36 2 1 
Art 456 469 745 5 7 69 110 30 53 50 40 2 1 
Gift Cards and 
Coupons 522 818 1784 4 6 373 1065 264 1001 17 27 2 1 
Music 585 1047 3583 5 8 172 334 91 196 31 31 2 1 
Consumer Electronics 734 425 2562 5 10 142 347 64 187 29 32 2 1 
DVDs and Movies 602 635 1688 4 6 180 831 80 222 24 29 2 1 
Dolls and Bears 679 1301 8033 5 9 219 370 90 155 17 24 2 1 
Entertainment 
Memorabilia 506 626 1257 5 9 140 323 62 168 43 38 2 1 
Health and Beauty 541 480 2098 5 9 100 191 44 94 35 34 2 1 
Video Games and 
Consoles 682 567 4264 5 8 159 392 71 170 23 30 2 1 
 
Table 2.D.2. Maximum A Posteriori of the model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Element of the maximum a posteriori model selection 
criteria 
Log 
Likelihood 
Number of bidders  evolution state space model -788,079 
Bid evolution with each auction state space model -92,739,612 
Valuation evolution state space model -627,982 
prior on the auctions parameters -16,854 
prior on the bidders parameters -107,558 
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Table 2.D.3. Bidder’s segment profile after mixture normal clustering 
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1 215 70 68 15 17 211 151 48 38 19 24 2 1 
2 23 630 606 7 8 3266 2604 856 715 9 20 2 1 
3 89 335 379 21 19 940 679 163 138 12 17 2 1 
4 963 588 1148 1 0 233 692 148 382 20 30 2 1 
5 153 671 5 5 0 192 0 90 1 26 1 2 0 
6 466 221 331 5 6 27 26 10 10 45 34 2 1 
7 90 1864 3782 3 1 252 215 160 154 12 22 2 1 
8 992 907 4109 1 0 214 545 136 357 19 29 2 1 
9 535 452 444 4 2 101 88 48 46 21 17 2 1 
10 284 75 77 15 14 107 182 14 19 56 33 2 1 
11 42 1783 2171 26 18 186 121 52 33 22 18 3 2 
12 83 978 1289 5 4 462 335 217 213 1 1 2 1 
13 12 19165 29755 9 9 3314 2474 1146 842 3 3 4 3 
14 52 449 598 21 14 1243 740 209 114 12 19 2 1 
15 113 5046 18209 23 26 1778 1551 718 692 26 33 2 2 
16 466 435 398 4 2 87 80 40 38 36 26 2 1 
17 522 1146 1751 9 12 404 348 159 174 23 27 2 1 
18 589 663 683 1 0 97 96 66 73 6 6 2 1 
19 310 173 190 2 2 7 7 4 4 59 36 1 0 
20 395 1426 1867 9 12 286 237 139 135 19 26 3 2 
21 403 196 226 6 8 12 11 4 2 62 27 1 0 
22 530 608 646 4 2 102 72 47 36 32 30 2 1 
23 49 5504 11521 10 18 2369 2317 1283 1631 18 32 2 2 
24 481 427 410 1 0 36 32 25 25 11 10 3 1 
25 142 59 48 3 3 3 3 1 1 100 0 1 0 
26 871 856 3857 1 0 81 162 56 124 19 29 2 1 
27 242 518 322 5 2 201 153 83 52 20 11 2 1 
28 569 122 156 7 10 29 34 9 9 46 33 2 1 
29 62 567 1003 19 12 1123 911 225 201 4 4 2 1 
30 83 1544 1884 13 15 162 170 40 29 14 13 3 1 
31 102 340 348 3 1 420 546 194 265 2 2 3 2 
32 7 14621 22217 2 0 4530 5814 1081 997 4 9 3 2 
33 64 929 961 1 0 1939 2030 1631 2099 7 18 2 2 
34 163 655 85 5 2 209 93 93 26 26 6 2 0 
35 183 273 599 3 0 80 142 30 61 35 35 2 1 
36 198 91 105 14 12 26 24 5 5 76 24 2 1 
37 346 560 1422 2 0 108 256 57 161 31 36 2 1 
38 971 714 1790 1 0 132 277 81 179 23 32 2 1 
39 65 527 1202 5 1 29 18 12 8 32 20 2 1 
40 14 2268 2423 10 5 301 147 115 58 17 19 3 1 
41 73 175 174 16 14 808 612 159 84 3 3 2 1 
42 73 350 449 7 4 143 80 45 23 7 4 3 1 
43 93 48 45 12 8 134 118 30 29 32 24 2 1 
44 41 198 264 35 17 177 97 35 35 27 11 2 1 
45 19 1780 1464 18 10 822 577 212 133 15 13 2 1 
46 5 84027 45365 3 1 831 893 644 703 2 2 3 3 
47 3 8113 4001 11 8 3761 2896 1486 1391 39 40 3 1 
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Table 2.D.4. The winner regret iα estimates across bidder’s segments 
Bidders Segment Segment Size Estimate STE t-stat p-value 
Segment 1 215 -1.36*** 0.06 -22.75 <0.0001 
Segment 2 23 -1.19*** 0.19 -6.32 <0.0001 
Segment 3 89 -1.31*** 0.09 -14.02 <0.0001 
Segment 4 963 -1.35*** 0.03 -49.76 <0.0001 
Segment 5 153 -1.33*** 0.07 -18.72 <0.0001 
Segment 6 466 -1.26*** 0.04 -33.82 <0.0001 
Segment 7 90 -1.19*** 0.09 -12.56 <0.0001 
Segment 8 992 -1.27*** 0.03 -45.81 <0.0001 
Segment 9 535 -1.33*** 0.04 -35.85 <0.0001 
Segment 10 284 -1.38*** 0.05 -25.37 <0.0001 
Segment 11 42 -1.67*** 0.13 -13.34 <0.0001 
Segment 12 83 -1.35*** 0.09 -14.82 <0.0001 
Segment 13 12 -1.13*** 0.23 -4.81 <0.001 
Segment 14 52 -1.16*** 0.11 -10.74 <0.0001 
Segment 15 113 -1.21*** 0.08 -15.86 <0.0001 
Segment 16 466 -1.35*** 0.04 -32.58 <0.0001 
Segment 17 522 -1.35*** 0.04 -38.33 <0.0001 
Segment 18 589 -1.32*** 0.04 -37.02 <0.0001 
Segment 19 310 -1.38*** 0.05 -27.72 <0.0001 
Segment 20 395 -1.28*** 0.04 -30.05 <0.0001 
Segment 21 403 -1.22*** 0.04 -29.13 <0.0001 
Segment 22 530 -1.30*** 0.04 -32.94 <0.0001 
Segment 23 49 -1.42*** 0.12 -12.18 <0.0001 
Segment 24 481 -1.36*** 0.04 -34.85 <0.0001 
Segment 25 142 -1.32*** 0.07 -17.62 <0.0001 
Segment 26 871 -1.28*** 0.03 -45.48 <0.0001 
Segment 27 242 -1.25*** 0.06 -22.10 <0.0001 
Segment 28 569 -1.30*** 0.04 -35.25 <0.0001 
Segment 29 62 -1.48*** 0.11 -12.93 <0.0001 
Segment 30 83 -1.46*** 0.09 -16.57 <0.0001 
Segment 31 102 -1.36*** 0.09 -14.97 <0.0001 
Segment 32 7 -0.87* 0.38 -2.30 0.027437 
Segment 33 64 -1.43*** 0.13 -11.08 <0.0001 
Segment 34 163 -1.30*** 0.07 -19.08 <0.0001 
Segment 35 183 -1.28*** 0.06 -21.78 <0.0001 
Segment 36 198 -1.27*** 0.06 -20.19 <0.0001 
Segment 37 346 -1.31*** 0.05 -28.41 <0.0001 
Segment 38 971 -1.32*** 0.03 -47.30 <0.0001 
Segment 39 65 -1.34*** 0.10 -13.31 <0.0001 
Segment 40 14 -1.34*** 0.19 -7.05 <0.0001 
Segment 41 73 -1.33*** 0.10 -13.87 <0.0001 
Segment 42 73 -1.29*** 0.08 -15.56 <0.0001 
Segment 43 93 -1.28*** 0.09 -13.94 <0.0001 
Segment 44 41 -1.41*** 0.13 -10.50 <0.0001 
Segment 45 19 -1.33*** 0.15 -8.87 <0.0001 
Segment 46 5 -0.52* 0.23 -2.26 0.036761 
Segment 47 3 -0.52  0.41 -1.28 0.145362 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.D.5. The loser regret iβ estimates across bidder’s segments 
Bidders Segment Segment Size Estimate STE t-stat p-value 
Segment 1 215 -1.34*** 0.06 -22.14 <0.0001 
Segment 2 23 -1.11*** 0.19 -5.69 <0.0001 
Segment 3 89 -1.39*** 0.09 -15.53 <0.0001 
Segment 4 963 -1.33*** 0.03 -47.22 <0.0001 
Segment 5 153 -1.37*** 0.07 -20.33 <0.0001 
Segment 6 466 -1.33*** 0.04 -32.76 <0.0001 
Segment 7 90 -1.15*** 0.09 -12.22 <0.0001 
Segment 8 992 -1.35*** 0.03 -48.69 <0.0001 
Segment 9 535 -1.31*** 0.04 -35.55 <0.0001 
Segment 10 284 -1.48*** 0.05 -29.18 <0.0001 
Segment 11 42 -1.55*** 0.13 -12.03 <0.0001 
Segment 12 83 -1.45*** 0.09 -15.86 <0.0001 
Segment 13 12 -1.46*** 0.31 -4.73 <0.001 
Segment 14 52 -1.29*** 0.11 -11.27 <0.0001 
Segment 15 113 -1.51*** 0.08 -18.92 <0.0001 
Segment 16 466 -1.26*** 0.04 -34.61 <0.0001 
Segment 17 522 -1.33*** 0.04 -36.52 <0.0001 
Segment 18 589 -1.28*** 0.04 -34.91 <0.0001 
Segment 19 310 -1.32*** 0.05 -26.63 <0.0001 
Segment 20 395 -1.36*** 0.05 -29.05 <0.0001 
Segment 21 403 -1.34*** 0.05 -29.24 <0.0001 
Segment 22 530 -1.24*** 0.04 -33.68 <0.0001 
Segment 23 49 -1.47*** 0.14 -10.88 <0.0001 
Segment 24 481 -1.36*** 0.04 -34.65 <0.0001 
Segment 25 142 -1.34*** 0.07 -19.36 <0.0001 
Segment 26 871 -1.36*** 0.03 -45.34 <0.0001 
Segment 27 242 -1.41*** 0.05 -26.47 <0.0001 
Segment 28 569 -1.29*** 0.04 -36.43 <0.0001 
Segment 29 62 -1.30*** 0.11 -11.96 <0.0001 
Segment 30 83 -1.31*** 0.11 -11.71 <0.0001 
Segment 31 102 -1.33*** 0.08 -16.93 <0.0001 
Segment 32 7 -1.70*** 0.27 -6.20 <0.001 
Segment 33 64 -1.51*** 0.10 -14.77 <0.0001 
Segment 34 163 -1.38*** 0.07 -18.55 <0.0001 
Segment 35 183 -1.21*** 0.06 -19.29 <0.0001 
Segment 36 198 -1.36*** 0.06 -22.33 <0.0001 
Segment 37 346 -1.33*** 0.04 -30.24 <0.0001 
Segment 38 971 -1.35*** 0.03 -47.39 <0.0001 
Segment 39 65 -1.32*** 0.11 -12.53 <0.0001 
Segment 40 14 -1.27*** 0.26 -4.92 <0.001 
Segment 41 73 -1.30*** 0.10 -13.57 <0.0001 
Segment 42 73 -1.40*** 0.10 -14.16 <0.0001 
Segment 43 93 -1.32*** 0.10 -13.39 <0.0001 
Segment 44 41 -1.51*** 0.11 -13.92 <0.0001 
Segment 45 19 -1.30*** 0.18 -7.41 <0.0001 
Segment 46 5 -0.79  0.49 -1.63 0.082383 
Segment 47 3 -1.23** 0.32 -3.85 <0.05 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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 Table 2.D.6. The update of valuation parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across bidder’s 
segments 
Bidders 
Segment 
Segment 
Size 
Valuation  
revelation
iδ  STE ( iδ ) Learning iρ  STE ( iρ ) 
Segment 1 215 1.21*** 0.05 0.15** 0.06 
Segment 2 23 0.79*** 0.09 0.21  0.15 
Segment 3 89 1.23*** 0.08 0.25*** 0.10 
Segment 4 963 1.22*** 0.03 0.26*** 0.03 
Segment 5 153 1.30*** 0.07 0.16** 0.07 
Segment 6 466 1.20*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.04 
Segment 7 90 1.25*** 0.08 0.28*** 0.09 
Segment 8 992 1.25*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.03 
Segment 9 535 1.25*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.04 
Segment 10 284 1.22*** 0.05 0.28*** 0.05 
Segment 11 42 1.33*** 0.11 0.27** 0.13 
Segment 12 83 1.33*** 0.08 0.07  0.09 
Segment 13 12 1.37*** 0.23 0.48* 0.26 
Segment 14 52 1.15*** 0.10 0.39*** 0.12 
Segment 15 113 1.22*** 0.07 0.32*** 0.08 
Segment 16 466 1.22*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.04 
Segment 17 522 1.20*** 0.03 0.28*** 0.04 
Segment 18 589 1.26*** 0.03 0.27*** 0.04 
Segment 19 310 1.22*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.05 
Segment 20 395 1.20*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.04 
Segment 21 403 1.24*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.04 
Segment 22 530 1.20*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.04 
Segment 23 49 1.26*** 0.12 0.21* 0.12 
Segment 24 481 1.21*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.04 
Segment 25 142 1.29*** 0.06 0.12* 0.06 
Segment 26 871 1.27*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.03 
Segment 27 242 1.18*** 0.04 0.40*** 0.06 
Segment 28 569 1.23*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.04 
Segment 29 62 1.33*** 0.09 0.05  0.14 
Segment 30 83 1.40*** 0.09 0.29*** 0.10 
Segment 31 102 1.13*** 0.08 0.39*** 0.09 
Segment 32 7 1.04*** 0.09 0.19  0.20 
Segment 33 64 1.25*** 0.10 0.25** 0.10 
Segment 34 163 1.21*** 0.06 0.33*** 0.07 
Segment 35 183 1.27*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.07 
Segment 36 198 1.24*** 0.06 0.14** 0.06 
Segment 37 346 1.22*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.05 
Segment 38 971 1.19*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.03 
Segment 39 65 1.13*** 0.09 0.28*** 0.09 
Segment 40 14 1.28*** 0.24 0.50* 0.25 
Segment 41 73 1.25*** 0.08 0.30*** 0.10 
Segment 42 73 1.17*** 0.09 0.39*** 0.10 
Segment 43 93 1.20*** 0.07 0.25*** 0.09 
Segment 44 41 1.10*** 0.12 0.33** 0.14 
Segment 45 19 1.42*** 0.17 0.28* 0.15 
Segment 46 5 1.07*** 0.24 0.81*** 0.18 
Segment 47 3 1.17** 0.27 -0.08  0.26 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.D.7.The winner regret iα and the loser regret iβ estimates across auction categories 
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Jewelry and Watches 1550 -1.32*** 0.02 -60.59 <0.0001 -1.32*** 0.02 -60.33 <0.0001 
Collectibles 859 -1.35*** 0.03 -46.96 <0.0001 -1.38*** 0.03 -47.07 <0.0001 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 453 -1.24*** 0.04 -29.94 <0.0001 -1.40*** 0.04 -35.06 <0.0001 
Crafts 558 -1.33*** 0.04 -37.27 <0.0001 -1.33*** 0.04 -34.27 <0.0001 
Pottery and Glass 607 -1.38*** 0.04 -38.98 <0.0001 -1.35*** 0.04 -38.37 <0.0001 
Antiques 546 -1.28*** 0.04 -33.61 <0.0001 -1.30*** 0.04 -33.74 <0.0001 
Toys and Hobbies 744 -1.27*** 0.03 -40.54 <0.0001 -1.35*** 0.03 -41.96 <0.0001 
Stamps 651 -1.38*** 0.03 -41.66 <0.0001 -1.32*** 0.03 -41.22 <0.0001 
Books 482 -1.37*** 0.04 -35.47 <0.0001 -1.31*** 0.04 -33.14 <0.0001 
Tickets and Experiences 489 -1.26*** 0.04 -32.47 <0.0001 -1.28*** 0.04 -34.57 <0.0001 
Art 456 -1.25*** 0.04 -31.10 <0.0001 -1.28*** 0.04 -31.00 <0.0001 
Gift Cards and Coupons 522 -1.32*** 0.04 -32.59 <0.0001 -1.30*** 0.04 -31.89 <0.0001 
Music 585 -1.32*** 0.04 -36.80 <0.0001 -1.34*** 0.04 -35.76 <0.0001 
Consumer Electronics 734 -1.30*** 0.03 -42.21 <0.0001 -1.36*** 0.03 -42.92 <0.0001 
DVDs and Movies 602 -1.28*** 0.04 -35.48 <0.0001 -1.37*** 0.03 -39.65 <0.0001 
Dolls and Bears 679 -1.29*** 0.03 -40.39 <0.0001 -1.37*** 0.03 -41.79 <0.0001 
Entertainment 
Memorabilia 506 -1.37*** 0.04 -36.04 <0.0001 -1.31*** 0.04 -34.57 <0.0001 
Health and Beauty 541 -1.31*** 0.04 -35.79 <0.0001 -1.36*** 0.04 -35.91 <0.0001 
Video Games and 
Consoles 682 -1.29*** 0.03 -38.58 <0.0001 -1.32*** 0.03 -39.19 <0.0001 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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 Table 2.D.8. The update of valuation parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across 
bidder’s segments 
Bidders segment 
number 
of 
bidders 
Learning value 
from bid 
parameter ( iρ ) 
STE 
 ( iρ ) 
Valuation 
revelation 
parameter ( iδ ) 
STE 
 ( iδ ) 
Jewelry and Watches 1550 0.25*** 0.02 1.22*** 0.02 
Collectibles 859 0.26*** 0.03 1.25*** 0.03 
Clothing, Shoes and   
Accessories 453 0.20*** 0.04 1.23*** 0.04 
Crafts 558 0.25*** 0.04 1.21*** 0.03 
Pottery and Glass 607 0.26*** 0.03 1.26*** 0.03 
Antiques 546 0.24*** 0.04 1.20*** 0.03 
Toys and Hobbies 744 0.25*** 0.03 1.24*** 0.03 
Stamps 651 0.25*** 0.03 1.24*** 0.03 
Books 482 0.22*** 0.04 1.25*** 0.03 
Tickets and Experiences 489 0.22*** 0.04 1.22*** 0.03 
Art 456 0.18*** 0.04 1.19*** 0.04 
Gift Cards and Coupons 522 0.29*** 0.04 1.26*** 0.03 
Music 585 0.23*** 0.03 1.19*** 0.03 
Consumer Electronics 734 0.25*** 0.03 1.23*** 0.03 
DVDs and Movies 602 0.29*** 0.04 1.23*** 0.03 
Dolls and Bears 679 0.32*** 0.03 1.28*** 0.03 
Entertainment Memorabilia 506 0.24*** 0.04 1.17*** 0.03 
Health and Beauty 541 0.24*** 0.04 1.24*** 0.03 
Video Games and Consoles 682 0.24*** 0.03 1.19*** 0.03 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.9. The growth of bids and their drift parameters, iτ  and iγ , and the rush of bidders at 
the end of auction rate and average entrance rate in each period, jη  and jι , estimates across 
auction segments 
Auction Cluster 
Auction 
Cluster 
Size 
growth of bids 
( iτ ) 
STE 
( iτ ) 
Drift of 
bids  
( iγ ) 
STE 
 ( iγ ) 
Last 
minute 
flood 
 ( jη ) 
STE 
(
jη ) 
Mean 
entrance 
rate 
 ( jι ) 
STE 
( jι ) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jewelry and Watches 150 1.65*** 0.07 5.44*** 0.08 1.01*** 0.06 1.84*** 0.08 
Collectibles 104 1.63*** 0.09 5.63*** 0.10 0.93*** 0.06 1.90*** 0.09 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 85 1.86*** 0.09 5.56*** 0.10 0.93*** 0.07 2.11*** 0.08 
Crafts 79 1.81*** 0.11 5.48*** 0.10 0.97*** 0.08 2.03*** 0.11 
Pottery and Glass 75 1.50*** 0.10 5.47*** 0.10 1.10*** 0.10 2.16*** 0.11 
Antiques 69 1.68*** 0.12 5.60*** 0.11 0.95*** 0.11 1.89*** 0.13 
Toys and Hobbies 94 1.73*** 0.10 5.61*** 0.09 0.90*** 0.09 2.21*** 0.10 
Stamps 73 2.00*** 0.12 5.64*** 0.12 1.04*** 0.12 2.08*** 0.13 
Books 85 1.83*** 0.12 5.50*** 0.11 1.13*** 0.12 2.12*** 0.12 
Tickets and Experiences 92 1.74*** 0.13 5.58*** 0.12 0.95*** 0.12 2.10*** 0.13 
Art 71 1.79*** 0.16 5.52*** 0.12 1.05*** 0.16 2.04*** 0.17 
Gift Cards and Coupons 86 1.77*** 0.15 5.36*** 0.12 1.06*** 0.15 2.14*** 0.15 
Music 87 1.86*** 0.16 5.65*** 0.12 1.15*** 0.16 2.03*** 0.16 
Consumer Electronics 84 1.76*** 0.17 5.37*** 0.15 1.13*** 0.17 2.13*** 0.17 
DVDs and Movies 88 1.82*** 0.17 5.75*** 0.14 1.11*** 0.17 2.26*** 0.18 
Dolls and Bears 85 1.66*** 0.19 5.81*** 0.16 1.26*** 0.19 2.08*** 0.19 
Entertainment Memorabilia 89 1.86*** 0.19 5.63*** 0.15 1.12*** 0.19 2.06*** 0.20 
Health and Beauty 75 1.84*** 0.24 5.77*** 0.20 1.15*** 0.24 2.26*** 0.24 
Video Games and  consoles 94 1.86*** 0.20 5.65*** 0.17 1.04*** 0.20 2.21*** 0.20 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Figure 2.D.1. The probabilistic graphical plate model of the main model 
 
2.D.2.1. ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE MODEL WITH LDA-ESTIMATED 
AUCTION CLUSTERS 
Table 2.D.10. Summary statistics for the bidder specific parameter estimations 
within each auction category (19) within each bidder segment (47) 
Parameter min max Mean SD min max Mean SD 
avg. winner regret 
-
1.37 -1.27 -1.33 0.03 -1.9 -1.09 -1.35 0.13 
se winner regret 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.49 0.11 0.10 
avg. loser regret 
-
1.38 -1.25 -1.32 0.03 -1.98 -1.08 -1.35 0.17 
se loser regret 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.005 0.03 0.5 0.11 0.10 
avg. valuation param. 1.2 1.3 1.26 0.03 0.85 1.89 1.27 0.14 
se valuation param. 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.005 0.03 0.54 0.10 0.10 
avg. learning param. 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.04 0 1.33 0.27 0.19 
se learning param. 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.78 0.12 0.14 
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Table 2.D.11. Relation between the winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation 
parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across forty seven bidder segments 
  
winner 
regret 
loser 
regret 
valuation 
revelation learning 
winner regret 1 
loser regret 
0.25 
1 
valuation revelation 
-0.14 0.45 
1 
learning 
-0.38 0.03 0.61 
1 
Table 2.D.12. Relation between the winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation 
parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across forty seven bidder segments 
Regressand Regressor Estimate SE Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Winner regret 
Intercept -1.10** 0.15 -1.40 -0.80 
loser regret 0.18* 0.11 -0.03 -0.41 
Winner 
Regret 
Intercept -1.28** 0.03 -1.35 -1.22 
Learning  -0.25** 0.09 -0.45 -0.07 
Loser Regret 
Intercept -2.03** 0.20 -2.44 1.62 
Valuation 
revelation 0.53** 0.16 0.21 0.86 
** Two tail 0.95% confidence interval significance   * One tail 0.95% confidence interval significance 
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Table 2.D.13. Explaining winner regret iα , the loser regret iβ , the update of valuation parameters 
iδ  and the learning parameter iρ estimates across 47 bidder segments  
 
Regressand Regressor Estimate SE Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Winner Regret )26.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept -1.3535* 0.0163 -1.3864 -1.3206 
Segment Size 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
Bidders Feedback mean -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 
Number of Bids on This item -0.0005 0.0026 -0.0057 0.0046 
total number of bids in 30 days -0.0075* 0.0035 -0.0145 -0.0004 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
Bid activity with current Seller -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0038 0.0006 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.0396 0.0439 -0.1284 0.0491 
Loser Regret )26.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept -1.3509* 0.0221 -1.3956 -1.3061 
Segment Size 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004 
Number of Bids on This item 0.0037 0.0035 -0.0033 0.0107 
total number of bids in 30 days -0.0122* 0.0047 -0.0218 -0.0026 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 
Bid activity with current Seller -0.0018 0.0015 -0.0048 0.0011 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.1336* 0.0597 -0.2544 -0.0129 
Learning value from bids )30.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept 1.2688* 0.0160 1.2364 1.3013 
Segment Size 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.0007* 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 
Number of Bids on This item 0.0038 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0089 
total number of bids in 30 days -0.0108* 0.0034 -0.0178 -0.0039 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0003 
Bid activity with current Seller -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0024 0.0019 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.0105 0.0433 -0.0980 0.0770 
Valuation update )76.0( 2 =−RAdjusted  
Intercept 0.2707* 0.0166 0.0000 0.2372 
Segment Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.2501 -0.0001 
Bidders Feedback mean 0.0013* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 
Number of Bids on This item 0.0032 0.0026 0.2314 -0.0021 
total number of bids in 30 days 0.0021 0.0036 0.5510 -0.0051 
Number of items bid on in 30 days 0.0000 0.0001 0.8363 -0.0002 
Bid activity with current Seller 0.0006 0.0011 0.5586 -0.0016 
Number of categories Bid on Mean -0.0227 0.0447 0.6151 -0.1132 
* Two tail 0.95% confidence interval significance 
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Table 2.D.14. Summary statistics for the auction specific parameter estimations 
within each auction category (19) within each auction cluster (50) 
Parameter min max Mean SD min max Mean SD 
avg. growth of bids 1.61 2.03 1.79 0.12 1.67 9.87 3.20 1.53 
se growth of bids 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.05 0.04 7.33 1.46 1.38 
avg. drift of bids 5.24 5.82 5.58 0.15 5.15 12.72 6.79 1.42 
se drift of bids 0.08 0.2 0.13 0.03 0.05 6.81 1.28 1.28 
avg. last minute flood 0.93 1.33 1.10 0.10 0.92 9.33 2.52 1.56 
se last minute flood 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.05 0.04 7.43 1.49 1.40 
avg. mean entrance 
rate 1.92 2.31 2.08 0.13 1.39 10.42 3.43 1.58 
se mean entrance rate 0.08 0.25 0.15 0.04 0.05 7.23 1.45 1.37 
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Table 2.D.15. Counterfactual analysis of shutting down only winner and both winner/loser regret  
 
 
  
Auction Category 
Number of 
Auctions 
Average 
improvement of 
shutting down  
winner regret 
Average 
improvement of 
shutting down both 
winner and loser 
Jewelry and Watches 149 32% 29% 
Collectibles 103 26% 23% 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 84 21% 39% 
Crafts 78 50% 42% 
Pottery and Glass 74 18% 28% 
Antiques 68 45% 49% 
Toys and Hobbies 93 31% 30% 
Stamps 72 52% 28% 
Books 84 50% 42% 
Tickets and Experiences 91 22% 6% 
Art 70 31% 28% 
Gift Cards and Coupons 85 40% 21% 
Music 86 32% 39% 
Consumer Electronics 83 34% 35% 
DVDs and Movies 87 47% 47% 
Dolls and Bears 84 29% 29% 
Entertainment 
Memorabilia 88 25% 6% 
Health and Beauty 74 38% 19% 
Video Games and 
Consoles 93 21% 21% 
Total improvement 26% 23% 
Average improvement across all auctions 34% 29% 
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Table 2.D.16. Auction’s Cluster profile 
Auction 
Cluster 
 index 
Cluster 
size 
number 
of  
bidders 
mean 
STD  
(number 
of 
bidders) 
number 
of bids 
STD  
(number 
of bids) 
mean 
duration 
(Days) 
STD 
 
(duration 
in Days) 
Dominant  
Auction 
Categories 
1 14 10 4 44 11 4 2 Jewelry, collectible 
2 12 9 5 44 15 5 2 Clothing, antique 
3 46 9 5 42 14 5 2 Jewelry, collectible, pottery 
4 13 10 4 45 16 5 2 Stamps and books 
5 14 10 5 44 18 5 2 Jewelry 
6 9 6 4 25 19 5 1 Jewelry 
7 454 9 4 63 19 5 2 Toys and hobbies 
8 19 8 3 33 9 5 2 Collectible 
9 10 9 5 41 19 5 1 Stamps 
10 27 8 3 44 18 5 2 DVD and entertainment 
11 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 Pottery 
12 214 13 5 44 15 4 2 Video Games and Consoles 
13 32 10 5 47 16 5 2 Pottery 
14 14 8 3 48 20 5 2 Dolls and Bears 
15 39 8 3 44 17 5 2 Healthy and beauty 
16 11 6 4 50 11 6 1 Jewelry 
17 48 12 6 50 19 5 2 Music and DVDs 
18 15 8 4 38 16 5 2 Video Games and Consoles 
19 37 9 4 48 15 5 1 Clothing 
20 22 8 5 47 21 5 2 Stamps, entertainment, jewelry 
21 29 10 4 50 18 5 1 Entertainment and music 
22 24 8 4 40 19 5 2 Clothing and jewelry 
23 29 10 4 55 18 4 2 DVD, consumer electronics 
24 12 7 3 36 9 5 2 Toy, music, gift 
25 19 10 3 47 13 5 1 Clothing and gift 
26 24 10 4 44 15 5 2 Crafts 
27 38 10 5 51 20 5 2 Art 
28 19 9 4 41 13 5 1 Dolls and Bears 
29 30 9 4 43 18 5 2 Pottery 
30 23 8 4 38 14 5 2 Craft and book 
31 16 7 3 40 14 5 1 Antique 
32 8 8 4 43 17 5 2 Craft, toys, book 
33 13 7 4 32 13 5 2 Helath and beauty 
34 38 9 4 43 14 5 1 Art 
35 20 7 3 34 12 5 2 Clothing and art 
36 23 8 3 42 10 5 2 Stamps 
37 8 10 5 36 13 4 2 Antique, collectible 
38 30 8 3 44 20 5 1 Gift Cards and Coupons 
39 10 10 3 38 12 4 2 Video game, dolls 
40 7 11 6 44 12 5 2 Video game, gift card, pottery 
41 17 7 2 50 16 5 2 Clothing 
42 16 10 4 45 15 5 2 Pottery, dolls 
43 16 8 3 43 16 5 2 Stamps, video games 
44 20 9 5 42 19 4 2 Stamps, toys 
45 17 8 4 48 18 5 2 Books entertainment 
46 10 11 6 43 12 5 2 Gift cards 
47 17 9 5 44 12 5 2 Books 
48 42 9 5 42 19 5 2 Consumer electronics 
49 11 11 4 45 16 4 2 Ticket experience 
50 5 8 1 48 7 6 0 Books, music, DVD 
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Table 2.D.17. Maximum A Posteriori of the model 
   Element of the maximum a posteriori model selection 
criteria 
Log 
Likelihood 
Number of bidders  evolution state space model -2,055,997 
Bid evolution with each auction state space model -96,099,682 
Valuation evolution state space model -991,098 
prior on the auctions parameters -17,261 
prior on the bidders parameters -112,190 
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Table 2.D.18. The winner regret iα estimates across bidder’s segments 
Bidders Segment Segment Size Estimate STE t-stat p-value 
Segment 1 215 -1.30*** 0.07 -19.28 <0.0001 
Segment 2 23 -1.68*** 0.18 -9.19 <0.0001 
Segment 3 89 -1.28*** 0.10 -13.02 <0.0001 
Segment 4 963 -1.29*** 0.03 -42.10 <0.0001 
Segment 5 153 -1.36*** 0.09 -15.53 <0.0001 
Segment 6 466 -1.31*** 0.05 -26.69 <0.0001 
Segment 7 90 -1.21*** 0.11 -11.38 <0.0001 
Segment 8 992 -1.36*** 0.03 -45.07 <0.0001 
Segment 9 535 -1.24*** 0.04 -30.68 <0.0001 
Segment 10 284 -1.23*** 0.06 -21.24 <0.0001 
Segment 11 42 -1.11*** 0.14 -7.87 <0.0001 
Segment 12 83 -1.33*** 0.10 -13.70 <0.0001 
Segment 13 12 -1.55*** 0.31 -4.99 <0.001 
Segment 14 52 -1.41*** 0.14 -10.04 <0.0001 
Segment 15 113 -1.53*** 0.09 -16.17 <0.0001 
Segment 16 466 -1.43*** 0.05 -31.14 <0.0001 
Segment 17 522 -1.21*** 0.05 -25.80 <0.0001 
Segment 18 589 -1.28*** 0.04 -32.03 <0.0001 
Segment 19 310 -1.32*** 0.06 -23.60 <0.0001 
Segment 20 395 -1.32*** 0.05 -26.16 <0.0001 
Segment 21 403 -1.34*** 0.05 -27.61 <0.0001 
Segment 22 530 -1.36*** 0.04 -33.75 <0.0001 
Segment 23 49 -1.32*** 0.11 -11.76 <0.0001 
Segment 24 481 -1.33*** 0.04 -30.30 <0.0001 
Segment 25 142 -1.35*** 0.09 -15.08 <0.0001 
Segment 26 871 -1.35*** 0.03 -40.01 <0.0001 
Segment 27 242 -1.32*** 0.06 -20.62 <0.0001 
Segment 28 569 -1.36*** 0.04 -33.70 <0.0001 
Segment 29 62 -1.33*** 0.14 -9.79 <0.0001 
Segment 30 83 -1.54*** 0.10 -15.96 <0.0001 
Segment 31 102 -1.33*** 0.10 -12.96 <0.0001 
Segment 32 7 -1.37** 0.40 -3.41 <0.05 
Segment 33 64 -1.29*** 0.11 -12.25 <0.0001 
Segment 34 163 -1.36*** 0.07 -18.81 <0.0001 
Segment 35 183 -1.37*** 0.08 -17.58 <0.0001 
Segment 36 198 -1.34*** 0.06 -21.06 <0.0001 
Segment 37 346 -1.33*** 0.05 -26.05 <0.0001 
Segment 38 971 -1.33*** 0.03 -42.88 <0.0001 
Segment 39 65 -1.09*** 0.12 -8.97 <0.0001 
Segment 40 14 -1.30*** 0.28 -4.64 <0.001 
Segment 41 73 -1.41*** 0.12 -11.29 <0.0001 
Segment 42 73 -1.44*** 0.11 -12.63 <0.0001 
Segment 43 93 -1.32*** 0.10 -13.58 <0.0001 
Segment 44 41 -1.36*** 0.13 -10.59 <0.0001 
Segment 45 19 -1.24*** 0.18 -6.97 <0.0001 
Segment 46 5 -1.45** 0.40 -3.60 <0.05 
Segment 47 3 -1.90** 0.49 -3.88 <0.05 
                               * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.19. The loser regret iβ estimates across bidder’s segments 
Bidders Segment Segment Size Estimate STE t-stat p-value 
Segment 1 215 -1.29*** 0.07 -18.31 <0.0001 
Segment 2 23 -1.15*** 0.28 -4.12 <0.001 
Segment 3 89 -1.21*** 0.09 -13.11 <0.0001 
Segment 4 963 -1.36*** 0.03 -43.41 <0.0001 
Segment 5 153 -1.32*** 0.08 -16.87 <0.0001 
Segment 6 466 -1.33*** 0.05 -29.32 <0.0001 
Segment 7 90 -1.27*** 0.10 -12.46 <0.0001 
Segment 8 992 -1.34*** 0.03 -43.52 <0.0001 
Segment 9 535 -1.26*** 0.04 -29.25 <0.0001 
Segment 10 284 -1.29*** 0.06 -21.81 <0.0001 
Segment 11 42 -1.14*** 0.14 -8.35 <0.0001 
Segment 12 83 -1.38*** 0.11 -12.98 <0.0001 
Segment 13 12 -1.37*** 0.32 -4.30 <0.01 
Segment 14 52 -1.50*** 0.13 -11.52 <0.0001 
Segment 15 113 -1.40*** 0.10 -14.72 <0.0001 
Segment 16 466 -1.29*** 0.05 -28.33 <0.0001 
Segment 17 522 -1.39*** 0.04 -31.98 <0.0001 
Segment 18 589 -1.39*** 0.04 -34.08 <0.0001 
Segment 19 310 -1.25*** 0.06 -22.04 <0.0001 
Segment 20 395 -1.38*** 0.05 -30.21 <0.0001 
Segment 21 403 -1.25*** 0.05 -27.67 <0.0001 
Segment 22 530 -1.27*** 0.04 -30.60 <0.0001 
Segment 23 49 -1.19*** 0.15 -8.13 <0.0001 
Segment 24 481 -1.34*** 0.04 -33.17 <0.0001 
Segment 25 142 -1.34*** 0.09 -15.08 <0.0001 
Segment 26 871 -1.34*** 0.03 -39.38 <0.0001 
Segment 27 242 -1.25*** 0.06 -20.25 <0.0001 
Segment 28 569 -1.29*** 0.04 -30.67 <0.0001 
Segment 29 62 -1.55*** 0.11 -14.03 <0.0001 
Segment 30 83 -1.40*** 0.12 -11.81 <0.0001 
Segment 31 102 -1.32*** 0.09 -14.93 <0.0001 
Segment 32 7 -1.98*** 0.50 -3.93 <0.01 
Segment 33 64 -1.29*** 0.13 -10.21 <0.0001 
Segment 34 163 -1.27*** 0.08 -16.42 <0.0001 
Segment 35 183 -1.32*** 0.07 -17.79 <0.0001 
Segment 36 198 -1.35*** 0.07 -18.79 <0.0001 
Segment 37 346 -1.30*** 0.05 -23.93 <0.0001 
Segment 38 971 -1.35*** 0.03 -44.24 <0.0001 
Segment 39 65 -1.18*** 0.11 -10.54 <0.0001 
Segment 40 14 -1.98*** 0.24 -8.34 <0.0001 
Segment 41 73 -1.29*** 0.13 -10.03 <0.0001 
Segment 42 73 -1.30*** 0.09 -14.57 <0.0001 
Segment 43 93 -1.50*** 0.10 -15.09 <0.0001 
Segment 44 41 -1.08*** 0.14 -7.86 <0.0001 
Segment 45 19 -1.42*** 0.18 -7.77 <0.0001 
Segment 46 5 -1.33*** 0.17 -7.59 <0.001 
Segment 47 3 -1.73** 0.50 -3.46 <0.05 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.20. The update of valuation parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across bidder’s 
segments 
Bidders Segment Segment Size Valuation  revelation iδ  STE ( iδ ) Learning iρ  STE ( iρ ) 
Segment 1 215 1.27*** 0.06 0.28*** 0.07 
Segment 2 23 1.53*** 0.19 0.53** 0.23 
Segment 3 89 1.22*** 0.07 0.22** 0.11 
Segment 4 963 1.22*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.03 
Segment 5 153 1.28*** 0.06 0.11 0.08 
Segment 6 466 1.26*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.05 
Segment 7 90 1.16*** 0.09 0.20* 0.11 
Segment 8 992 1.29*** 0.03 0.25*** 0.03 
Segment 9 535 1.16*** 0.03 0.20*** 0.04 
Segment 10 284 1.29*** 0.05 0.26*** 0.06 
Segment 11 42 1.38*** 0.16 0.27* 0.15 
Segment 12 83 1.35*** 0.08 0.15 0.10 
Segment 13 12 1.21*** 0.22 0.38* 0.21 
Segment 14 52 1.04*** 0.11 0.49*** 0.14 
Segment 15 113 1.23*** 0.07 0.23** 0.09 
Segment 16 466 1.24*** 0.04 0.33*** 0.05 
Segment 17 522 1.29*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.04 
Segment 18 589 1.22*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.04 
Segment 19 310 1.26*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.05 
Segment 20 395 1.30*** 0.04 0.29*** 0.05 
Segment 21 403 1.23*** 0.04 0.32*** 0.05 
Segment 22 530 1.22*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.04 
Segment 23 49 1.31*** 0.12 0.26* 0.14 
Segment 24 481 1.27*** 0.04 0.19*** 0.04 
Segment 25 142 1.22*** 0.06 0.33*** 0.08 
Segment 26 871 1.28*** 0.03 0.26*** 0.03 
Segment 27 242 1.23*** 0.06 0.23*** 0.06 
Segment 28 569 1.28*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.04 
Segment 29 62 1.07*** 0.09 0.00 0.12 
Segment 30 83 1.40*** 0.09 0.27** 0.11 
Segment 31 102 1.28*** 0.07 0.22** 0.09 
Segment 32 7 0.85** 0.27 0.20 0.47 
Segment 33 64 1.25*** 0.10 0.14 0.13 
Segment 34 163 1.15*** 0.07 0.22*** 0.07 
Segment 35 183 1.18*** 0.06 0.11 0.07 
Segment 36 198 1.33*** 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Segment 37 346 1.35*** 0.04 0.27*** 0.05 
Segment 38 971 1.24*** 0.03 0.25*** 0.03 
Segment 39 65 1.29*** 0.09 0.25** 0.12 
Segment 40 14 1.24*** 0.17 0.32 0.30 
Segment 41 73 1.27*** 0.10 0.27** 0.12 
Segment 42 73 1.42*** 0.09 0.15 0.12 
Segment 43 93 1.34*** 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Segment 44 41 1.51*** 0.14 0.42** 0.17 
Segment 45 19 1.13*** 0.19 0.05 0.18 
Segment 46 5 1.89** 0.54 1.33** 0.49 
Segment 47 3 1.20* 0.40 0.55 0.78 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.21. The growth of bids and their drift parameters, iτ  and iγ , and the rush of bidders at 
the end of auction rate and average entrance rate in each period, jη  and jι , estimates across 
auction segments 
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1 15 2.28*** 0.20 5.47*** 0.36 1.27*** 0.28 1.88*** 0.25 
2 13 1.93*** 0.23 5.15*** 0.33 1.16*** 0.20 1.93*** 0.32 
3 47 1.73*** 0.15 5.32*** 0.14 1.22*** 0.12 2.07*** 0.16 
4 14 1.84*** 0.28 5.43*** 0.27 0.96*** 0.27 1.39*** 0.28 
5 15 1.89*** 0.37 5.46*** 0.21 0.92*** 0.30 2.01*** 0.30 
6 10 1.74*** 0.49 5.50*** 0.21 1.13* 0.53 2.75*** 0.37 
7 455 1.67*** 0.04 5.54*** 0.05 0.96*** 0.04 2.03*** 0.05 
8 20 1.89*** 0.40 5.29*** 0.28 1.23*** 0.37 2.13*** 0.37 
9 11 2.25*** 0.67 5.78*** 0.43 1.35* 0.74 2.45*** 0.72 
10 28 2.15*** 0.33 5.82*** 0.29 1.29*** 0.34 2.53*** 0.32 
11 6 3.82** 1.34 6.34*** 0.91 2.48  1.57 3.82** 1.34 
12 215 1.68*** 0.08 5.59*** 0.08 1.10*** 0.07 2.16*** 0.09 
13 33 2.08*** 0.37 5.39*** 0.29 1.76*** 0.38 2.43*** 0.35 
14 15 2.39** 0.84 6.49*** 0.57 2.22** 0.84 2.66*** 0.81 
15 40 2.05*** 0.36 5.91*** 0.27 1.53*** 0.36 1.95*** 0.37 
16 12 2.89** 1.16 6.33*** 0.90 2.08  1.22 3.18** 1.15 
17 49 1.84*** 0.33 5.68*** 0.28 1.40*** 0.34 2.29*** 0.34 
18 16 3.10*** 1.00 7.17*** 0.74 2.43** 1.04 2.87** 1.00 
19 38 2.15*** 0.47 5.73*** 0.38 1.53*** 0.48 2.28*** 0.47 
20 23 2.34*** 0.81 6.12*** 0.64 1.76** 0.83 2.64*** 0.80 
21 30 2.43*** 0.66 6.05*** 0.54 1.62** 0.67 2.77*** 0.66 
22 25 2.49*** 0.82 6.29*** 0.66 1.73** 0.84 2.82*** 0.80 
23 30 2.36*** 0.72 6.09*** 0.61 1.51** 0.74 2.64*** 0.71 
24 13 3.31* 1.67 6.70*** 1.40 2.78  1.71 3.48* 1.65 
25 20 2.72** 1.15 6.31*** 0.98 2.43* 1.17 2.72** 1.16 
26 25 2.77*** 0.96 6.20*** 0.83 2.03* 0.99 2.81*** 0.97 
27 39 2.49*** 0.65 5.87*** 0.58 1.57** 0.67 2.55*** 0.65 
28 20 3.06** 1.29 6.66*** 1.11 2.08  1.33 3.57** 1.28 
29 31 2.49*** 0.89 6.24*** 0.76 2.06** 0.89 2.99*** 0.87 
30 24 2.78** 1.17 6.60*** 1.01 2.23* 1.19 2.90** 1.18 
31 17 3.54** 1.67 7.20*** 1.46 2.94  1.71 3.72** 1.66 
32 9 5.32  3.16 8.36** 2.81 4.31  3.27 5.30  3.16 
33 14 3.66  2.19 7.64*** 1.89 3.18  2.21 3.68  2.19 
34 39 2.43*** 0.83 6.13*** 0.74 1.76** 0.85 2.82*** 0.82 
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35 21 3.29** 1.56 7.06*** 1.38 2.55  1.59 3.50** 1.54 
36 24 2.97** 1.42 6.93*** 1.25 2.19  1.44 3.23** 1.41 
37 9 5.70  3.70 8.99** 3.31 5.46  3.72 6.31  3.63 
38 31 3.06** 1.16 6.85*** 1.04 2.28* 1.18 2.98** 1.16 
39 11 5.00  3.25 8.59** 2.91 4.54  3.30 5.02  3.25 
40 8 6.52  4.48 9.71** 4.06 5.84  4.57 6.91  4.43 
41 18 3.85* 2.13 7.66*** 1.92 3.17  2.17 4.05* 2.12 
42 17 4.05* 2.32 7.94*** 2.07 3.51  2.34 4.17* 2.30 
43 17 3.97  2.38 7.41*** 2.17 3.35  2.41 4.47* 2.35 
44 21 3.80* 1.97 7.38*** 1.80 3.03  2.00 4.39** 1.94 
45 18 4.16* 2.34 7.79*** 2.13 3.56  2.38 4.30* 2.34 
46 11 5.75  3.84 9.18** 3.52 5.05  3.91 6.19  3.81 
47 18 4.04  2.46 8.12*** 2.23 3.31  2.50 4.68* 2.43 
48 43 2.87** 1.07 6.28*** 0.99 1.90* 1.09 3.13*** 1.07 
49 12 5.69  3.78 8.96** 3.49 5.13  3.83 5.59  3.79 
50 6 9.87  7.33 12.72  6.81 9.33  7.43 10.42  7.23 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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 Table 2.D.22. The winner regret iα and the loser regret iβ estimates across auction categories 
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Jewelry and Watches 1550 
-1.30*** 0.02 -52.40 <0.0001 -1.31*** 
0.03 -51.92 <0.0001 
Collectibles 859 
-1.27*** 0.04 -36.14 <0.0001 -1.33*** 
0.03 -39.61 <0.0001 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 453 
-1.28*** 0.04 -30.07 <0.0001 -1.31*** 
0.05 -28.91 <0.0001 
Crafts 558 
-1.31*** 0.04 -29.89 <0.0001 -1.38*** 
0.04 -34.35 <0.0001 
Pottery and Glass 607 
-1.29*** 0.04 -32.21 <0.0001 -1.27*** 
0.04 -32.27 <0.0001 
Antiques 546 
-1.37*** 0.04 -32.08 <0.0001 -1.34*** 
0.04 -33.99 <0.0001 
Toys and Hobbies 744 
-1.31*** 0.03 -38.17 <0.0001 -1.32*** 
0.04 -36.28 <0.0001 
Stamps 651 
-1.36*** 0.04 -36.26 <0.0001 -1.32*** 
0.04 -34.17 <0.0001 
Books 482 
-1.32*** 0.04 -29.72 <0.0001 -1.25*** 
0.04 -29.83 <0.0001 
Tickets and Experiences 489 
-1.37*** 0.04 -31.65 <0.0001 -1.37*** 
0.04 -30.73 <0.0001 
Art 456 
-1.29*** 0.05 -26.94 <0.0001 -1.32*** 
0.05 -28.36 <0.0001 
Gift Cards and Coupons 522 
-1.34*** 0.04 -29.96 <0.0001 -1.34*** 
0.04 -30.39 <0.0001 
Music 585 
-1.36*** 0.04 -34.28 <0.0001 -1.35*** 
0.04 -36.23 <0.0001 
Consumer Electronics 734 
-1.35*** 0.03 -39.15 <0.0001 -1.35*** 
0.04 -35.97 <0.0001 
DVDs and Movies 602 
-1.36*** 0.04 -33.58 <0.0001 -1.32*** 
0.04 -34.18 <0.0001 
Dolls and Bears 679 
-1.30*** 0.04 -32.33 <0.0001 -1.31*** 
0.04 -35.22 <0.0001 
Entertainment 
Memorabilia 506 
-1.34*** 0.04 -32.42 <0.0001 -1.36*** 
0.04 -31.30 <0.0001 
Health and Beauty 541 
-1.37*** 0.04 -34.49 <0.0001 -1.30*** 
0.04 -30.04 <0.0001 
Video Games and 
Consoles 682 
-1.35*** 0.04 -37.11 <0.0001 -1.32*** 
0.04 -35.68 <0.0001 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.23. The update of valuation parameters iδ  and learning parameter iρ estimates across 
bidder’s segments 
Bidders segment 
number 
of 
bidders 
Learning value 
from bid 
parameter ( iρ ) 
STE 
 ( iρ ) 
Valuation 
revelation 
parameter ( iδ ) 
STE 
 ( iδ ) 
Jewelry and Watches 1550 1.24*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.02 
Collectibles 859 1.20*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.03 
Clothing, Shoes and   
Accessories 453 1.28*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.04 
Crafts 558 1.21*** 0.03 0.21*** 0.04 
Pottery and Glass 607 1.28*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.04 
Antiques 546 1.26*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.04 
Toys and Hobbies 744 1.29*** 0.03 0.28*** 0.04 
Stamps 651 1.27*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.04 
Books 482 1.20*** 0.04 0.33*** 0.04 
Tickets and Experiences 489 1.25*** 0.04 0.20*** 0.04 
Art 456 1.28*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.04 
Gift Cards and Coupons 522 1.24*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.04 
Music 585 1.27*** 0.03 0.26*** 0.04 
Consumer Electronics 734 1.28*** 0.03 0.27*** 0.04 
DVDs and Movies 602 1.27*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.04 
Dolls and Bears 679 1.29*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.04 
Entertainment Memorabilia 506 1.21*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.04 
Health and Beauty 541 1.30*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.04 
Video Games and Consoles 682 1.26*** 0.03 0.21*** 0.04 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.D.24. The growth of bids and their drift parameters, iτ  and iγ , and the rush of bidders at 
the end of auction rate and average entrance rate in each period, jη  and jι , estimates across 
auction segments 
Auction Cluster 
Auction 
Cluster 
Size 
growth of bids 
( iτ ) 
STE 
( iτ ) 
Drift of 
bids  
( iγ ) 
STE 
 ( iγ ) 
Last 
minute 
flood 
 ( jη ) 
STE 
(
jη ) 
Mean 
entrance 
rate 
 ( jι ) 
STE 
( jι ) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jewelry and Watches 150 1.62*** 0.07 5.47*** 0.08 0.93*** 0.06 1.99*** 0.08 
Collectibles 104 1.79*** 0.09 5.24*** 0.10 1.03*** 0.08 1.99*** 0.10 
Clothing, Shoes and      
Accessories 85 1.62*** 0.10 5.46*** 0.12 1.07*** 0.09 1.94*** 0.11 
Crafts 79 1.84*** 0.10 5.58*** 0.12 0.99*** 0.08 2.10*** 0.13 
Pottery and Glass 75 1.78*** 0.12 5.40*** 0.10 1.01*** 0.10 2.09*** 0.12 
Antiques 69 1.77*** 0.11 5.40*** 0.12 1.05*** 0.11 1.92*** 0.12 
Toys and Hobbies 94 1.70*** 0.11 5.55*** 0.10 1.05*** 0.09 1.95*** 0.14 
Stamps 73 1.77*** 0.14 5.63*** 0.11 1.07*** 0.12 2.13*** 0.14 
Books 85 1.61*** 0.12 5.75*** 0.12 1.02*** 0.12 2.08*** 0.13 
Tickets and Experiences 92 1.64*** 0.13 5.60*** 0.12 1.17*** 0.12 1.92*** 0.15 
Art 71 1.87*** 0.17 5.54*** 0.15 1.05*** 0.16 2.05*** 0.17 
Gift Cards and Coupons 86 2.03*** 0.15 5.63*** 0.13 1.21*** 0.15 2.00*** 0.16 
Music 87 1.65*** 0.16 5.53*** 0.14 1.07*** 0.16 2.20*** 0.16 
Consumer Electronics 84 1.84*** 0.17 5.50*** 0.15 1.04*** 0.17 2.27*** 0.18 
DVDs and Movies 88 1.80*** 0.18 5.68*** 0.14 1.24*** 0.18 2.31*** 0.18 
Dolls and Bears 85 1.92*** 0.20 5.65*** 0.17 1.23*** 0.19 2.27*** 0.20 
Entertainment Memorabilia 89 1.87*** 0.20 5.82*** 0.17 1.24*** 0.19 2.15*** 0.20 
Health and Beauty 75 2.00*** 0.24 5.73*** 0.20 1.33*** 0.24 1.93*** 0.25 
Video Games and  consoles 94 1.83*** 0.21 5.81*** 0.17 1.12*** 0.21 2.24*** 0.21 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Figure 2.D.2. Histogram of regret and valuation evolution parameters across bidder segments 
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 Figure 2.D.3. Counterfactual analysis of shutting down winner regret (blue line the 
optimal bidding when regret is shut down, and red line the observed) 
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Figure 2.D.4. Histogram of winner regret parameter distribution across item categories 
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Figure 2.D.5. Histogram of loser regret parameter distribution across item categories 
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Figure 2.D.6. Histogram of distribution of learning parameter distribution across item categories 
229 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.D.7. Histogram of valuation revalation parameter distribution across item categories 
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2.D.3.   K-MEANs BIDDER CLUSTERS 
Table 2.D.25. Bidder’s segment profile (based on k-means approach) 
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1 252 319 695 4 2 33 75 18 54 70 7 1 0 
2 940 654 242 5 1 189 55 88 25 26 3 2 0 
3 185 233 389 14 4 215 174 48 42 13 9 2 0 
4 27 728 623 15 14 3660 696 876 325 18 28 3 1 
5 51 1539 1578 1 1 2218 543 1643 287 5 14 2 1 
6 542 573 678 2 2 93 93 50 51 6 6 4 0 
7 384 402 709 3 2 43 94 20 44 65 13 2 0 
8 128 101 157 23 4 97 191 11 26 86 14 1 1 
9 70 539 951 2 3 122 127 57 57 70 20 5 1 
10 77 2944 2913 2 2 1232 300 918 198 4 8 1 1 
11 89 660 1178 18 5 326 277 73 69 14 13 5 1 
12 170 346 746 11 3 152 153 41 43 15 9 1 0 
13 156 281 611 28 5 295 249 56 54 22 13 1 0 
14 994 533 662 2 1 83 79 44 41 6 5 3 0 
15 389 258 432 3 2 27 54 14 28 34 5 1 0 
16 102 203 480 42 7 143 184 17 39 72 22 1 1 
17 428 849 987 2 2 145 168 83 98 6 8 5 1 
18 569 274 378 2 1 30 48 16 24 19 4 1 0 
19 66 862 994 2 2 1341 455 638 237 6 13 4 1 
20 3 63923 4161 2 0 2033 492 1631 332 0 0 8 1 
21 283 749 930 2 2 345 132 189 76 3 4 2 0 
22 1024 207 462 2 1 21 85 8 25 99 2 1 0 
23 18 4219 3906 1 1 6547 796 5777 810 0 0 0 1 
24 24 1610 1138 12 12 7469 2529 1533 583 9 21 2 1 
25 245 334 372 3 3 71 116 37 69 34 9 3 0 
26 102 384 449 19 7 1483 455 240 111 9 13 2 1 
27 354 305 500 2 2 29 68 17 43 51 4 1 0 
28 534 331 475 2 2 25 27 13 13 15 4 2 0 
29 112 6040 1989 2 2 135 137 91 88 9 13 1 0 
30 337 342 545 2 2 24 41 13 20 33 7 2 0 
31 170 748 811 2 2 539 217 296 121 3 5 3 0 
32 91 357 762 48 6 781 584 105 125 16 12 2 1 
33 959 345 495 1 1 49 41 26 21 5 3 1 0 
34 910 441 594 2 1 71 55 38 29 4 3 2 0 
35 217 579 741 2 2 496 161 268 78 3 6 1 0 
36 8 118039 13206 2 1 1973 810 1517 624 1 2 7 3 
37 145 185 417 16 4 65 86 13 19 49 12 2 1 
38 358 931 1016 2 1 220 80 132 43 3 5 1 0 
39 7 35175 8251 3 1 103 76 74 55 20 32 2 1 
40 29 16632 2988 2 2 240 316 164 191 17 32 2 1 
41 28 477 786 2 2 1330 580 805 278 82 18 1 0 
42 21 5739 6559 2 2 3898 631 3013 368 1 2 3 3 
43 91 606 1181 35 7 357 244 58 51 25 18 4 1 
44 205 1030 1122 2 2 848 254 447 142 7 12 1 0 
45 73 5572 2184 1 1 180 176 128 130 7 11 3 1 
46 238 133 349 9 3 62 165 13 37 94 8 1 0 
47 41 161 182 71 10 908 1084 79 86 36 30 2 1 
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APPENDIX 3.A: CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ESTIMATION OF THE 
GAMIFICTION CHOICE MODEL 
Conditional distributions of the choice variable include the following: 
Iicbdgbdgrnkrnk
repcreprcvconty
iiititiwiw
iwiwitit
j
iti
...1,,,,,
,,,,,|
1111
1111
=Σ∆
Λ
−−−−
−−−−
µ
         (A1) 
 where this conditional distribution can be estimated by random walk metropolis hasting on the 
weighted likelihood.  
    The priors for normal mixture distribution of the individual and the category specific 
parameters used are: 
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where the first conditional is the standard posterior Polya Urn representation for the mean and 
variance of individual specific random coefficient choice model parameters. *),( ii Σµ  denotes a 
set of unique ),( ii Σµ , which the DP process hyper-parameters depend  only on (a posteriori). 
Given the )*},{( ii Σµ set
dα and based measure parameters (i.e. ϑ,, va ) are independent, a 
posteriori. The conditional posterior of the 0G hyper-parameters (i.e. ϑ,, va ), factors into two 
parts as a  is independent of ϑ,v  given )*},{( ii Σµ . The form of this conditional posterior is: 
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where .,.)|(.φ  denotes the multivariate normal density. .,.)|(.IW  denotes Inverted-Wishart 
distribution. Finally, for Polya representation implementation the following conditional 
distribution is used: 
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I assessed the prior hyperparameters to provide proper but diffuse distributions, defined formally 
by:  
 4,0.1,3,0.1,2,0.01 ====== vvaa sr
wvsr ϑϑ      (C5) 
Finally to complete the exposition, the posterior for the partition (segment) parameters has the 
following form: 
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APPENDIX 3.B: EXTRA TABLES FOR THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
Table 3.B.1. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (10K sample size with model 
that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 50.881 160.168 50.144 53.493 
States: 
    
    Previous contribution 
-0.004 0.042 -0.097 0.095 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.065 0.201 -0.489 0.256 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.101 0.190 -0.335 0.455 
    Reputation 
-6.340 18.781 -7.643 -4.691 
    Rank 
-0.053 0.419 -0.926 0.797 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.198 0.826 -1.074 0.350 
    Silver Bade 
-0.084 0.443 -0.973 0.526 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.002 0.370 -0.711 0.679 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.014 0.197 -0.387 0.344 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.015 0.157 -0.317 0.284 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.010 0.125 -0.252 0.235 
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Table 3.B.2. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect  
(10K sample size with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 9711 60 97% 1% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 864 902 9% 9% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 450 1250 5% 13% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 1124 565 11% 6% 
    Reputation 60 9706 1% 97% 
    Rank 552 860 6% 9% 
    Rank Change 1316 1407 13% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 33 318 0% 3% 
    Silver Bade 69 91 1% 1% 
    Bronze Badge 208 201 2% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 300 298 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 837 945 8% 9% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 968 986 10% 10% 
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Table 3.B.3. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (5K sample size with model that 
explains parameters with all variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.405 0.938 -2.826 0.830 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.008 0.065 -0.100 0.101 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.085 0.370 -0.429 0.217 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.111 0.198 -0.318 0.455 
    Reputation 
-0.441 0.874 -1.706 1.014 
    Rank 
-0.032 0.374 -0.805 0.750 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 0.078 1.237 -1.291 1.955 
    Silver Bade 
-0.155 0.519 -0.818 0.566 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.011 0.615 -0.862 1.174 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.040 0.269 -0.388 0.460 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.011 0.187 -0.290 0.277 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.010 0.152 -0.237 0.217 
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Table 3.B. 4. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect  
(5K sample size with model that explains parameters with all variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 94 725 2% 15% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 428 498 9% 10% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 205 624 4% 12% 
Leader Board:   
  
 
    Cum Reputation 541 261 11% 5% 
    Reputation 167 362 3% 7% 
    Rank 308 360 6% 7% 
    Rank Change 665 716 13% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 643 569 13% 11% 
    Silver Bade 53 58 1% 1% 
    Bronze Badge 147 92 3% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 158 163 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 429 468 9% 9% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 491 476 10% 10% 
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Table 3.B.5. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (5K sample size with model that 
explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.094 0.818 -1.414 2.455 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.010 0.079 -0.107 0.110 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.089 0.449 -0.481 0.232 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.111 0.193 -0.312 0.444 
    Reputation 
-0.447 0.622 -1.478 0.940 
    Rank 
-0.023 0.362 -0.803 0.735 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.089 0.641 -1.730 0.844 
    Silver Bade 
-0.045 0.312 -0.592 0.446 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.049 0.390 -0.833 1.005 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.022 0.230 -0.418 0.451 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.012 0.189 -0.294 0.279 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.011 0.152 -0.249 0.222 
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     Table 3.B.6. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect 
(5K sample size with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 356 536 7% 11% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 427 513 9% 10% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 208 622 4% 12% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 532 251 11% 5% 
    Reputation 147 390 3% 8% 
    Rank 301 363 6% 7% 
    Rank Change 684 707 14% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 116 310 2% 6% 
    Silver Bade 49 54 1% 1% 
    Bronze Badge 144 92 3% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 154 164 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 412 459 8% 9% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 490 478 10% 10% 
 
  
  
239 
 
 
Table 3.B.7.PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for k-mean stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.003 2.045 -3.356 2.772 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.034 0.089 -0.236 0.165 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.031 0.213 -0.557 0.403 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.095 0.233 -0.384 0.540 
    Reputation 
-0.271 0.869 -1.937 1.391 
    Rank 0.004 0.386 -0.818 0.834 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.004 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.134 1.138 -2.132 2.822 
    Silver Bade 
-0.448 1.019 -1.756 1.265 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.193 2.120 -5.708 0.877 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.021 0.494 -0.584 0.432 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.020 0.170 -0.394 0.330 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.011 0.188 -0.288 0.330 
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Table 3.B.8. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for k-mean stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 215 284 4% 6% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 97 134 10% 13% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 62 121 6% 12% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 122 73 12% 7% 
    Reputation 78 106 8% 11% 
    Rank 66 68 7% 7% 
    Rank Change 122 123 12% 12% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 128 213 13% 21% 
    Silver Bade 26 98 3% 10% 
    Bronze Badge 28 57 3% 6% 
    Cum Gold Badge 39 34 4% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 77 98 8% 10% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 126 96 13% 10% 
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Table 3.B.9. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for LDA stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 14.635 2.287 12.119 19.938 
Times:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.015 0.079 -0.174 0.174 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.110 0.208 -0.613 0.272 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.069 0.183 -0.318 0.435 
    Reputation 
-1.989 0.847 -3.334 -0.197 
    Rank 
-0.092 0.357 -0.853 0.654 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.314 1.366 -2.758 2.276 
    Silver Bade 
-0.136 1.076 -2.265 1.370 
    Bronze Badge 0.047 0.535 -1.181 1.053 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.044 0.262 -0.472 0.526 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.034 0.178 -0.413 0.329 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.017 0.137 -0.266 0.236 
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Table 3.B.10. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for LDA stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 1000 0 20% 0% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 114 116 11% 12% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 42 156 4% 16% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 99 49 10% 5% 
    Reputation 5 936 1% 94% 
    Rank 60 81 6% 8% 
    Rank Change 128 145 13% 15% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 162 320 16% 32% 
    Silver Bade 46 69 5% 7% 
    Bronze Badge 25 19 3% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 38 32 4% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 84 114 8% 11% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 94 93 9% 9% 
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Table 3.B.11. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for Uniform stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.260 1.280 -2.227 3.432 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.027 0.080 -0.177 0.153 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.109 0.272 -0.690 0.318 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.091 0.182 -0.319 0.424 
    Reputation 
-0.083 1.060 -1.772 1.937 
    Rank 
-0.073 0.415 -0.995 0.863 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.004 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.351 1.971 -3.725 2.775 
    Silver Bade 
-0.533 1.056 -2.180 1.218 
    Bronze Badge 0.060 0.892 -1.307 1.414 
    Cum Gold Badge 
-0.015 0.275 -0.503 0.580 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.027 0.163 -0.313 0.271 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.003 0.150 -0.288 0.305 
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     Table 3.B.12. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for Uniform stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 82 89 2% 2% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 93 118 9% 12% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 52 152 5% 15% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 100 52 10% 5% 
    Reputation 126 103 13% 10% 
    Rank 69 92 7% 9% 
    Rank Change 137 139 14% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 158 323 16% 32% 
    Silver Bade 14 145 1% 15% 
    Bronze Badge 21 23 2% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 49 45 5% 5% 
    Cum Silver Badge 82 98 8% 10% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 133 111 13% 11% 
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Table 3.B.13. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for mixed-normal 
stratified sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 0.065 1.353 -2.403 3.649 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.023 0.076 -0.153 0.103 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.055 0.279 -0.437 0.237 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.119 0.206 -0.294 0.506 
    Reputation 
-0.456 0.621 -1.603 0.814 
    Rank 
-0.048 0.282 -0.676 0.494 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.005 -0.006 0.004 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.085 0.933 -1.858 2.451 
    Silver Bade 
-0.108 0.895 -2.220 1.019 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.029 0.607 -0.800 0.798 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.019 0.319 -0.445 0.397 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.007 0.196 -0.321 0.339 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.023 0.149 -0.312 0.259 
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     Table 3.B.14. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for mixed-normal 
stratified sample with model that explains parameters with fixed variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 195 137 4% 3% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 88 105 9% 11% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 41 124 4% 12% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 114 44 11% 4% 
    Reputation 31 152 3% 15% 
    Rank 44 58 4% 6% 
    Rank Change 121 125 12% 13% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 81 108 8% 11% 
    Silver Bade 25 42 3% 4% 
    Bronze Badge 25 21 3% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 40 38 4% 4% 
    Cum Silver Badge 97 83 10% 8% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 108 109 11% 11% 
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Table 3.B.15. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for mixed-normal 
stratified sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.294 1.505 -3.123 2.165 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.037 0.103 -0.195 0.143 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.119 0.498 -0.927 0.356 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.134 0.273 -0.373 0.533 
    Reputation 
-0.579 1.416 -2.484 2.422 
    Rank 0.031 0.583 -1.019 1.080 
    Rank Change 
-0.001 0.026 -0.005 0.005 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 0.046 1.667 -5.272 1.733 
    Silver Bade 
-0.094 1.547 -2.989 3.156 
    Bronze Badge 0.115 1.429 -1.215 1.436 
    Cum Gold Badge 
-0.025 0.176 -0.398 0.300 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.019 0.182 -0.399 0.324 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.006 0.160 -0.320 0.329 
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Table 3.B.16. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for mixed-normal 
stratified sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 155 288 3% 6% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 92 145 9% 15% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 57 135 6% 14% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 131 57 13% 6% 
    Reputation 78 220 8% 22% 
    Rank 85 88 9% 9% 
    Rank Change 134 157 13% 16% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 135 89 14% 9% 
    Silver Bade 122 129 12% 13% 
    Bronze Badge 32 27 3% 3% 
    Cum Gold Badge 24 20 2% 2% 
    Cum Silver Badge 73 115 7% 12% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 129 80 13% 8% 
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Table 3.B.17. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for k-mean stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 
-0.419 1.661 -4.120 2.602 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.024 0.150 -0.199 0.147 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.168 0.397 -0.734 0.286 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.118 0.199 -0.330 0.472 
    Reputation 
-0.419 0.893 -2.209 1.093 
    Rank 
-0.049 0.376 -0.777 0.742 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.008 -0.006 0.004 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.131 1.950 -3.361 3.930 
    Silver Bade 0.052 1.412 -2.208 1.787 
    Bronze Badge 0.068 0.847 -1.282 1.994 
    Cum Gold Badge 
-0.021 0.727 -0.440 0.546 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.021 0.216 -0.364 0.317 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.006 0.167 -0.266 0.274 
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Table 3.B.18. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for k-mean stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 202 380 4% 8% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 99 109 10% 11% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 48 135 5% 14% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 114 53 11% 5% 
    Reputation 56 218 6% 22% 
    Rank 70 72 7% 7% 
    Rank Change 141 140 14% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 222 292 22% 29% 
    Silver Bade 131 75 13% 8% 
    Bronze Badge 52 32 5% 3% 
    Cum Gold Badge 47 36 5% 4% 
    Cum Silver Badge 97 82 10% 8% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 103 84 10% 8% 
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Table 3.B.19. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for LDA stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 13.886 2.334 9.135 17.403 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.034 0.082 -0.197 0.134 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.104 0.249 -0.695 0.410 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.130 0.203 -0.287 0.522 
    Reputation 
-1.850 0.930 -3.612 -0.218 
    Rank 
-0.093 0.448 -1.088 0.860 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.005 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 
-0.874 1.402 -3.808 2.347 
    Silver Bade 0.034 1.194 -2.064 3.101 
    Bronze Badge 0.130 0.548 -0.800 1.268 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.000 0.289 -0.493 0.600 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.035 0.176 -0.403 0.364 
    Cum Bronze Badge -0.008 0.140 -0.289 0.280 
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Table 3.B.20.PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for LDA stratified 
sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant % positive % Negative 
Fixed Effect 997 1 20% 0% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 82 107 8% 11% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 43 131 4% 13% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 115 39 12% 4% 
    Reputation 6 850 1% 85% 
    Rank 58 70 6% 7% 
    Rank Change 131 140 13% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 70 555 7% 56% 
    Silver Bade 163 144 16% 14% 
    Bronze Badge 39 16 4% 2% 
    Cum Gold Badge 33 30 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 89 94 9% 9% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 106 89 11% 9% 
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Table 3.B.21. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for 
Uniform stratified sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at 
Hierarchy) 
 
 Estimate Std. Dev. 2.5th  97.5th    
Fixed Effect 0.459 2.628 -4.001 4.872 
States:     
    Previous contribution 
-0.021 0.080 -0.190 0.156 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) -0.104 0.244 -0.662 0.294 
Leader Board:   
   
    Cum Reputation 0.124 0.203 -0.327 0.489 
    Reputation 
-0.651 1.382 -2.805 1.752 
    Rank 0.062 0.534 -0.922 0.892 
    Rank Change 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.004 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 0.012 2.723 -4.257 5.609 
    Silver Bade 
-0.167 1.287 -4.334 3.800 
    Bronze Badge 
-0.014 0.966 -2.003 1.228 
    Cum Gold Badge 0.051 0.211 -0.385 0.426 
    Cum Silver Badge 
-0.023 0.149 -0.325 0.269 
    Cum Bronze Badge 0.004 0.120 -0.230 0.274 
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Table 3.B.22. PARAMETER ESTIMATES: Individual Choice effect (1K size for 
Uniform stratified sample with model that explains parameters with full variables at 
Hierarchy) 
 
 
Positive 
Significant 
Negative 
Significant 
% 
positive 
% 
Negative 
Fixed Effect 358 155 7% 3% 
States:     
    Previous contribution 85 119 9% 12% 
    Reciprocity (contribution received) 44 132 4% 13% 
Leader Board:   
 
 
 
    Cum Reputation 120 48 12% 5% 
    Reputation 76 243 8% 24% 
    Rank 72 70 7% 7% 
    Rank Change 135 140 14% 14% 
Badges         
    Gold Badge 257 332 26% 33% 
    Silver Bade 53 91 5% 9% 
    Bronze Badge 47 57 5% 6% 
    Cum Gold Badge 34 34 3% 3% 
    Cum Silver Badge 69 95 7% 10% 
    Cum Bronze Badge 112 84 11% 8% 
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